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SUMMARY
Delusions have been defined as false beliefs different from those that almost 
everyone believes. However, studies suggest that beliefs (including delusions) 
comprise a continuum where content does not distinguish psychosis.
Despite the explicit characterisation of delusions as (false) beliefs, most 
research has focused on delusions while neglecting non-clinical beliefs. To address 
this, the first formal study of key features of belief was conducted. A large public 
survey (n=1000) confirmed that most regarded beliefs as relatively stable personal 
convictions, capable of influencing thoughts and/or behaviour. These participants 
then completed the Cardiff Beliefs Questionnaire (CBQ), a newly developed 
measure designed to investigate the prevalence of different types of belief (delusion­
like [bizarre and non-bizarre], paranormal, religious, and societal/cultural). Results 
showed that 38% of participants strongly endorsed one or more delusion-like 
beliefs) (DLB), with 91% reporting at least one ‘weak’, ‘moderate’ or ‘strong’ 
DLB. Moreover, 26% strongly endorsed at least one bizarre DLB. Levels of DLB 
endorsement were not distinguishable from those of paranormal and religious beliefs 
(P&RB). These findings support a continuum account but present difficulties for 
existing clinical definitions of delusion.
The CBQ also investigates anomalous experiences (AE), given their 
proposed causal role in delusion formation. AE and anomalous beliefs (DLB and 
P&RB) were associated in this sample, but the relationship was not found for all 
individuals, suggesting that having AE is neither necessary nor sufficient for holding 
anomalous beliefs.
Finally, belief consistency and coherence were explored across and within 
different belief types. DLBs appeared less stable than other belief types, 
emphasising the importance of functional characteristics in distinguishing clinically 
relevant beliefs. In addition, while seemingly contradictory beliefs were reported by 
some, results generally supported coherence between DLB and P&RB. Collectively, 
these findings complement those of traditional clinical studies, while demonstrating 
the value of non-clinical investigations in elucidating the nature of delusions.
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CHAPTER 1 
BELIEF AND DELUSION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
“For those who believe, no proof is necessary. For those who don't 
believe, no proof is possible ” [Stuart Chase]
Individuals hold many different beliefs ranging from simple causal beliefs that act as 
explanations for the events of our everyday lives, to more complex social beliefs (e.g., 
religious or paranormal ideas) that often play a key role in identity formation. 
According to Damasio (2000, p.326), the main purpose of belief is to provide 
meaning and certainty “about matters that have to do with the idea we hold of 
ourselves”. Beliefs may be powerful because as social constructs they provide for a 
shared meaning of the world. Indeed some people have been willing to die and to kill 
for beliefs. Moreover, as the quote by Chase above suggests, beliefs can provide 
comfort, or elicit derision or (in the case of delusions) distress for both the individual 
and their family and friends.
Although Fodor (1981, p.93) claimed that many “theories in the cognitive 
sciences are largely about the belief organisms have”, the formal study of beliefs has 
received comparatively little interest within mainstream psychology, and even fewer 
attempts have been made to link research between interested clinical and theoretical 
disciplines such as psychiatry and philosophy. However, the recent study of delusions, 
when viewed through a cognitive neuropsychological approach (cognitive 
neuropsychiatry), has begun to offer a productive framework for understanding 
normal beliefs (Coltheart et al., 2007; Garety & Hemsley, 1994; Halligan & David, 
2001; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000). For many within psychiatry, delusions are
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considered to be pathological forms, or products, of belief processes (e.g., Bentall et 
al., 2001; Davies et al., 2001; Freeman, Garety & Kuipers, 2001; Langdon & 
Coltheart, 2000; Oltmanns & Maher, 1988; van Os, 2003). Furthermore, the link 
between beliefs and the study of delusions has been reinforced by the growing 
evidence of a continuum of beliefs where only a minority are of clinical relevance or 
provide for significant morbidity or disability (Blackwood et al., 2001; Claridge, 
1994; Crow, Done & Sacker, 1995; Johns & van Os, 2001; Rutten et al., 2008; 
Strauss, 1969; van Os et al., 2009). The fact that more people in the general 
population report beliefs that resemble delusions in both content, factor structure, 
demographic and risk factor associations than the clinical population (van Os et al., 
2009) suggests that the investigation of these non-clinical samples provides a rich and 
relatively untapped vein for future research.
In pursuing a number of these research questions related to the nature of belief 
and its pathology, this thesis assumes that most clinical delusions are beliefs and that 
beliefs are best understood from a dimensional or continuum approach 
(notwithstanding the understandable clinical requirement of categorical diagnostic 
boundaries). Given these framework assumptions, the main research questions 
explored in this thesis focus on four linked themes: (1) understanding and refining the 
characteristic features of the term ‘belief held by the general public; (2) establishing 
the prevalence of different types of beliefs (including delusion-like beliefs) and 
anomalous experiences (including hallucination-like experiences) in the general 
population; (3) exploring the relationship between beliefs and experiences; and finally 
(4) examining the neglected area relating to the consistency and coherence of 
delusion-like and other beliefs. (See Figure 1.1 for a road map of the main thesis 
research questions and cross links.)
2
Delusions form a continuum with 
other beliefs
H hat features are important in 
identifying a belief?
I
1. Key characteristics o f  belief 
as judged by general public
I
What differentiates ‘belief from 
other similar terms?
2. Use o f  assumed-to-be interchangeable 
terms (believe/think/feel)
To what extent do these properties 
hold for ordinary beliefs?
THE NATURE OF DELUSION AND  
DKLIJSION-LIKK BELIEF
ta
To what extent are beliefs 
with a similar content to 
delusions present in the 
general population ?
A *
Development o f  stigma 
reducing questionnaire, 
including ordinary beliefs I
i
13. Prevalence o f  delusion-like beliefs
I Does delusion-like belief have similar correlates/ characteristics to delusion?
Delusions defined as false beliefs different 
to those held by everyone else
low commonly reported are examples oj 
afferent types o f non-delusional beliefs?
A
4. Prevalence o f ‘ordinary’ beliefs 
(societal/cultural, paranormal and 
religious)
i
5. Relationships between delusion-like 
and ‘ordinary’ beliefs
6. Relationships between anomalous 
beliefs and anomalous experiences
7. Stability o f  different types o f  belief 
(e.g., delusion-like)
I
8. Coherence o f  different types o f  belief
Figure 1.1. Main research questions (purple boxes), related studies (blue boxes) and inter-connections (arrows), following from two influential accounts o f  delusions 
(white boxes: the continuum account [left] and DSM definition [right]). The thesis discusses the studies in the order indicated here.
This first chapter will describe the background behind and need to address these areas, 
beginning with a review of current philosophical ideas defining ‘belief. The second 
section will link belief and delusions, considering the psychiatric conceptualisation of 
delusion as a form of belief and outlining the importance of the continuum approach 
for investigating delusional beliefs.
1.2 WHAT IS MEANT BY A BELIEF?
Investigations of belief have been carried out in multiple subject areas, in 
particular within philosophy, psychology and psychiatry. Given the distinct motives 
driving each area of research, different aspects of the concept have been debated 
within each discipline. Within philosophy, a primary focus has been on identifying the 
defining characteristics of belief. Within psychology, work has begun to address the 
cognitive systems underlying belief (i.e., identifying those features that are necessary 
and/or sufficient for belief formation and its maintenance), as well as investigating the 
influence of belief on other cognitive processes. Finally, psychiatry has mainly 
focused on categorising and diagnosing pathological beliefs and investigating the 
prognostic outcome associated with these.
1.2.1 Philosophical concepts of belief
Despite the term ‘belief being used frequently and without apparent 
misunderstanding in everyday life, “there is no philosophical consensus about just 
what a belief actually is ” (McKay & Dennett, 2009). In 1739, the Scottish 
philosopher and advocate of empiricism David Hume stated that belief ‘has never yet 
been explain'd  by any philosopher ’ and over a quarter of a millennium later an agreed 
definition for this term remains elusive.
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Nevertheless, several attempts have been made to explain belief. The 
following criteria are those that commonly feature in discussions and definitions of 
belief (e.g., Borg, 2001; Campbell, 1967; Oxford English Dictionary; Price, 1934; 
Stephens & Graham, 2004; Williams, 1970):
Beliefs should: (1) be coherent, (a) within themselves and (b) as part o f a 
wider web o f  beliefs; (2) be supported by subjectively sufficient evidence (i.e., 
the holder has confidence about the belief ’s truth, while objective agreement is 
not necessary); (3) have an impact on (a) action and (b) emotion under 
relevant circumstances
Criterion (3) holds to some degree for all beliefs but fluctuates with the strength and 
significance of the belief, being particularly relevant for strong, personally significant 
beliefs.
Each criterion is briefly considered and elaborated below.
(la) Beliefs should be coherent within themselves
This first criterion appears reasonably straightforward. An elementary pre­
condition is that a belief should be meaningful to the person holding it. Consequently, 
a belief should not be self-contradictory (e.g., ‘I believe tapirs are bald with stripy 
fur’, ‘I believe my red pencil is green’, or even T believe I don’t have beliefs’). 
Without internal coherence, it would be difficult for a proposition to be consistent 
with other beliefs, or to have an effect on a person’s actions or emotions, or provide 
an adequate explanation for relevant events.
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(lb) Beliefs should be coherent as part o f a larger web o f beliefs
The key element for this criterion is coherence with and between other beliefs 
held by the same individual, as has been highlighted in several philosophical and 
psychological debates concerning the relationships and cross-influence between 
beliefs (Festinger, 1956; Quine & Ullian 1970; Thagard 2000). Two main 
philosophical views dominate: atomism and holism. Atomists, such as Price (1969), 
argue that beliefs comprise separate entities (corresponding perhaps to an 
encapsulated cognitive representation in memory). In contrast, holists (e.g., Davidson, 
1984) argue that beliefs can only be understood in terms of their relations with other 
beliefs. This distinction is illustrated by comparing the belief ‘mules are stubborn’ 
held by one person who believes that a mule is a cross between a horse and a donkey, 
and another who mistakenly believes that mules are a species in their own right. 
Atomists consider the two people to hold the same belief, whereas holists would say 
these were different beliefs.
The argument that a belief must fit with the other beliefs held by an individual 
has also been strongly made by Quine and Ullian (1970). They argue that new beliefs 
must cohere with existing beliefs held by the individual, or else older beliefs need to 
change to accommodate these. In this way, all beliefs held by a person constitute a 
coherent ‘web of beliefs’ - the need for consistency creating a situation whereby 
beliefs with similar content to those already held are more likely to be endorsed by the 
individual. This proposal links well with Festinger’s (1957) ideas from cognitive 
dissonance theory, which suggests individuals tend to seek consistency between 
cognitions. Festinger suggests that negative feelings occur when a person holds 
contradictory views simultaneously, and thus he/she is motivated to alter these views 
and/or provide justification or resolution for this discrepancy. Evidence for this type
6
of process is suggested in that people often seem to filter evidence in a way 
compatible with their previous beliefs. This is seen (in extreme form) in the subjective 
validation effect, where people ignore clear and unambiguous evidence that would 
contradict prior beliefs (Marks, 2006).
However, whilst this criterion receives support from both the philosophical 
and psychological literature, there appears to be little by way of formal evidence to 
substantiate the criterion explicitly. One aim of this thesis is to provide an initial 
evaluation of this criterion, looking at the extent to which beliefs held by healthy 
individuals cohere together (see Chapter 7).
(2) Beliefs should he supported by subjectively sufficient evidence that provides for 
the truth o f  the proposition
‘Belief implies that the holder has a degree of conviction in the truth of a 
proposition. Furthermore, this criterion highlights one of the basic distinctions 
between belief and knowledge. According to Kant, belief lies between opinion and 
certain knowledge (see Figure 1.2). Kant characterised belief as judging an idea to be 
true using reasons (evidence) that are objectively insufficient but subjectively 
sufficient. Whilst philosophers have been the major contributors to such debates, this 
distinction has had implications for psychiatry. Spitzer (1990) suggested patients with 
delusions often use the word ‘know’ rather than ‘believe’ when talking about their 
delusion (although this has not been formally empirically confirmed). This criterion, 
alongside the inclusion of (3b), provides a distinction between beliefs and knowledge, 
with (3b) emphasising the more personal and emotional characteristics of beliefs.
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Figure 1.2. Kant’s distinction between opinion, belief and knowledge.
The dotted lines indicate where a sufficient level o f  evidence is reached and where a 
new term becomes appropriate.
In everyday use, people sometimes use the term ‘belief when, according to 
Kant, they really mean knowledge. Even within philosophical arguments, ‘beliefs’ 
such as ‘I am eating a tomato’ or ‘There are less than 10 planets in our solar system’ 
(Schwitzgebel, 2006) are used as illustrative examples. Indeed, one could argue using 
Kant’s distinction that all knowledge could be described as a belief, although one 
would be choosing a ‘weaker’ term than would be necessary. However, describing 
beliefs as equivalent to knowledge would be inappropriate when there is insufficient 
objective evidence. Indeed, portraying sufficient subjective evidence as sufficient 
objective evidence may in some cases suggest a lack of insight into the beliefs of 
others in one’s community. On the other hand, the concept of ‘sufficient objective 
evidence’ is obviously difficult to determine, and depends upon culture, context, and 
the individual. The transition between belief and knowledge may vary from person to 
person, and may even require different amounts of evidence to support ‘knowledge’. 
This, together with the fact that both terms are sometimes used interchangeably with 
more affective terms (such as feel), makes it even harder to distinguish these concepts 
in colloquial use.
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(3a) Beliefs have an impact on behaviour
If someone were to profess a strong belief (e.g., that whales were fish), it 
would be expected that when circumstances arise that elicit that belief (e.g., if asked 
to classify whales into their vertebrate type), the individual would act appropriately on 
that belief. As such, if a belief did not appear to elicit appropriate actions, this could 
rightly be questioned as a belief (see section 1.3). Indeed, interpretationist or 
dispositionalist philosophers would argue that to say that someone believes something 
is to say that someone is disposed to behave in certain ways under certain conditions 
(e.g., Dennett, 1987). However, given that individuals may hold several beliefs 
relevant to a particular context (each with the potential to influence behaviour), it is 
not easy to disentangle the effects of a single belief on action and emotion.
In addition to their impact on other cognitive processes, beliefs can influence 
physical wellbeing, e.g., by affecting adherence to medication (Home, 2006). Studies 
looking at the power of a placebo (a physical substance or procedure presented as 
having physical properties which in fact, it does not have; see Kirsch, 2006) 
demonstrate that patients’ beliefs have a substantial effect on the outcome of 
treatment. For example, without explicit knowledge of (or belief in) having received 
morphine, the effectiveness of the painkiller is dramatically reduced (Benedetti et al., 
2003). In contrast, believing that you will get better can be sufficient to cure 
symptoms. For example, Wolf (1950) gave a pregnant woman suffering from nausea 
and vomiting a drug designed to induce those very symptoms, but told her it would 
alleviate these; 20 minutes later the symptoms had stopped. Even subconscious cues 
can have an influence (e.g., feeling better just by going to the doctor) as with other 
conditioned responses. Goebel et al. (2002) gave 18 healthy men an 
immunosuppressive drug along with an unusual drink several times over three days.
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Five days later, when they were given a dummy capsule and the same drink, they 
again experienced reduced function of the immune system, whereas a control group 
who took dummy pills throughout showed no such effects.
(3b) Beliefs have an impact on emotion
The word ‘belief originates from the Aryan word ‘lubh’, which meant ‘to like 
or hold dear’ (OED, 1989), suggesting an enduring link to an emotional component. 
There is increasing support for the notion that beliefs are connected and indeed derive 
their distinct nature from their relationship to emotions, both in the formation of the 
belief and also as a consequence of holding a particular belief. Beliefs often have 
emotional consequences; indeed, cognitive behavioural therapy first addresses 
dysfunctional beliefs held by individuals to alter or mitigate the emotions they feel as 
a result of holding these. On the other hand, “Emotions can awaken, intrude into, and 
shape beliefs, by creating them, by amplifying or altering them, and by making them 
resistant to change” (Frijda et al., 2000, p. 5). As such, the relationship between 
beliefs and emotions is complex, with a change in one capable of altering the other, 
which can then feed back into the former again, and so on.
1.3 VALIDITY OF THE CONCEPT
While the above criteria are commonly and widely endorsed in the published 
literature, there remain problems with a more precise operational definition of belief, 
given its multidimensional nature. In addition, the nature of belief remains 
controversial on the grounds that the validity of our folk or common sense usage (i.e., 
whether a belief exists in a manner that can be adequately characterised by our
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commonly used statements of the form ‘I believe X’) has yet to be established. Thus, 
even if a formal conceptual definition were philosophically agreed, it is not clear 
whether such an operational definition would have ecological validity in terms of the 
general public’s everyday usage of belief.
Four main philosophical standpoints have been described regarding the degree to 
which the everyday usage of the term ‘belief resembles what is considered to be the 
more formal understanding of belief (Baker, 1987):
(1) Our common sense understanding o f  belief is validfor scientific study 
Some philosophers of mind (e.g., Dretske, 1988; Fodor, 1975; Millikan, 1993) 
argue for a representational approach (‘mental sentence theory’), which claims 
that each belief exists as a coherent mental representation in mind, similar to 
the propositional content of the belief itself, although there remains 
disagreement as to the exact nature of these representations.
(2) Our common sense understanding o f belief is not completely valid but is 
close enough that we can use it to gain some notion about what constitutes a 
belief
Stich (1983) suggests that while there will probably prove to be a relationship 
between current and future conceptualisations of belief, at present our ideas 
are impeded by a lack of knowledge, particularly regarding the neurological 
basis of belief.
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(3) Our common sense view o f belief is incorrect, but there are advantages to 
be gained by viewing animals or machines as having and holding beliefs 
This view, commonly held by interpretationists (e.g., Davidson, 1984; 
Dennett, 1987, 1999), focuses on patterns of observable behaviour. For 
example, Dennett believes that beliefs are not reducible to the neural level. 
However, by taking what he refers to as ‘the intentional stance’ (i.e., by 
attributing beliefs to a person, and assuming he/she will act in a rational 
manner), we are able to produce a convenient explanation for their behaviour.
(4) Our common understanding o f belief as a mental representation in mind is 
invalid
This view is shared by those who endorse dispositional or eliminativist 
approaches (e.g., Churchland, 1981). Similar to the interpretationists, 
dispositional views assert that if someone holds a belief, then they have one or 
more behavioural dispositions concerning it. Dispositionalists hold that the 
internal structure of mind is not important in determining whether a person 
holds beliefs. They argue against representational accounts by suggesting that 
it is improbable that there are representations in the mind for every belief 
statement. Marcus (1990) illustrates this using the example of implicit beliefs 
(e.g., few people would doubt that cats have fewer than five legs, or fewer 
than six, or seven, and so on). However, there have also been challenges to the 
dispositional account as most individuals’ behaviour is very dependent on 
context (e.g., denying certain religious beliefs in a climate of persecution). 
However, some liberal dispositionalists, such as Schwitzgebel (2002), include 
private mental episodes as dispositions.
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Philosophers taking a stronger eliminativist approach, such as 
Churchland (1981), claim that ‘beliefs’ (as commonly used) exist only as a 
product of ‘folk psychology’. They suggest that new scientific advances will 
in time produce better neuroscientific theory and that the old concept of belief 
will be discarded, similarly to previous outdated folk psychological ideas. 
Ramsay (2007) gives the example of our abandonment of once widespread 
beliefs that demonic possession caused mental illness, an idea which now has 
no place in psychiatric discussions.
Whilst several formal or academic philosophical stances suggest that the study 
of beliefs (as commonly understood) may not be valid at a conceptual or neural level, 
this is not to say that research in this area is unproductive. Indeed, one does not need 
to make any assumptions regarding the underlying structure of belief when embracing 
beliefs at the ‘folk psychological’ level. By doing so, this debate can be taken further 
by examining the folk or protoscientific understanding of belief, and establishing the 
characteristics that people associate with this concept.
In addition to these more formal philosophical investigations, most of us 
frequently use the word ‘belief in everyday life. In this manner, we all implicitly 
claim to have some understanding of the term ‘belief, and the way in which we both 
use and interpret use of the term. Indeed, most researchers take for granted that people 
share or adopt a common usage of the term ‘belief, despite a lack of empirical 
evidence for this assumption (there are no studies that explicitly probe the everyday 
use of the term). Given the difficulties described above with formal definition of 
belief (e.g., subjectivity when distinguishing between belief and knowledge), this 
assumption may be questioned. Knowledge of how people interpret the term ‘belief
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when they encounter this in questionnaire-based studies or how they use the term in 
everyday life may help interpret their reports of beliefs. Consequentially, Chapter 3 
describes a study designed to assess the general public’s concept of belief, and indeed, 
whether there is a common social understanding. Furthermore, given that the term 
‘belief is often used synonymously with other terms in everyday use, a related study 
examines whether the term ‘belief is considered equivalent to certain other common 
terms (such as think, feel) used interchangeably by some assessment measures.
1.4 CONTENT-SPECIFIC BELIEFS
1.4.1 Assessment of specific beliefs
In contrast to the more conceptual investigations of belief conducted by 
philosophers, psychological and psychiatric studies of beliefs have tended for the 
most part to focus on specific content beliefs (e.g., political, paranormal, delusional or 
religious beliefs). Within psychology, a useful distinction is drawn between 
declarative and non-declarative memory (e.g., Squire, 2004), a distinction that can be 
extended to beliefs (reliant on memory of past experiences and events). Declarative 
beliefs comprise those beliefs that one is aware of and can communicate, while non­
declarative beliefs encompass those propositions or actions that one may not be 
explicitly aware of but that could be consistently attributed to oneself- as would stem 
from the philosophical dispositionalist or interpretationist approaches. Therefore it 
follows that there are at least three empirical routes for investigating beliefs: (1) Study 
people’s actions and attribute beliefs on the basis that these provide plausible reasons 
for the observed actions, communications and/or emotions; (2) Ask participants to
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identify/describe their beliefs; and finally, (3) given that the above approaches are not 
mutually exclusive, combine methods (1) and (2).
In the case of route (1) it is clear that the actions resulting from holding a 
belief may well vary considerably between individuals, depending on other beliefs 
and context, as indicated by Chisholm [1957]), This makes it difficult (if not 
dangerous), to discern a one-to-one relationship between the beliefs held and an 
individual's subsequent actions (as would be required by method (1)). One cannot 
assess the impact of a belief in isolation from the other beliefs, or from the desires, 
emotions and context of the person at that moment in time. Indeed, interpretationist 
philosophers Davidson (1984) and Dennett (1987) suggest that multiple, and 
potentially contradictory, belief attributions may explain a participant’s behaviour, 
and so from their perspective there is no single ‘correct’ belief to be attributed. 
Secondly, not all beliefs have obvious behavioural consequences (e.g., ‘I believe there 
are werewolves in a faraway land’). Those that have very little impact on the life of a 
person are unlikely to be revealed without direct questioning. Thus the most reliable 
and straightforward method remains the second as it has the obvious advantages of 
being quick and easy to interpret. By using this approach, studies avoid difficulties 
associated with coding or interpreting actions or accounting for different aspects of a 
situation.
Indeed, Campbell (1967) proposed that the only sufficient condition for 
determining the occurrence of a belief was when a ‘proposition is mentally asserted 
or judged by [a person] to be true’ (p. 217). Nevertheless his work highlights a major 
limitation of the second method, in that he explicitly distinguishes between forming a 
private view (‘judgement’) and publicly asserting one (‘statement’). It is clear that the
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‘statement’ of belief in a proposition may not always represent the underlying 
‘judgement’ of that proposition. For example, a religious person may choose not to 
reveal their true beliefs at certain times for fear of stigmatisation, discrimination or 
persecution. Furthermore, “Deception (including lying)...is a ubiquitous form of 
social behaviour that all people, at some time, engage in” (Bass & Halligan, 2007,
p.81).
1.4.2 Working definition of ‘belief
Notwithstanding the above qualifications and considerations, the working 
definition for ‘belief adopted in this thesis will be as follows;
A belief describes a proposition that a person consciously endorses as being true, and 
can be communicated either verbally or in writing, assuming no reason not to 
truthfully make such a statement
It is worth noting that this definition is given with particular reference to 
consciously mediated declarative beliefs and is not expected to provide an all- 
encompassing definition of implicit beliefs. For example, one conclusion following 
from this working definition would be that both language and memory are necessary 
to “hold” a belief. This could be potentially problematic if the definition was intended 
to be generic, as it would not allow animals or pre-linguistic children to hold beliefs.
Given that, as noted above, people are capable of misleading others as to their 
mental state, the caveat (assuming no reason not to truthfully make such a statement) 
is essential when evaluating the statements they make regarding their mental 
judgements. However, questioning seems the most practical and effective method to
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discover what beliefs people hold. Furthermore, this approach (examining the beliefs 
reported by an individual) does not contravene the views of the interpretationists or 
dispositionalists, but rather allows the assessment of beliefs by examining their most 
interpretable form of output -  that of a verbal declaration. In studies in health and 
social sciences, this is the approach that has generally been taken, with much work 
carried out by directly asking people about paranormal (e.g., Taylor, 2003), religious 
(e.g., Magyar-Russell et al., 2008) and health beliefs (e.g., Harvey & Lawson, 2009). 
These methods have also been utilised in investigations of beliefs in psychiatry.
1.5 DELUSIONAL BELIEFS
1.5.1 Importance of delusion
Most applied belief research concerns forms of what might be generically 
described as anomalous beliefs. These would include delusions, which are relatively 
well-represented within the literature, due in main part to their clinical consequences 
(both for the individual and for society). Delusions constitute the major criterion for 
psychosis or, as Jaspers (1963, p. 93) claimed, ‘the basic characteristic o f  madness’. 
They are particularly important when assessing schizophrenia, where the presence of 
bizarre delusions is considered sufficiently significant to fulfil one of the necessary 
criteria for diagnosis. Certainly delusions are a common feature of schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders, with one study finding that over 60 percent of patients with 
schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorders reported some form of delusion over a 7- to 
8-year period (Harrow et al., 1995).
Researchers typically investigate the conviction, preoccupation and distress 
associated with delusions, but little is known about the degree to which much of the
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same belief content or dimensions are shared in the ‘normal’ (i.e., non-clinical) 
population (see section 1.3). Nevertheless, as discussed below in section 1.6, 
delusions may be considered one extreme on a distribution of all beliefs. Therefore 
comparisons between ‘normal’ beliefs and delusions suggest a productive avenue of 
investigation. First though, it is important to review the extent to which it is 
appropriate to describe delusions as beliefs at all.
1.5.2 Are delusions a form of belief?
In general, there appears to be considerable support (albeit disputed evidence) 
for the assumption that delusions are best understood as the result of abnormal belief 
processes (e.g., Bentall et al., 2001; Freeman et al., 2001; Oltmanns & Maher, 1988). 
Indeed, this assumption is frequently made without question or evidence (and as such 
could be considered a belief), by following the formal DSM-IV criteria. As Chapter 2 
will demonstrate, these attempts to explain delusions typically use the construct of 
belief explicitly, and the growing continuum approach for psychotic symptoms (see 
section 1.6) within psychiatry implicitly assumes normal equivalents of delusions in 
the non-clinical population (Bentall, 2003).
However, several authors have questioned the definition of delusion in terms 
of a deviant form of belief. Spitzer (1990) comments that patients tend to state that 
they ‘know’ their delusions rather than ‘believe’ in them and suggests that to consider 
delusions as a subset or type of belief may therefore be unhelpful. However, this does 
not in itself suggest the lack of a belief (one might choose to use alternative 
vocabulary if asked to describe one’s beliefs, but that is not to say that one does not 
hold this as a belief). As discussed earlier with regard to the distinction between belief 
and knowledge, to ‘know’ something suggests objective and subjective evidence,
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whereas to ‘believe’ implies only subjective, thus suggesting that (while choosing a 
stronger term than may be appropriate) these statements would still fulfil the proposed 
criteria for belief. Indeed, a statement that, e.g., ‘My wife has been replaced by an 
impostor’ would seem strong evidence for attributing a belief with this content to the 
individual concerned. Moreover, recent studies have found that the level of conviction 
with which delusions are held can fluctuate under questioning (Myin-Germeys et al., 
2001), unlike those that might be expected for ‘knowledge’ (implying a more 
consistent level of confidence). Instead it seems plausible that the conviction of a 
delusion may be similar to that of other strongly held non-clinical beliefs.
Others have suggested delusions do not have sufficient conviction to qualify 
as a belief (e.g., Sass, 1994). They note that patients often maintain a detachment from 
their delusions, seeming to express these ideas ‘as i f  they were true (Young, 1999). 
However, these concerns presuppose that all beliefs must reach a prescribed level of 
conviction, which may not be appropriate. Investigations of the conviction with which 
a range of non-clinical beliefs are held would be useful to clarify this point.
Berrios (1991, p. 12) takes an even stronger position by claiming that clinical 
delusions are not beliefs but rather ‘empty speech acts ’, given that patients are often 
unable coherently to discuss the implications of their delusions. In addition, patients 
do not always show appropriate emotional responses for their delusions (Sass, 1994). 
For example, instead of being distraught about his wife having been replaced, a 
patient with Capgras syndrome ‘specifically expressed thankfulness that she had 
located a substitute’ (Alexander et al., 1979, p.335). However, Stone and Young 
(1997) argue that even patients like that reported by Alexander and colleagues often 
retain some understanding of the bizarreness of the belief. Thus this is not an ‘empty
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speech act’ in that patients recognise some of the impact of their delusion and the 
likely reactions it will evoke.
Nevertheless, Currie (2000) notes that delusions often ‘fail to engage 
behaviour’ (p. 174), and suggests these are more akin to ‘imaginings’ that patients 
mistake for beliefs (although, again this could be true of non-clinical beliefs). Indeed, 
other authors have also argued that action resulting from delusional beliefs is rare 
(Anderson & Trethowan, 1973; Merskey, 1980; Slater & Roth, 1969). However, this 
is not true for all cases. Taylor (1985) found associations between delusions and 
violent offending, and one review reported this in 18% of cases of delusional 
misidentification (Forstl et al., 1991). Moreover, Buchanan and Wessely (2004) found 
that half of their sample of patients with delusions reported having acted on these 
beliefs at least once. Furthermore, other subtler safety behaviours may be performed, 
to prevent the need for more overt actions in response to the delusional belief 
(Freeman, Garety et al., 2001). Indeed, (as discussed above when describing 
methodologies suitable for investigating beliefs) establishing a one-to-one 
correspondence between a belief and its consequential action is fraught with 
difficulties even in non-clinical cases. As such, whilst some patients with delusions 
are clearly not just voicing an ‘empty speech act’ and appear to have considerable 
insight, in others it is harder to determine the degree to which their delusion impacts 
onto their actions or emotions.
Indeed, several critics of the claim that delusions constitute a form of belief 
acknowledge that some delusions seem best described as the result of dysfunctional 
belief processes (Currie, 2000; Sass, 1994; Young, 1999). Even Jaspers (1963), who 
described ‘delusion proper’ to be so distinct from ordinary phenomena as to be 
‘psychologically irreducible ’ (1963, p. 96), acknowledged another set of beliefs,
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delusion-like ideas, which he regarded as emerging ‘understandably from preceding 
affects’ (p. 96). Indeed, it is easier to see that delusions that seem to be extremes of 
normal cognitions (e.g., pathological jealousy) can be described as beliefs than those 
delusions that have bizarre content. These differences have led some authors (e.g., 
Mullen, 2003) to advocate more than one kind of delusion. Mullen suggests some 
delusions may be best regarded as distinct from normal belief, whereas others would 
be better viewed as comprising part of a continuum with normal beliefs.
This distinction has also been highlighted with regard to the delusion’s 
compatibility with the prior or co-existing beliefs held by the individual, tying in with 
the philosophical debate regarding atomism versus holism discussed earlier. Quine 
and Ullian (1970) proposed that all beliefs cohere to form a ‘web of beliefs’. This 
implies that individuals should not be able to consciously hold (i.e., be aware of) 
contradictory beliefs. However, Stone and Young (1997) point out that some patients 
have fairly circumscribed delusions, particularly those with bizarre beliefs such as 
Cotard or Capgras (where the very bizarreness of the belief suggests contradictory 
beliefs may be held). Indeed, Bisiach (1988) describes a case where a patient with 
unilateral neglect insisted that his left arm was the examiner’s, even though this led 
him to the conclusion that the examiner must have three arms. Whilst some of these 
patients do form further delusions (e.g., one patient with Cotard delusion [‘I am 
dead’] developed the belief that he was in hell as a result of the heat during a visit to 
South Africa: Young et al., 1992), for others their delusion seems relatively 
encapsulated.
These perspectives on the nature of delusion also have an impact on cognitive 
views of modularity. Fodor (1983) suggested that belief formation was not a modular 
process, similar to other cognitive processes. He considered that beliefs need access to
21
all information to be reliable, meaning that informational encapsulation was not an 
option. Thus, taking a holist’s perspective, one might predict that holding a bizarre 
belief (e.g., Cotard) should impact onto the other beliefs held by an individual. 
However, some monothematic delusions are reported as highly circumscribed or 
encapsulated and some others seemingly ‘coexist with beliefs they contradict' (Currie 
& Jureidini, 2001, p. 160). Indeed, Jones (2003) argues that delusion formation does 
therefore show some of the properties of a modular system, suggesting this is fast and 
informationally encapsulated.
However, others have suggested that monothematic delusions largely arise 
from anomalous perceptual experiences (e.g., Stone & Young, 1997). This is not a 
new idea -  Kraepelin suggested this almost a century ago -  but this hypothesis was 
recently developed further and brought to prominence by Maher (1988). Maher 
proposed that delusions arose as a result of attempting to account for anomalous 
experiences (AE). For example, in the case of Capgras (the belief that someone, 
usually a close friend or relative, has been replaced by an impostor), the delusion is 
thought to result from a loss of the expected feeling of familiarity when perceiving a 
known face (Ellis & Young, 1990). If an individual was receiving frequent perceptual 
information that was consistent with this hypothesis, then this perceptual input may 
override the bias associated with coherence from other beliefs.
Indeed, Stone and Young (1997) note that belief formation is already subject 
to certain biases, so this is not a perfect system even in healthy individuals. Thus, 
given we are already aware of the fallibility of the system, the focus should be on 
whether biases are the same for patients with delusions as for healthy individuals. 
Indeed, whilst inherently plausible, the extent to which belief coherence takes place in
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healthy individuals is not known, and as such it is premature to claim any difference 
in the beliefs of patients with delusions from normal belief processes.
Given that both beliefs and delusions can be defined in a multitude of ways, it 
is not surprising that comparisons between these two concepts are problematic. This is 
exacerbated by applying a strict definition of belief to a range of reported delusions, 
without any consideration that belief, as used by most individuals, can cover a 
spectrum of conviction, stability and influence. Indeed, to examine the manner in 
which individuals report delusions and determine whether or not these are beliefs 
seems to necessitate investigating how people describe their beliefs. This issue will be 
considered further in Chapter 3.
Although there are outstanding questions regarding the similarity of formation 
processes for ‘normal’ beliefs and a minority of delusions (those that appear to be 
relatively circumscribed), the evidence seems on balance to suggest it is appropriate to 
view delusions as a form of belief. Therefore throughout this thesis and following 
most authors (Davies et al., 2001; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000; van Os, 2003) and the 
official DSM definition (APA, 2000), delusions will be considered as one form of 
anomalous beliefs.
Consequently, the main research agenda remains to determine and/or elaborate 
the various factors that may cause a belief to be considered delusional. One approach 
that can be used to help determine the distinctions between delusions and other beliefs 
is by looking at psychiatric symptoms and/or syndromes as extremes on a continuum 
rather than categorically different from ‘normal’ beliefs and experiences. This 
continuum approach is discussed below.
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1.6 THE CONTINUUM HYPOTHESIS
1.6.1 Continuum of Psychosis
Schizophrenia remains the most common form of psychotic illness, affecting 
1% of the population (Andreasen, 1999). The standard compartmentalisation of 
schizophrenia, as with most illnesses (DSM), implies that the illness is categorically 
delineated. Recent evidence from large non-clinical samples, however, suggested that 
the disorder is not easily and/or consistently distinguishable from schizotypal and 
schizoid personality disorders (Siever, Kalus, & Keefe, 1993) and similarly overlaps 
with bipolar disorders (Craddock & Owen, 2007). These shared characteristics have 
led several researchers to question the conceptualisation of schizophrenia as a discrete 
illness entity (Claridge, 1994; Crow et al., 1995; Johns & van Os, 2001; McGovern & 
Turkington, 2001; Strauss, 1969). Indeed, although this approach has only relatively 
recently gained ground in psychiatry, it has been widely applied throughout medicine. 
Rose (1992) recognised that virtually all pathophysiological factors examined were 
continuously distributed throughout the population, and as a result advocated 
prevention strategies that target the population as a whole, an idea that remains 
influential (Manuel et al., 2006).
Evidence in support of the argument for a spectrum of schizophrenic disorders 
comes from findings suggesting that certain common cognitive deficits (e.g., deficits 
in attention, abstract reasoning, cognitive inhibition, verbal working memory, 
recognition memory, and general intellectual functioning) and neural differences (e.g., 
the total volume of the left dominant posterior superior temporal gyrus [STG] relating 
to delusion scores and grey matter reduction in the left posterior STG relating to 
inverse thought disorder scores) exist in individuals with schizotypal personality 
disorder to a moderate extent but in schizophrenia to a greater extent (Cadenhead et
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al., 1999; Menon et al., 1995; Shenton et al., 1992). Further research has focused on 
similarities between the known correlates of clinical symptoms, and those of their 
subclinical counterparts.
A. Similar correlates for subclinical and clinical symptoms
a. Demographics
One assumption of the continuum account is that subclinical psychotic 
symptoms should associate with known correlates of clinical symptoms (e.g., 
demographics). Indeed, positive subclinical symptoms (i.e., symptoms people do not 
usually experience: delusions, hallucinations and thought disorder) have been found 
to be associated with negative subclinical symptoms (i.e., the lack of normal traits: 
e.g., flat affect or avolition) (van Os et al., 2000) and both have also been associated 
with depressive symptoms (Stefanis et al., 2002), thus reflecting the dimensions found 
within schizophrenia. In addition, a recent large meta-analysis revealed that 
demographic factors relating to schizophrenia (e.g., males, unmarried, unemployed, 
ethnic minorities) also relate to subclinical symptoms, with the exception of age, 
where the results are difficult to interpret (van Os et al., 2009). Moreover, the meta­
analysis also found that other known risk factors, such as urbanicity, trauma and 
cannabis use, were associated with higher levels of subclinical psychosis (Henquet et 
al., 2005; Krabbendam & van Os, 2005; Read et al., 2005).
As might be expected following a continuum account, measures of clinical and 
subclinical experiences have different degrees of association with demographic 
variables (van Os et al., 2000) and also different increased risks for developing the 
full-blown clinical disorder (Hanssen et al., 2005). Furthermore, van Os et al. (2001)
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have demonstrated that the levels of psychotic experiences observed in the general 
population can predict the prevalence of disorder. Utilising the association between 
psychotic disorder and urbanicity, they used five samples grouped by degree of 
urbanicity to show that as the rate of psychotic disorder increases with urbanicity, the 
levels of reported psychotic experiences also increased in a dose-response manner.
b. Genetics
Another way of looking at the relationship between clinical and subclinical 
symptoms is by examining the genetic risk factors. Several studies of twins in the 
general population strongly support genetic links, implying that both genetic and 
environmental factors play roles in the presentation of psychotic symptoms (Kendler 
& Hewitt, 1992; Linney et al., 2003; MacDonald et al., 2001). In terms of cognitive 
deficits, children of patients with schizophrenia are often found to have impaired 
verbal memory and deficits with other cognitive tasks (Owens & Johnstone, 2006). 
Furthermore, a recent meta-analysis by Sitskoom et al. (2004) showed that first- 
degree relatives of patients with psychotic disorders had minor difficulties with verbal 
memory, executive functioning and to some degree with attention.
Similar results have been found for positive symptoms. Kendler et al. (1993) 
found that psychosis phenotypes (clinical and subclinical expression) tended to cluster 
in families. In the general population, Hanssen et al. (2006) used both self-report and 
interview measures to assess positive and negative subclinical psychosis within 
families, and found familial clustering for both dimensions. Similarly, the types of 
symptoms reported by patients often predict the expression of subclinical experiences 
in their relatives (Fanous et al., 2001), and the positive symptom scores of relatives of 
patients with psychotic disorders typically relate to their genetic risk (Vollema et al., 
2002).
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B. The presence o f similar beliefs and experiences in non-clinical populations
Clinical psychosis remains comparatively rare, with one recent study 
estimating lifetime prevalence of broadly defined psychosis at 3.48% (Perala et al., 
2007). By comparison, the continuum account suggests that “the core symptoms of 
psychosis, delusions and hallucinations, are much more prevalent in the general 
populations than their clinical counterparts” (Krabbendam et al., 2004, p.411). This 
hypothesis is particularly interesting given the lack of a definitive demarcation in 
diagnosis, e.g., determining where schizotypal disorder becomes schizophrenia. To 
avoid these limitations inherent in diagnosing syndromes, some researchers adopt a 
cognitive neuropsychiatric perspective, which focuses on symptoms rather than 
medically or psychiatrically labelled syndromes.
The difficulties with drawing absolute boundary distinctions apply to all fields 
of clinical practice, however. Even when addressing a single symptom, diagnosis 
remains a dichotomous choice, while the presenting symptom exists to varying 
degrees across the population. Indeed, this is independent of the presentation of the 
illness, and holds whether symptoms are predominantly physical (e.g., obesity) or 
predominantly psychological, e.g., autism spectrum disorders (Newschaffer et al., 
2007).
Indeed, whilst the definition of a delusion in DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) 
supports a clear categorical distinction, ‘A false belief based on incorrect inference 
about external reality ’, the glossary now states that ‘delusional conviction occurs on a 
continuum and can sometimes be inferredfrom an individual’s behaviour' (p. 821). In 
fact, even Jaspers, whose work is often cited as support for the distinction between 
normal beliefs and delusions, appeared to consider at least a subset of delusions as 
continuous in some ways, suggesting that a ‘jealous man can develop into a man with
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delusion-like jealousy ’ and 'a suspicious person into someone with delusion-like ideas 
o f persecution' (p. 640). Moreover, despite the historical dominance of categorisation, 
criticisms of this approach are not new - Bleuler (1911) made similar arguments 
against assuming categorical divisions between ‘healthy’ and ‘ill’ individuals.
As such, a growing number of researchers agree that individual psychiatric 
symptoms (including beliefs) lie on a continuum where only a small number located 
at some (arbitrarily defined but clinically agreed) extreme endpoint become clinically 
relevant (i.e., delusions) and where much of the distribution is not necessarily 
associated with any significant disability (Johns & van Os, 2001; McGovern & 
Turkington, 2001; Rutten et al., 2008; Strauss, 1969; van Os et al., 2009). It is worth 
noting that such a continuum is not simply due to variation within a single factor (e.g., 
conviction, as suggested by the DSM description). People may differ in terms of the 
frequency, intensity and number of symptoms they present as they vary over the 
continua. Moreover, research has indicated that the conviction with which a 
delusional belief is held fluctuates over time and between contexts (Myin-Germeys et 
al., 2001). As Claridge (1997) points out, however, two people may have the same 
psychotic symptoms but one may require care and the other may not, as they may use 
a different coping strategy; for example, non-patients may be more likely to perceive 
hallucinated voices as predominantly positive (Honig et al., 1998).
Strong evidence in favour of the continuum hypothesis comes from general 
population studies, which estimate lifetime prevalence for delusions at around 15% 
(Rutten et al., 2008, p. 53) and an average annual prevalence rate of 5% (van Os et al., 
2009). The consistent finding that many non-clinical participants endorse questions 
relating to both delusions and hallucinations implies that “experiencing symptoms of 
psychosis such as delusions and hallucinations is not inevitably associated with the
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presence of disorder” (van Os et al., 2009, p. 1). Clearly other factors, such as 
intrusiveness, psychopathological co-morbidities, illness behaviour, societal tolerance, 
coping and distress, play a significant role in the clinical relevance of delusional 
beliefs, and this continuum approach underpins much of modem cognitive therapy for 
psychosis (Johns & van Os, 2001).
To date, most of the single-symptom studies have focused on hallucinatory 
experiences (e.g., Johns et al., 2002; van Os et al., 2000). Nonetheless, as delusions 
are often assumed to be a critical aspect of psychosis and a pathological form of belief 
(Davies et al., 2001; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000; van Os, 2003), research has begun 
to open up this rich vein of study by examining “delusional ideation” or what might 
be best described as “delusion-like beliefs” in the non-clinical population (e.g., 
Lincoln, 2007; Peters, Joseph & Garety, 1999; Peters et al., 2004; Verdoux et al., 
1998). These studies provide compelling evidence that delusion-like beliefs (i.e., 
beliefs that have a similar content to delusions but are not associated with the 
significant behavioural and/or psychological consequences found with delusions) are 
more commonly present in non-clinical populations than previously expected.
1.6.2 Areas for further research
Despite a growing number of studies investigating delusions and/or delusional 
ideation in non-clinical samples, there are still problems obtaining a reliable estimate 
of the degree to which such ideas are present in the general population (Henderson, 
1996). These difficulties include: (1) the range of terms used when constructing 
questions to address delusional-type beliefs and (2) the range and types of beliefs 
covered by existing measures (i.e., targeting only strictly defined delusions [where 
attempts are made to determine plausibility, drug/alcohol abuse, distress, etc.] versus
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including all beliefs with a similar content to delusions). Moreover, many of these 
reports have focused on predominantly non-bizarre delusions and those commonly 
found in schizophrenia. Indeed, non-clinical analogues of monothematic and typically 
circumscribed delusions may present in non-clinical populations, given that cases of 
Capgras in people without psychiatric diagnoses have been reported (see Coltheart et 
al., 2007). Investigations of those delusions more commonly associated with 
neuropsychiatric problems enable a more accurate comparison of these delusion types.
Chapter 4 describes the development of a new measure, the Cardiff Beliefs 
Questionnaire (CBQ). The CBQ includes a wider range of beliefs and experiences 
than previously included, allowing comparisons between results for different types of 
belief (i.e., it is possible to establish the similarities and differences between delusion­
like and both normal societal/cultural beliefs and other anomalous beliefs). 
Furthermore, it also includes a range of bizarre delusion-like beliefs, which have not 
previously been thoroughly investigated in non-clinical populations.
The prevalence of delusion-like beliefs in a large general population sample 
using reports on this new measure will be discussed in Chapter 5. Moreover, in 
addition to items addressing psychotic-like experiences, the Cardiff Beliefs 
Questionnaire (CBQ) includes questions on a range of beliefs and experiences with no 
explicit psychiatric background. Establishing the prevalence of these ‘ordinary’ 
beliefs and experiences provides a benchmark from which to interpret the levels of 
endorsement of psychotic-like items. It also provides an indication of the degree of 
encapsulation or cross-relationships between beliefs. Furthermore, as the CBQ 
includes a wider range of beliefs than other measures (which focus on psychotic or 
psychotic-like symptoms), this provides an opportunity to investigate the relationships 
between different belief types.
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1.6.3 Implications of the continuum approach
Studies reporting a continuum of symptoms have significant implications for 
established psychiatric definitions (DSM-IV), which treat delusions as qualitatively 
distinct from those beliefs ordinarily held by members of a person’s culture, despite 
little evidence of the likelihood of similar beliefs being held by society. Most 
clinicians are not in a position to know whether such beliefs are ‘normally’ accepted, 
other than by direct benchmarking with their own peer group. This is not necessarily a 
reliable strategy as studies show poor inter-rater reliability among psychiatrists for 
ratings of bizarre beliefs (Flaum et al., 1991; Junginger et al., 1992). High levels of 
delusions reported by non-clinical samples suggest that this assumption may be 
invalid.
Furthermore, this APA criterion (delusion is a belief not ‘ordinarily accepted 
by other members o f  the person’s culture or subculture (e.g. it is not an article o f 
religious faith) *) raises questions for distinguishing between paranormal beliefs and 
delusion-like ideas. Both have been associated with placing too much significance on 
coincidences (Brugger & Mohr, 2008; Emrich, 1992), and those who report 
paranormal experiences have higher than usual levels of psychiatric symptoms 
(McCreery & Claridge, 1995) and vice versa (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). 
Paranormal beliefs may form part of the continuum alongside delusional beliefs. 
Indeed, Brugger and Mohr (2008, p. 1291) claim that “Paranormal ways o f  
experiencing and reasoning seem predestined to link abnormal to normal ways, and 
their study may thus be ideally suited to bridge major gaps between 
(neuro)psychology and cognitive neuropsychiatry”. A major research theme in the 
current thesis concerns the relationships between different types of beliefs.
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This theme will be explored and elaborated in Chapter 7, which addresses the 
often cited but underspecified proposal for a ‘web of beliefs’ (Quine & Ullian, 1970), 
where individual beliefs cohere together. Whilst intuitively plausible, there has been 
no empirical evaluation of these ideas. The CBQ, however, includes five pairs of 
beliefs designed to investigate the presence of dissonance between beliefs, allowing 
belief coherence to be explored further.
Overall, it is clear that there is now substantial evidence to support a 
continuum model of psychosis. One noteworthy consequence of assuming a 
continuum of belief is the implication that a range of presumably more socially 
acceptable (and therefore less stigmatising) beliefs exist, which can still provide us 
with insight into the nature of delusional beliefs. Moreover, by combining this 
approach with a cognitive neuropsychiatric approach (focusing on a single symptom), 
one can carry out detailed investigations of the ‘normal’ (i.e., non-clinical) population, 
thus linking in with a normative model that could inform the clinical presentation.
Indeed, central to many cognitive neuropsychiatric accounts of delusions (e.g., 
Ellis & Young, 1990; Maher, 1988) is the proposal that anomalous perceptual 
experiences (attributable to discemable and quantifiable neuropsychological 
impairments) provide the key causal trigger for monothematic delusions. Assuming a 
continuum explanation of psychotic symptoms, then a productive line of research 
would be to evaluate the relationships between anomalous beliefs (AB) and 
anomalous experiences (AE) in a general population sample, and see if these in turn 
reveal associations or dissociations that may inform our models. This is another key 
strand of research addressed in this thesis, and these ideas will be explored in greater 
detail in Chapter 2.
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Thus this approach not only opens up a new vein of research into the 
conceptualisation of psychosis, but also overcomes some of the practical limitations 
inherent in psychiatric studies, as investigations of subclinical experiences and beliefs 
are not fraught with the range of difficulties (e.g., concerns over the effects of anti­
psychotic medication, for example, lack of motivation: Lewander, 1994) associated 
with investigating patients.
1.7 AIMS OF THE THESIS
Thus far this chapter has outlined the background to research on belief and delusions, 
as well as identifying the continuum and cognitive neuropsychiatric approaches that 
will be used to develop and evaluate the research studies in this thesis. The research 
questions and thesis structure are described briefly below.
CHAPTER 2: Delusions: History, Concept and Theory
The second chapter sets out the current research and theory on delusions. This 
summarises the difficulties in defining delusion and places this process within a 
historical context to demonstrate how the present conceptualisations developed. In 
addition, it describes existing studies investigating the cognitive biases and correlates 
related to holding delusions, and their influence in developing models of delusion 
formation and maintenance.
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CHAPTER 3: Characteristic Features o f Belief
This chapter addresses some of the assumptions regarding the use of the term ‘belief 
by members of the general population, given that these impact onto a wide research 
area (including religious, paranormal and psychiatric studies). These include:
The understanding o f  the term ‘belief in the general population. Delusions are 
assumed to be a form of belief, despite lack of knowledge about the characteristics 
necessary for belief. This chapter aims to provide an indication of the general public’s 
understanding of belief.
A comparison o f  belief with *interchangeable ’ terms (such as feel ’ and ‘think ’). As 
well as establishing the defining characteristics of a belief, it is interesting to note how 
belief is typically distinguished from other cognitions. The terms ‘think’ and ‘feel’ are 
focused on in particular as they are commonly used in place of ‘belief on measures of 
delusion and delusional ideation.
CHAPTER 4: Development o f the Cardiff Beliefs Questionnaire (CBQ)
Chapter 4 describes the development and validation of a new measure, the Cardiff 
Beliefs Questionnaire (CBQ). The CBQ includes a wider range of beliefs and 
experiences than previous measures of delusions or delusion-like beliefs, in particular, 
a range of bizarre delusion-like beliefs (previously neglected in non-clinical studies). 
In addition, the CBQ includes questions on a range of beliefs and experiences with no 
psychiatric background.
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CHAPTER 5: Prevalence o f  Delusion-Like and Other Belief Types in the General 
Population
This chapter describes findings relating to the prevalence of delusion-like beliefs and 
the other belief types measured by the CBQ, as reported by members of the general 
population. In addition, the relationships between belief types are explored. Research 
questions include:
The prevalence o f  delusion-like beliefs in the general population. By avoiding clinical 
language and including a range of non-clinical beliefs, it was predicted that any 
effects of stigma would be reduced and the general public would be more willing to 
be open in their responses, with the prediction that this would lead to increased 
prevalence levels.
The prevalence o f  bizarre delusion-like beliefs in the general population. By 
investigating bizarre beliefs, it is possible to compare the prevalence of both bizarre 
and non-bizarre delusion-like beliefs. The expectation was that both would be present 
in the general population, but bizarre beliefs would be reported to a lesser extent than 
the non-bizarre beliefs.
The prevalence in the general population o f individual beliefs with different themes 
(e.g., paranormal), and comparisons with delusion-like beliefs. DSM-IV considers 
that delusions should not be commonly endorsed by other members of a person’s 
culture, using this criterion to distinguish these from other belief types, such as 
religious or paranormal. Given previous findings of association between delusion-like 
and paranormal beliefs (e.g., Lawrence & Peters, 2004), a similar relationship was 
expected. Furthermore, it was predicted that these belief types would not be 
distinguishable on the basis of the prevalence of individual beliefs of these types.
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CHAPTER 6: Anomalous Experience: Prevalence and Relationship to Beliefs 
Chapter 6 reports the prevalence of hallucination-like and paranormal experiences in 
the general population. As the CBQ includes some experience questions alongside 
those addressing beliefs, the relationships between anomalous beliefs (AB) and 
anomalous experiences (AE) in non-clinical participants could also be explored. This 
chapter describes these investigations of the associations and/or dissociations between 
beliefs and experiences, and their implications for models of delusion formation (e.g., 
Ellis & Young, 1990; Maher, 1988). The main research questions comprise:
The prevalence o f  anomalous experiences (AE) in the general population. In a similar 
manner to the delusion-like beliefs in Chapter 5, AE were expected to be commonly 
found in the general population, as indicated in previous studies (e.g., Ohayon, 2000). 
The co-occurrence and content association between AE and beliefs, at both the group 
and individual levels. Despite AE having been hypothesised as a predictor of AB in 
cognitive models of delusion formation, few studies have empirically evaluated the 
nature of the relationship between delusions and AE, and some of the findings have 
been mixed. This chapter addresses both the degree of the association and dissociation 
between overall anomalous experience and belief groups, and also investigates the 
relationships between specific AEs and ABs (given the one-to-one correspondence 
predicted by some models). It was expected that, while AE and AB would be related, 
this would not be true for every individual (i.e., this would not be a necessary 
condition).
CHAPTER 7: Belief Consistency and Coherence: Exploring the “Web o f Beliefs”
Chapter 7 focuses on Quine and Ullian’s (1970) suggestion of a web of belief. The 
CBQ addresses a wide range of beliefs, including five pairs of beliefs designed to
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investigate dissonance between beliefs. The degrees of coherence and inconsistency 
between beliefs are explored in detail here. The research questions addressed include: 
The extent to which belief dissonance (i.e., holding two contradictory beliefs) occurs. 
Given that theory suggests that beliefs should be coherent, it is expected that only a 
small minority of participants should hold inconsistent beliefs.
The extent to which coherence influences the beliefs held by an individual. Intuitively, 
it seems likely that if an individual holds one belief of a particular type (e.g., 
religious), this should increase the likelihood of that person holding another belief of 
that type. Furthermore, this would tie in to the philosophical coherence arguments.
The stability o f  different types o f belief over time. Beliefs are generally assumed to be 
relatively stable, especially in the case of delusions. However, less is known about 
delusion-like beliefs and (given these are held in the general population and therefore 
most do not have psychiatric implications) it seems plausible that these are not as 
influential generally as some other beliefs (e.g., religious beliefs), and as such are 
more likely to be discarded.
CHAPTER 8: Conclusions
Finally, Chapter 8 summarises the findings of the thesis, and outlines how these build 
on and feed back into the research area. Suggestions for ways to move forward are 
discussed.
The following chapter will provide a more detailed overview of the literature on 
delusional beliefs and demonstrate the way in which characterisations of delusions 
have developed to form current conceptualisations and how these have informed 
current models of delusion formation.
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CHAPTER 2
DELUSIONS: HISTORY, CONCEPT AND THEORY
2.1 BACKGROUND
Delusions are often considered one of the central features of a mental illness (Jaspers, 
1963; Peters, 2001). The presence and type of a delusional belief has a significant 
impact on diagnosis, treatment and most importantly, the quality of life and active 
functional engagement of the patient. As a belief that can have debilitating effects, it 
is essential to understand the clinical characteristics of delusions and their similarities 
to ‘normal’ beliefs before investigating beliefs in the following chapters. This chapter 
provides some background on the history behind, and current classifications of, 
delusions, as well some of the current competing cognitive accounts: (1) The chapter 
begins by considering the history of delusions and the reasons for focusing on 
symptoms rather than medical syndromes, (2) the following sections consider the 
challenging issues surrounding the definition of delusion and (3) finally, the chapter 
concludes with a discussion of current attempts to explain delusion employing 
psychological and cognitive neuropsychiatric models.
2.2 HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF DELUSION
The first recorded use of the term ‘delusion’ was c.1420, when it was used to 
mean an ‘act of misleading someone’. It was not recorded as implying or indicating 
mental illness until 1552 (Online Etymology Dictionary). Since then, ideas 
surrounding delusions and mental illness have developed considerably. It is helpful to 
consider how the current conceptualisation of delusion emerged, given the prominent
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role that delusions continue to play in the diagnosis of schizophrenia. Psychiatry has 
generally focused on identifying syndromes rather than symptoms, a trend that began 
with the influential ideas of Emil Kraepelin, who played a central role in the 
development of modem psychiatry. In 1887 Kraepelin (1856-1926) produced the 
second edition of his Textbook o f Psychiatry, a book that would transform the clinical 
domain. In it, he argued for a discrete number of psychiatric diagnoses, each with a 
typical pattern of symptoms, relating to different types of brain pathologies. These 
included a disorder marked by inappropriate affect, stereotyped behaviours, 
distractibility, hallucinations and/or delusions, combined with a general deterioration 
in cognition, which he named ‘dementia praecox’ (meaning senility of the young).
The first major revision to dementia praecox was made by the Swiss 
psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler (1857-1939). He preferred the term ‘schizophrenia’ 
(meaning split mind), arguing that ‘dementia praecox’ was inappropriate as this 
illness did not always result in mental deterioration and onset was not always in 
young patients. In choosing this name, Bleuler suggested that the illness was 
characterised by a separation in the personality, cognitions, memories and perception 
of affected individuals. He proposed four key symptoms (known as the four ‘As’): (1) 
loosening of associations; (2) ambivalence with regard to their emotions and 
attitudes; (3) autism; and (4) inappropriate affect. Bleuler was influenced by Freud’s 
ideas that unconscious forces played a role in mental illness. He argued that delusions 
and hallucinations were the results of psychological reactions to the illness rather than 
being directly caused by it. Interestingly, he also noted the presence of ‘a latent 
schizophrenia’ which he claimed was ‘the most frequent form, although admittedly 
these people hardly ever come for treatment’, thus suggesting the likelihood of a 
continuum approach (as discussed in Chapter 1).
39
The next influential contributor was German philosopher and psychiatrist Karl 
Jaspers (1883-1969), who considered the psychological aspects of mental illness to be 
important. He furthered the understanding of psychiatric disorders by bringing a 
detailed study of individual case histories to the forefront of nosological 
classifications. In examining such cases, Jaspers distinguished between primary 
delusions, which were ‘ununderstandable’ (i.e., the observer could see no relation 
between this belief and the holder’s life experiences), and secondary delusions, where 
a belief could be placed in the context of the holder’s life story. This distinction is 
elaborated later in this chapter (section 2.4).
Another German psychiatrist, Kurt Schneider (1887-1967), further honed the 
psychiatric conceptualisation of schizophrenia by focusing on those symptoms most 
predictive of the disorder. These symptoms, which he termed ‘first-rank symptoms’, 
comprised delusions, hallucinations and passivity experiences. In contrast to the 
increasingly psychological approaches of his time, Schneider also proposed that the 
‘form’ that symptoms took should be viewed as more significant than their content 
(i.e., delusions should not be diagnosed on the basis of content but rather on the 
manner in which they are held).
2.2.2 Diagnostic reliability
The consensus between many of these authors was the suggestion that 
psychotic illness could be categorised using a number of different symptoms. Indeed, 
this approach, following Kraepelin’s ideas, continues to exert a powerful influence 
today. Similar distinctions are made in current psychiatric diagnosis, whereby patients 
are compared across symptoms, determining the subsequent treatment of the patient. 
This is in large part due to the ‘official’ diagnostic manuals (Diagnostic and
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Statistical Manual o f Mental Disorders [American Psychiatric Association]; 
International Classification o f Diseases [World Health Organisation]), which carve 
mental illness into such categories.
The evolution of the current criteria from the initial Kraepelinian account has 
been driven by evaluation of the usefulness of these classifications. These can be 
assessed by examining the reliability of these diagnoses, i.e., (1) whether the named 
condition is stable over time and in different contexts, and (2) whether the diagnosis is 
consistent when the patient is assessed by different clinicians. In an attempt to 
standardise diagnosis, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) produced a 
chapter on psychiatric disorders for the 1933 medical manual Standard Classified 
Nomenclature o f  Disease. This was the first classification system widely used in the 
US. However, it was quickly found wanting following the rise in psychiatric disorders 
during the Second World War. Adding to the confusion, organisations such as the US 
Army used their own criteria. To solve these difficulties, the APA created a task force 
to establish a new diagnostic system, which was published in 1952 as the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual o f Mental Disorders (DSM). At around the same time, the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) was also trying to secure a consensus on 
psychiatric classification at an international level. Their first attempt, the International 
Classification o f  Diseases (ICD), was published in 1951 but, having little impact, was 
revised to include only operational definitions (which was closer to the DSM system), 
rather than suggesting aetiological factors, which it was felt led to controversy over 
classifications.
Simultaneously, researchers were beginning to subject the reliability of 
diagnoses to empirical evaluation (Ash, 1949; Hunt, Wittson & Hunt, 1953; 
Masserman & Carmichael, 1938; Sandifer, Pettus & Quade, 1964). Initial findings
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confirmed that a substantial proportion of the diagnoses employed showed low 
reliability. Furthermore, different diagnostic practices in different countries 
contributed to the problem (Cooper et al., 1972; Kendell et al., 1971; Kramer, 1961; 
WHO, 1973). In addition, the ongoing concern regarding reliability coincided with a 
shift in scientific thinking (neoKraepelinism), which emphasised a more biological 
understanding of psychiatric disorders. These factors provided an impetus for 
researchers to re-examine the issue of diagnosis. Simultaneously, cultural and political 
changes (in particular, a new focus on gay rights, given that homosexuality was listed 
as a disorder in DSM-II), and also pressure from health insurance companies for 
tighter regulation, contributed to the need for yet further revisions to the official 
guidelines. Consequentially, alternative, more specific guidelines (“Feighner criteria”) 
were developed, with rules that specified the number of symptoms required for each 
diagnosis, and a more detailed portrayal of the nature of the symptoms themselves 
(Feighner et al., 1972). This also provided the model for the revised DSM-III, 
published in 1980 and quickly accepted, with journals requiring authors to confirm 
their patients had been diagnosed according to these standards.
Despite claims of increased reliability following DSM-III (Hyler, Williams & 
Spitzer, 1982; Klerman, 1986), two further major revisions have taken place, in 1987 
(DSM-III-R) and 1994 (DSM-IV), and a text revision in 2000 (DSM-IV-TR). 
Currently work is underway on DSM-V, which is due to be published in 2012.
However, many authors (both psychiatrists and non-psychiatrists) continue to 
question the reliability of these new systems (e.g., Kutchins & Kirk, 1997; McGorry 
et al., 1995). Moreover, the presence of competing systems remains a source of 
concern. A comparison of the diagnoses suggested by DSM-II-R, ICD-10 and a 
variant of the Feighner criteria (the Research Diagnostic Criteria) in a group of over
42
700 patients found that 371, 387 and 268 participants respectively would be 
diagnosed with schizophrenia (van Os et al., 1999). This has led some researchers to 
advocate the use of several criteria sets simultaneously; a polydiagnostic approach 
(McGuffin, Farmer & Harvey, 1991).
As such, it is clear that despite the considerable cross-decade efforts, the 
categorisation of psychotic illnesses remains controversial and tentative. Furthermore, 
some changes in definition may reflect the medical context of the time. Boyle (1990) 
has suggested that Kraepelin’s work was influenced by the prevalence of encephalitis 
lethargica between 1916-1927, which left afflicted patients with tremors or catatonic- 
like symptoms and thus could have been diagnosed as dementia praecox. Indeed, 
these issues regarding reliability could be predicted. Any categorical diagnostic 
system that attempts to provide a simple answer to a complex multifactorial disorder 
can be disputed if the symptoms really exist along a continuum. One way of avoiding 
some of these issues is to follow the cognitive neuropsychiatric tradition, by focusing 
on symptoms (e.g., hallucinations and delusions).
2.2.3 The cognitive neuropsychiatric approach
One difficulty with much of syndrome-led psychiatric research remains the 
inherently subjective and unrealistic nature of its diagnosis. By classifying patients 
according to a ‘syndrome’, arbitrary distinctions may separate individuals with similar 
symptoms into different diagnostic groups. Furthermore, as Marshall and Halligan 
(1996, p.5) note, there is “no guarantee that patients within a particular taxonomic 
category have anything in common with each other, other than the diagnostic label 
itself’. Indeed, when Copeland et al. (1971) presented clinicians with the same 
vignette, 69% of US psychiatrists but only 2% of British psychiatrists diagnosed
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schizophrenia. Thus, as Read (2004, p.45) points out, “for decades ‘schizophrenia’ 
researchers on either side of the Atlantic were researching different groups of people”.
To avoid some of the arbitrary and controversial distinctions between various 
syndromes, some researchers have chosen to instead examine different symptoms 
associated with these (Bentall, Jackson & Pilgrim, 1988; Persons, 1986). As well as 
shifting the focus onto a more tangible and ultimately more quantifiable aspect of the 
psychiatric illness, this approach allows the researcher to make a more direct 
comparison between the processes that appear to be dysfunctional in these disorders 
and their healthy counterparts. This developed from the cognitive neuropsychological 
approach (Ellis & Young, 1990), where researchers interested in drawing inferences 
about cognitive processes (e.g., reading) studied the dysfunctions of these processes in 
brain-damaged patients. In a similar manner, cognitive neuropsychiatry is concerned 
with the study of processes such as belief formation, where dysfunctions are 
associated with psychiatric disorders.
The cognitive neuropsychiatric perspective emphasises (1) the study of 
symptoms (independent of psychiatric syndrome) and (2) that delusions, as unusual 
beliefs, cannot be fully explained without an understanding of the normal processes 
by which beliefs are formed and maintained. Indeed, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, debates regarding the similarities of delusions to beliefs can only be fully 
addressed by reference to a (currently non-universal) definition of belief. By studying 
both healthy and abnormal beliefs, it is possible to build a testable cognitive model of 
the processes involved in their formation.
One of the best examples of the use of this approach was that proposed by 
Ellis and Young (1990) for Capgras syndrome (the belief that a loved one has been 
replaced by an identical impostor). Ellis and Young suggest that patients draw this
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conclusion as the result of a deficit mirroring that of patients with prosopagnosia (the 
inability to recognise faces). In prosopagnosia, patients are unable to explicitly 
recognise faces but typically retain a differential skin conductance response for 
familiar compared to unfamiliar faces (an implicit recognition measure) (Tranel & 
Damasio, 1985). Ellis and Young (1990) hypothesised that whilst patients with 
Capgras syndrome were able to recognise faces, their implicit recognition was 
impaired. This was confirmed by later studies (Ellis et al., 1997; Hirstein & 
Ramachandran, 1997). The delusion was thought to develop as a result of attempting 
to integrate these disparate familiarity cues, along with other psychological factors 
which mean that this belief is not rejected in light of its apparent unlikeliness 
(Halligan & David, 2001).
Thus far, cognitive neuropsychiatric research into models of belief (e.g., 
Coltheart et al., 2007) has focused on relatively rare but typically circumscribed 
delusional beliefs (e.g., Capgras syndrome), given the more precise nature of these 
deficits. In contrast recent investigations focusing on a continuum of psychotic 
symptoms have looked at the equivalent counterparts of more common non-bizarre 
(i.e., logically possible) delusions. As the factors contributing to delusion formation 
are likely to be many, it is important to consider the range of delusional types before 
attempting a definition of delusion.
2.3 TYPES OF DELUSION
Following Schneider’s (1959) suggestions, delusions remain an important and 
distinctive component when diagnosing psychosis. They are especially characteristic 
of schizophrenia, with 90% of patients with this diagnosis reporting delusions at some 
point during their illness (Hirsch & Weinberger, 2003). Furthermore, the type of
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delusion (see Table 2.1 for examples of delusional themes) can have a significant 
impact on the nature of the diagnosis.
2.3.1 Different diagnoses
While schizophrenia is the most common diagnosis involving delusions, there 
is also the possibility of “delusional disorder”. Delusional disorder itself is extremely 
uncommon, with an estimated 0.03% of the population affected (Hillert et al., 2004). 
It is primarily a single symptom diagnosis - while hallucinations can be present, these 
are not prominent (APA, 2000), whereas patients with schizophrenia often have 
auditory hallucinations (Roberts & Stock, 2005). In addition to being differentiated by 
the presence of other symptoms, these diagnoses can sometimes be distinguished by 
the nature of the delusional beliefs. Delusions associated with schizophrenia may have 
a bizarre quality, whereas individuals with delusional disorder are commonly 
systematic and coherent in their beliefs (Guryanova, Smith & Toricelli, 2006). These 
content-based differences will be considered in more detail below.
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Table 2.1. Recurrent themes of reported clinical delusions (adapted from Bell, Halligan & Ellis, 2006b)
Delusional Theme Example
Delusional disorder (DSM defined)
Persecutory “The Mafia are out to get me”
Grandiose “I have special talents that other people fail to recognise”
Jealous “My partner is cheating on me”
Erotomanic “A celebrity is secretly in love with me”
Somatic: General “I am deformed”
Somatic: Delusional parasitosis “1 am infected by tiny parasites”
Mis identification (Bizarre*)
Capgras syndrome ______________“My relatives have been replaced by identical looking impostors”
Reduplicative paramnesia: Place “This location exists in two places simultaneously”
Reduplicative paramnesia: Person “That person exists in two places simultaneously”
Fregoli syndrome “The same person is disguising himself as others”
Mirrored self misidentification “The reflection in the mirror is not me”
Somatoparaphrenia “Part of my body doesn’t belong to me”
Subjective doubles “There is another person who looks and acts like me”
Control (Bizarre)
Thought insertion/withdrawal “Thoughts are being inserted into/withdrawn from my mind”
External control “My mind/body is being controlled by an external agent”
Other
Reference (Non-bizarre)_____________ “Articles in magazines are written especially for me”
Nihilistic (Non-bizarre) “The world is about to end”
Cotard delusion (Bizarre) “I am dead”
Lycanthropy (Bizarre) “I am/have transformed into an animal”
* The bizarre/ non-bizarre distinction is determined here by the generic example given and may not always hold for individual cases
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2.3.2 Bizarre vs. non-bizarre
DSM-IV defines delusions as bizarre when they are clearly implausible, not 
understandable and do not derive from ordinary life experiences. Bizarre delusions 
have a key influence on the DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia (see 
Box 1), since even one such delusion is sufficient to fulfil the characteristic symptom 
requirements for diagnosis. The boundaries between bizarre and non-bizarre, 
however, are not always clear, and there is disagreement even between experienced 
clinicians (Flaum, Arndt & Andreasen, 1991). As well as having implications for the 
study of delusions, this lack of specificity has potentially life-altering consequences 
when a diagnosis of mental illness (i.e., schizophrenia) relies so heavily upon it.
Box 1: DSM-IV-TR Diagnostic Criteria for Schizophrenia (APA, 2000)
Criterion A. Characteristic symptoms: For a diagnosis o f  schizophrenia, at least two o f  the 
follow ing sym ptom s must be present over a 1-month period:
(1) D elusions
(2) Hallucinations
(3) D isorganized speech
(4) Grossly disorganized or catatonic behaviour
(5) N egative sym ptom s
H owever, only one o f  the Criterion A  symptoms is required if:
D elusions are bizarre
Hallucinations consist o f  a voice keeping up a running commentary on the person's 
behaviour or thoughts
Hallucinations consist o f  two or more voices conversing with each other 
In addition, a person must meet criteria B (Social/occupational dysfunction) and C (6 month 
duration) to qualify for diagnosis.
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2.3.2.1 Types o f non-bizarre delusions
Non-bizarre delusions present in both schizophrenia and delusional disorder 
(indeed, delusions must be non-bizarre for a diagnosis of delusional disorder: see Box 
2). The delusional theme thought to be most common, ideas of reference (an estimated 
92.5% of psychotic patients hold such ideas: Bowins & Shugar, 1998), is typically 
non-bizarre, although not a subtype of delusional disorder. There are five subtypes of 
delusional disorder, defined largely by the content of the delusion: erotomanic, 
grandiose, jealous, persecutory or somatic. These are also amongst the most common 
delusional themes, present in several different psychiatric disorders: with an estimated 
72.5% of psychotic patients reporting persecutory ideas, 57.5% grandiose ideas, 
17.5% somatic concerns and 5% ideas of jealousy (Bowins & Shugar, 1998). It is 
worth noting that whilst these subtypes of delusion may be non-bizarre, in individual 
cases it may be more appropriate to classify these as bizarre, depending on the 
justification and wider web of beliefs associated with the delusion.
Box 2: DSM-IV-TR Diagnostic Criteria for Delusional Disorder (APA, 2000)
All the fo llow in g criteria must be fulfilled for a diagnosis o f  delusional disorder:
A. Non-bizarre delusions: D elusions that can occur in real life, held over a 1 -month period
B. D iagnosis for schizophrenia is not met
C. A side from the consequences o f  holding the delusion, functioning is not impaired nor behaviour 
odd
D. I f  present, m ood disturbances have been brief relative to delusion duration
E. The delusion is not the direct result o f  physiological (e.g ., drug) effects or another general 
medical condition
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23.2.2 Types o f bizarre delusion
Two groups of delusions that tend to be classified as bizarre are delusions of 
control and delusions of misidentification (see Table 2.1). Delusions of control (e.g., 
ideas of thought insertion/withdrawal or thoughts/actions being manipulated by an 
external source) are relatively common: Bowins and Shugar (1998) report that ideas 
of thought insertion and external control are endorsed by 22.5% and 40% of psychotic 
patients respectively.
In contrast, delusions of misidentification (DM) are very rare; one study 
reported them as accounting for only 4.1% of admissions for psychotic illness (Kirov, 
Jones & Lewis, 1994). Tamam et al. (2003) reported a five year prevalence of 1.3% 
for Capgras syndrome, and other delusions of misidentification or Cotard delusion are 
believed to be even rarer (Forstl et al., 1991; McClenahan & Westphal, 2006). These 
delusions are thought to develop following impairment in an individual’s ability to 
recognise people (or places) known to them, or even to recognise themselves (e.g., 
Ellis & Young, 1990). They are more likely than other delusions to be circumscribed, 
and often occur as a result of brain injury, but also can present in disorders such as 
Alzheimer’s (Forstl et al., 1994) and schizophrenia (Edelstyn & Oyebode, 1999).
Another bizarre delusion, Cotard delusion (similarly often found following 
brain trauma) has been linked to Capgras delusion, and may be due to a global 
affective processing deficit (Gerrans, 2003).
2.4 DEFINING DELUSION
Considering the wide range of beliefs described as delusional, it is important 
to establish the core features that a delusion must possess to satisfy the current 
psychiatric diagnosis. It seems clear that content alone is not sufficient, given the non-
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bizarre nature of many beliefs (e.g., those found in delusional disorder). Instead the 
way in which a belief is held (i.e., the conviction, preoccupation or distress associated 
with the delusion) plays a critical role.
Of the individuals described in the preceding historical summary, Jaspers drew 
most attention to the individual symptom of delusion. As discussed earlier, Jaspers 
distinguished between what he termed ‘true’ or primary delusional beliefs that were 
‘irreducible’ and those that could be understood as the result of the individual’s 
personality and past experiences. Jaspers (1963, pp. 95-96) defined ‘true’ delusions as 
false judgements, with four qualifying characteristics:
(1) Held with extraordinary conviction
(2) Impervious to other experiences and compelling counter-argument
(3) Impossible content
(4) Ununderstandable
By ‘ununderstandable’, Jaspers meant that an observer could not understand 
the belief in terms of the holder’s background or experiences, but rather the belief 
seemingly arose in the absence of any meaningful context. However, as Bentall (2003, 
p.28) comments, “far from making the borderline between normality and madness 
more objective, [this final criterion] introduces an alarming degree of subjectivity”. 
The judgement of what constitutes a meaningful context for a delusion remains 
unclear. Indeed, as is apparent from Table 2.1, delusional content themes usually 
contain an explicitly personally-relevant element (with the exceptions of reduplicative 
paramnesia and nihilism in these examples). This feature is confirmed by findings 
from several clinical studies. Garety, Everitt and Hemsley (1988) reported that only 4 
out of their sample of 55 patients described delusions that did not directly integrate 
themselves. Moreover, Bowins and Shugar (1998) estimated that 92.5% of psychotic
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patients held ideas of reference, which are necessarily refer to the individual 
concerned. Thus in most cases delusions have an understandability at least for the 
subject reporting them, in that they originate from and appear to link in with (e.g., as a 
way of explaining events or perceptions) the patient’s own background.
Given concerns regarding the ‘ununderstandability’ distinction, it is not 
surprising that only the first three of Jaspers’s criteria are advocated in the DSM-IV- 
TR (APA, 2000) definition of a delusion:
‘A false belief (1A) based on incorrect inference about external reality (2) 
that is firmly sustained (3) despite what almost everybody believes (4A) and 
despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the 
contrary (IB). The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members o f 
the person *s culture or subculture (4B) (e.g. it is not an article o f religious 
faith). ’
There remain substantial criticisms of this APA definition, however. These criteria 
and limitations are discussed in detail below, with reference to the particular clauses 
indicated by the numbers in brackets.
(I) A false belief fheld/  despite incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the 
contrary
In chapter 1 the case for treating delusions as beliefs was accepted, although 
this view is not without its critics. However, this first statement may still be criticised 
on the grounds that a delusion need not necessarily be false. Delusions may begin as 
false, but actually become true, as in cases where delusions of infidelity led to conflict 
in the patient’s relationship, which in turn caused the belief to become reality (Jaspers, 
1963). Indeed, Davies et al. (2001) argue that the content of a delusion may happen to
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be true, but this should still be considered a delusion as long as the holder has no good 
reason to maintain this belief.
One major difficulty is our inability to categorically classify a belief as false 
(as discussed above) or bizarre (Bell, Halligan & Ellis, 2003). Delusions may be 
unfalsifiable in that they are value statements, e.g., ‘I am an amazing artist’ (as a 
grandiose delusion), or if they are of a religious nature. Moreover, non-bizarre 
delusions, such as delusional jealousy, are inherently plausible (albeit deemed 
unlikely), with the clinician’s judgement of credibility as the deciding factor in 
diagnosis, again bringing a high degree of subjectivity to each diagnosis. Indeed, for a 
busy clinician, ascertaining the truth of such claims may be impossible and/or an 
inappropriate expense of time. However, this is not a trivial decision, given the 
‘enormous implications for diagnosis and treatment, as well as complex notions 
concerning responsibility, prediction o f behaviour, etc. ’ (David, 1999, p. 17).
For example, the case of Martha Mitchell (Maher, 1988) illustrates how 
cultural or political perceptions can colour the diagnostic procedure. The wife of US 
Attorney General John Mitchell (who served under President Nixon), Martha Mitchell 
contacted the press after details of the Watergate scandal began to emerge, to divulge 
information regarding the role her husband and his colleagues had played. Her claims 
that illegal activities were being carried out by the government led to a smear 
campaign against her, and she was discredited and labelled as delusional. She was 
subsequently vindicated by the release of further information confirming her 
originally far-fetched sounding story.
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(2) Incorrect inference about external reality
Linked to the first set of criticisms (1) is the notion of delusions involving an 
incorrect inference. Although there is evidence of reasoning biases in patients with 
delusions (e.g., Garety & Hemsley, 1994), which will be covered later in this chapter, 
the difficulties outlined above in determining the falsity or otherwise of a belief 
remain.
Moreover, the second part of this statement raises a further concern - not all 
delusions are necessarily formed by reference to external reality. Coltheart (2007) 
gives the example of ‘thoughts are inserted into my mind by others’, which would 
generally be considered as delusional despite its internal basis. In fact, several 
delusions refer to internal thought processes (e.g., thought broadcasting, thought 
withdrawal).
(3) Firmly sustained
Delusions vary in their bizarreness (see Table 2.1), the degree of conviction 
they are held with, and the extent to which participants are preoccupied with or 
distressed by them (Appelbaum et al., 1999; Garety & Hemsley, 1987; Kendler, 
Glazer & Morgenstem, 1983). Given that the content of the belief may not in itself be 
sufficient to warrant diagnosis, delusions (in particular, those categorised as non- 
bizarre) are often distinguished on the basis of the intensity (e.g., conviction) with 
which they are judged to be held. While delusions may persist for years (Harrow, 
Rattenbury & Stoll, 1988; Harrow et al., 1995), changes to content and intensity have 
also been described (Appelbaum et al., 2004; Kuipers et al., 1997; Sharp et al., 1996). 
Indeed, some patients report varying levels of conviction over the period of a single
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day (Myin-Germeys et al., 2001), or even agree to the possibility that they could be 
mistaken in their belief (Garety et al., 2005).
Despite this, some degree of conviction is considered an important criterion in 
diagnosing delusion. The DSM-IV-TR considers obsessive-compulsive disorder to 
involve delusional disorder if the obsession reaches ‘delusional proportions \ 
Similarly, if an imagined defect in body dysmorphic disorder is ‘held with delusional 
intensity ’, an additional diagnosis of delusional disorder is made. However, Phillips et 
al. (1994) compared patients with delusional and non-delusional forms of body 
dysmorphic disorder and found that there were no major differences between the two 
groups in terms of their response to treatment or results on various measures. Some 
authors have suggested a category of partial delusions (Wing, Cooper & Sartorius, 
1974) consisting of delusions without complete conviction. However, Mullen (2003) 
criticises this idea, arguing that the term ‘delusional’ would lose all meaning if it 
becomes synonymous with ‘severe’. Cutting (1997) also criticises this emphasis on 
conviction in delusions as naive.
This highlights another challenge in establishing an adequate definition of 
delusion (one not fully addressed by the DSM definition) - the distinction between 
delusions and other forms of belief (e.g., overvalued ideas). David (1999) provides a 
useful illustration of this problem. He suggests that a belief in alien abduction may not 
be delusional but many people would doubt it (referring to such beliefs as ‘daft’), 
whereas a belief that one needs to lose weight when already dangerously thin is 
usually classed as an overvalued idea. Nevertheless, it is clear that such ideas have 
much in common with delusional beliefs, demonstrating the ill-defined boundaries 
between these categories.
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(4) Despite what almost everybody believes, i.e., not a belief ordinarily accepted by 
other members o f the person’s culture or subculture
A major and neglected issue in defining delusion concerns this final statement 
of the DSM definition. Interestingly, without this statement, the definition would 
seem to include religious or paranormal beliefs. Religious beliefs (like paranormal 
beliefs) typically lie outside the clinical domain, despite the fact that they cannot be 
rationally explained. As suggested by DSM, the distinction between these and 
delusional beliefs seems primarily to be the perceived number of people considered to 
hold these beliefs. (Although work by Harris and colleagues [Harris, 2002; Harris & 
Koenig, 2006] suggests religion is taught and spoken about in a different way from 
other beliefs.) There is a major difficulty distinguishing such beliefs on the grounds of 
sheer numbers, however, as there is little knowledge of the beliefs held within any 
population (Chapter 5 will address this issue in more detail). Furthermore, as Moor 
and Tucker (1979) point out, it is not impossible for the majority of people to be 
mistaken. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that subcultures may actually form around 
delusional beliefs (Bell, Maiden et al., 2006).
These debates highlight the blurred boundaries between different 
categorisations of belief, as characterised by DSM. Thus, as David (1999, p. 17) 
observed, there is ‘no acceptable (rather than accepted) definition o f a delusion'.
2.5 THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF DELUSION
Despite the ongoing controversy and dissatisfaction regarding the definition of 
delusion, studies have nevertheless utilised this categorisation to further investigate 
these beliefs. Theories of delusion formation generally fall into two camps: (1) those
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that concentrate on perceived motivational influences and cognitive biases, and (2) 
those focusing on potential anomalous experiences that may play a critical role in the 
belief process. The former tend to primarily focus on non-bizarre (in particular, 
persecutory) delusions, whereas the latter often consider bizarre delusions to illustrate 
their models. As can be seen from the model of persecutory delusion formation used 
by Freeman et al. (2002) (see Figure 2.1), this is often just a matter of emphasis (in 
reference to the particular delusion type in mind), with researchers acknowledging 
that both factors may actually play a role. This section outlines the key theories of 
delusion formation.
PRECIPITANT
ANOMALOUS
EMOTION: BELIEFS +  
ABOUT THE SELF, 
OTHERS, AND THE 
WORLD
>  EXPERIENCES/ 
AROUSAL
+  COGNITIVE BIASES 
ASSOCIATED WITH
PSYCHOSIS
A SEARCH FOR 
MEANING
SELECTION OF AN 
EXPLANATION
(mediated by beliefs about 
illness, social factors, and 
belief flexibility)
THE THREAT 
BELIEF
Figure 2.1. Summary of the formation of a persecutory delusion (from Freeman et al., 
2002). This model integrates factors (cognitive/motivational influences and 
anomalous perceptual experiences) highlighted by both approaches outlined above.
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There are several cognitive biases proposed to contribute to or account for delusion 
formation (summarised in Table 2.2). Some of these have been developed with 
particular reference to certain types of delusions, whereas others are hypothesised to 
play a role in the formation of all or most delusions. Given the varied nature of 
delusion, it seems likely that there are several routes to delusion formation, with these 
types of factors playing roles to differing degrees for each. The proposed factors will 
be discussed in turn below.
Table 2.2. The main cognitive factors proposed to contribute to delusion formation
Proposed deficit/bias Main account Key proponents
Perceptual experience Delusions result from normal 
reasoning applied to abnormal 
perceptual experiences
Maher (1999)
Belief evaluation Deficit/bias in the belief formation 
process leads to unlikely 
hypotheses (generated by 
perceptual experiences, see above) 
being accepted as beliefs
Stone and Young 
(1997)
Langdon and Coltheart 
(2000)
Coltheart et al. (2007)
Face processing Capgras delusion stems from 
reasoning bias, 
and a covert affective face 
processing deficit
Ellis et al. (1997)
Ellis and Lewis (2001)
Attribution processes Persecutory delusions are the 
result of excessive attribution of 
negative events to other people in 
an attempt to protect self-esteem
Bentall et al. (2001)
Inferential reasoning 'Jumping to conclusions' reasoning 
style causes delusional beliefs to 
be formed from low levels of 
perceptual information
Garety and Hemsley 
(1994)
Garety and Freeman 
(1999)
Metacognitive beliefs Delusions result from information 
that is accurately perceived but is 
misinterpreted due to faulty self 
and social knowledge
Morrison (2001)
Metarepresentation Delusions of reference, 
misinterpretation and persecution 
may result from misinterpretation 
of another person’s behaviour or 
intentions; Delusions of control 
may result from the loss of the 
ability to identify self-generated 
thoughts and actions as one’s own
Frith (1992)
Garety and Freeman 
(1999)
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2.5.1 The role of anomalous perceptual experiences
Anomalous experiences (AE) have been suggested as a necessary and 
understandable condition for delusion formation (Maher, 1988; Stone & Young, 
1997). As such, AE have been implicated in the cause of some major delusions of 
misidentification. Capgras delusion, the belief that (usually) someone close to the 
affected individual has been replaced by an impostor, was predicted to result from a 
loss of the expected feeling of familiarity one should get when perceiving a known 
face (Ellis & Young, 1990). As expected from this account, studies showed that when 
Capgras patients viewed familiar faces the usual skin conductance responses were 
absent (Ellis et al., 1997; Hirstein & Ramachandran, 1997). Similarly, Breen et al. 
(2001) examined patients with mirrored-self misidentification (where individuals 
misidentify their reflection); finding that one had a deficit in face recognition, and a 
second was impaired in his ability to correctly understand the workings of a mirror. 
Thus there is evidence of anomalous perceptual experiences being present in patients 
with delusions.
Further support for this proposal comes from the strong associations between 
hallucinations (a form of anomalous perceptual experience) and delusions, noted 
within both clinical and non-clinical samples (Bilder et al., 1985; Johns et al., 2002; 
Laroi & van der Linden, 2005; Lewinsohn, 1970; Liddle, 1987; Lincoln, 2007; 
Mortimer et al., 1996; Peralta et al., 1992; Verdoux et al., 1998). Furthermore, 
findings indicate that hearing difficulties (a cause of AE) are associated with 
psychotic symptoms (Cooper & Curry, 1976; David et al., 1995; Stefanis et al., 2006). 
Indeed, delusions have been elicited from patients who are encountering anomalous 
experiences: Zimbardo et al. (1981) hypnotised participants and induced temporary 
deafness, leading to an increase in reported paranoid ideas. However, further evidence
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suggests that simply generating an unusual AE is not sufficient to lead participants to 
develop an abnormal belief (Blakemore et al., 2003; Cahill et al., 1996).
These ideas that AE provide for delusion have been especially prominent in 
the two-factor model (Coltheart et al., 2007; Davies et al., 2001; Langdon & 
Coltheart, 2000). This model builds on the ideas of Maher (1988), but argues that the 
perceptual experience alone does not seem sufficient to account for the development 
and maintenance of a delusion; patients could instead acknowledge their perceptual 
deficit. Indeed, patients with Capgras often report other delusional ideas (Young, 
1994), suggesting an additional, more cognitive or psychological problem. Coltheart 
et al. (2007) use the example of patients with a right temporoparietal lesion and 
resulting hemiplegia. Some of these patients may develop anosognosia (i.e., deny or 
show unawareness of their paralysis), and of these a few may further develop the 
delusion of somatoparaphrenia (that a part of one’s body belongs to someone else). 
However, it is clear that, given the number of patients who do not develop this 
delusion, an additional factor is necessary. Moreover, as the patients that go on to 
develop the delusion have right-hemisphere damage, then this is the obvious 
candidate for the location of a belief evaluation system. Indeed, patients with Capgras 
have also been shown to have right-hemisphere damage (Edelstyn & Oyebode, 1999; 
Feinberg & Shapiro, 1989). The two-factor model suggests that in addition to the 
perceptual deficit, a second deficit in this belief evaluation system is necessary to 
account for delusional beliefs. However, there remain difficulties for this model; for 
instance, this would predict that the beliefs should be stable, whereas studies have 
indicated that belief conviction varies (Coltheart, 2007). Coltheart (2007) offers a 
speculative account of this, suggesting that if belief evaluation was defective but not 
defunct, this could be explained in terms of the salience of evidence at the point in
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time (e.g., presentation of sufficient contradictory evidence could lead to the 
individual no longer reporting the delusion at some points, whereas at other times 
their perceptual input would override this).
Other difficulties are highlighted by findings that AE are distributed 
throughout the normal population and a significant number of patients with delusions 
do not report such abnormalities (Bell, Halligan & Ellis, 2006c), indicating that this 
may be a contributory factor rather than a necessary condition. Similarly, evidence 
casting doubt on the universality of this hypothesis comes from Chapman and 
Chapman’s (1988) interviews with students scoring high on schizotypy, which found 
that not all those reporting delusional ideas reported anomalous experiences and vice 
versa. They also report that there were seldom obvious potential causal links between 
reported experiences and beliefs. Moreover, Escher et al. (2002) report that only 9% 
of their sample of child voice hearers developed delusions over a three year period. 
While the causal importance of APEs for delusions has yet to be determined, it seems 
likely that this is a contributory factor, but will not hold for all delusional beliefs. This 
issue is picked up in Chapter 6, where the degree of association and dissociation 
between anomalous beliefs and experiences will be considered in detail.
2.5.2 The role of cognitive biases
2.5.2.1 Attributional and attentional biases
Several studies have found evidence for both attributional and attentional 
biases in patients with delusions, although much of this work has largely focused on 
those with persecutory beliefs. Kaney and Bentall (1989) found that paranoid patients 
tended to report explanations for negative events that extended to all aspects of their 
lives and were impossible to avoid or change. Furthermore, patients with persecutory
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delusions showed an externalising bias: a tendency to assume responsibility for 
positive events and blame external situations for negative outcomes (Candido & 
Romney, 1990; Kaney & Bentall, 1989, 1992; Krstev, Jackson & Maude, 1999). This 
was later refined to include a personalising bias, whereby patients tended to blame 
other people rather than general external situations (Beck & Proctor, 2002; Freeman 
& Garety, 2004; Kinderman & Bentall, 1996). However, Sharp, Fear and Healy 
(1997) found that this bias only occurred in those reporting paranoid or grandiose 
ideas rather than other delusional themes.
In addition, some differences have been noted regarding attention in people 
with paranoid delusions, whereby they pay selective attention to self-referential, and, 
in particular, threatening information (Bentall & Kaney, 1989; Fear et al., 1996; 
Kinderman, 1994). Furthermore, there is some evidence that these biases are 
specifically linked to the presence of delusions. One patient with both Cotard and 
Capgras delusions was slower to name the colours of words in the Stroop test when 
these related to her delusions during an acute phase of her illness but had no 
difficulties when these delusions had remitted (Leafhead et al., 1996). Moreover, 
patients are more likely to recall threatening episodes (Kaney et al., 1992), which 
could lead to the propagation of these beliefs (Blackwood et al., 2001). However, 
Phillips and colleagues (Phillips & David, 1997; Phillips et al., 2000) found that 
patients with paranoid delusions did not attend more to threatening stimuli; in fact 
they seemed faster at identifying potential threat but then moved on to scan the 
remainder of the stimuli quickly.
Bentall et al. (2001) focus on attentional and attributional biases to address the 
formation of persecutory delusions. Their model emphasises the attributional style
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and self-representation of the individual (see Figure 2.2). They propose that 
persecutory delusions are the result o f attempting to minimise discrepancies between 
patients’ actual and ideal selves, by blaming others for negative events.
Mood
Stored knowledge 
about the self
(beliefs, memories)
Attributions
(internal, external- 
personal or external -  
situational)
Beliefs about 
Others
(including paranoid 
beliefs)
Situation-relevant
information
(including beliefs about 
others’ mental states)
Person-relevant
inform ation
(accentuated by 
attention to threat- 
related stimuli)
Event
Figure 2.2. The attribution -  self-representation cycle (from Bentall & Kaney, 2001)
The authors believe that negative beliefs about the self can lower implicit self-esteem, 
even though explicit reports of self-esteem may be high, a view supported by studies 
suggesting that self-esteem is affected by attributions in both healthy and delusional 
individuals (Kinderman et al., 2003). However, not all studies attempting to compare 
overt and covert self-esteem have supported this hypothesis (Krstev et al., 1999), and
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different measures of attributional style have not always correlated with persecutory 
ideation (Martin & Penn, 2002). On the other hand, recent findings using the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT: Greenwald et al., 1998) have suggested that this may provide 
a better means of distinguishing implicit and explicit self-esteem (Greenwald & 
Famham, 2000). Using this method, Jordan et al. (2003) showed that discrepancies 
between implicit and explicit self-esteem were associated with defensiveness. 
Moreover, while patients with schizophrenia have been reported to have lower covert 
and overt self-esteem than healthy controls, paranoid patients have been found to have 
higher explicit self-esteem than non-paranoid patients (Moritz et al., 2006). However, 
a similar study found only weaker evidence for Bentall et al.’s hypothesis (McKay et 
al., 2007a): while patients with current persecutory delusions scored lower overall on 
measures of both covert and overt self-esteem, only the differences in covert self­
esteem remained after controlling for depression.
The somewhat equivocal findings in this area suggest that this hypothesis may 
be appropriate for some but not all cases of delusions. Indeed, further difficulties for 
this account come from findings suggesting that self-esteem does not lower as 
delusions improve (Freeman et al., 1998). In addition, Bowins and Shugar (1998) 
found that persecutory delusions were among the most self-diminishing delusions and 
that lower self-esteem was linked to more self-diminishing delusions. This highlights 
another aspect that has been incorporated into models of delusion -  the idea of a direct 
link between emotions and the development of delusional beliefs (Garety et al., 2001), 
as included in the Freeman et al. (2002) adaptation of this model for persecutory 
beliefs (see Figure 2.1).
These authors (Freeman et al., 2002; Garety et al., 2001) also include the idea 
of AE leading to delusional beliefs. Garety et al. (2001) suggest that biased appraisal
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processes (such as those identified by Bentall and colleagues) could result in these 
experiences being judged as externally motivated rather than as the result of an 
internal process. Freeman and Garety (2004) further suggest that maintaining the 
delusion provides the individual with an explanation for any ongoing experiences, and 
therefore resolves cognitive dissonance. In addition, McKay et al. (2007b) have also 
combined deficit and motivational approaches in an update to the original two-factor 
model. In this modified account, the first factor constitutes the sources of information 
providing for a particular delusional belief (including anomalous perceptual 
experiences and defensive desires). The second factor comprises biases in belief 
evaluation, such as unwarranted influence of unreliable sensory information or 
motivational factors. In this manner, many of the accounts have converged to some 
degree, allowing for the incorporation of a range of contributory factors.
These ideas have been further expanded by Young (2008), who highlights the 
limitations of linear-focused models, advocating instead an interactionist model, 
which allows for both bottom-up and top-down processes, thus providing the potential 
for anomalous experiences and delusions to feed into each other. For example, Young 
(2008) suggests that Capgras beliefs may form following an AE, but it is the delusion 
itself that leads to the maintenance of the experience being perceived in a manner 
consistent with the belief.
2.5.2.2 Reasoning biases
Furthermore, other cognitive biases may contribute to the development of 
some or all delusions to an extent. Patients with delusions also have a tendency to 
jump to conclusions, and to change their minds easily when presented with 
contradictory evidence (Garety et al., 1991; Garety & Hemsley, 1994; Huq et al.,
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1988; Linney et al., 1998). This effect is thought to be more pronounced with 
meaningful stimuli (Dudley et al., 1997a; Young & Bentall, 1997). Moreover, this is 
unlikely to be due to patients responding to the most immediate stimuli in the 
environment, as patients with delusions still follow trends to become more cautious as 
evidence becomes less meaningful (Dudley et al., 1997b; Young & Bentall, 1997). An 
additional bias is suggested as that both patients with paranoid delusions and 
individuals scoring highly on delusional ideation have a higher need for closure (less 
tolerance of ambiguity) than others (Bentall & Swarbrick, 2003; Colbert & Peters, 
2002).
One version of the reasoning bias accounts is the Bayesian account of belief 
formation (Hemsley & Garety, 1986). In these accounts, beliefs are subjective 
probabilities, based on the evidence available at the time, that some proposition is 
true. A failure to update beliefs in accordance with new evidence could lead to the 
belief becoming abnormally tenacious, as with many delusions.
2.5.2.3 Metacognitive beliefs
Previous research has suggested meta-cognitive beliefs (beliefs about one’s 
thought processes) play a critical role in emotional dysfunction (Wells & Matthews, 
1994). Morrison (2001) adapted this idea, emphasising the influence of metacognitive 
beliefs on the development of psychotic symptoms, especially those relating to the 
controllability and causal influence of one’s thoughts, and the degree to which one is 
personally responsible for thought content. Indeed, studies show that patients with 
hallucinations (compared to patients without hallucinations) and hallucination-prone 
individuals (compared to non-hallucination-prone subjects) report differences in 
metacognitive beliefs, in particular those relating to controllability of thoughts (Laroi
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& van der Linden, 2005; Morrison & Wells, 2003). These metacognitive appraisals of 
belief processes may determine the degree to which an individual is distressed by a 
particular experience (e.g., a person who believes that all their thoughts should always 
be controllable is likely to be more distressed by intrusive or unpleasant thoughts than 
someone who does not hold such a belief). Given that the continuum account suggests 
anomalous experiences occur in the non-clinical population, maladaptive 
metacognitive beliefs may be one factor that increases the likelihood of an experience 
developing into a psychiatric symptom, mediated by the associated degree of distress. 
However, the influence of metacognitive beliefs was originally considered in terms of 
more general psychological distress, and even when focusing on psychotic symptoms 
this theory has been developed mainly with reference to hallucinations. As such, 
while metacognitive beliefs may be a contributory factor to delusion formation, study 
of these is limited in terms of its insight into the specific correlates of delusions.
2.5.2,4 Theory o f mind deficits
Another key cognitive deficit implicated in delusions, highlighted by Frith 
(1994), focuses on the ability of patients with schizophrenia to complete theory of 
mind (ToM) tasks. Theory of mind deficits are often associated with autistic spectrum 
disorders (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995), but are regarded as milder and more transient 
(present only during psychotic episodes) in schizophrenia, suggesting this is a state 
rather than trait variable (Pickup & Frith, 2001). Frith and Corcoran (1996) found that 
both patients with current paranoid delusions and those with predominantly negative 
symptoms were impaired on higher order ToM tasks, but only with the latter group 
was this associated with IQ scores. Further studies indicated deficits in other higher 
order ToM tasks (Corcoran, Cahill & Frith, 1997; Corcoran, Frith & Mercer, 1995),
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and with patients with delusions other than paranoia (Drury et al., 1998). However, 
some evidence suggests that patients may have good ToM performance even when 
delusions are present (Walston et al., 2000), and others failed to find associations with 
persecutory delusions but rather with thought disorder (Sarfati et al., 1999) or 
negative symptoms (Langdon et al., 1997). Moreover, conversational interactions 
with patients with schizophrenia do not reveal ToM deficits (McCabe et al., 2004). As 
with the results on attributional and attentional biases, the multiple aetiology and 
presentation of delusion makes it difficult to fully evaluate the impact of each 
cognitive factor.
2.5.3 Physiological models
In addition to the cognitive models outlined above, physiological theories regarding 
delusion formation have been proposed. These are briefly outlined below, but, given 
the focus of this thesis on cognitive mechanisms, will not be discussed in detail.
2.5.3.1 Misattribution o f self-generated thoughts and/or actions
When one performs an action, the body usually sends an internal copy (the 
efference copy) of the motor signals to allow an estimate of the sensory feedback that 
will occur as a result of this movement (corollary discharge). As a result of this 
prediction, one’s awareness of the sensory consequences is modulated and dampened 
(Ford et al., 2007; Heinks-Maldonado et al., 2005; Shergill et al., 2003). Several 
studies have indicated that patients experiencing hallucinations or delusions do not 
have this reduced sensory feedback for their own self-generated speech and/or actions 
(Blakemore et al., 2000; Ford & Mathalon, 2004; Shergill et al., 2005).
68
Proponents of this account note that many of the delusions and hallucinations 
associated with schizophrenia seem to involve a misattribution of self-generated 
thoughts and actions to other people. For example, Blakemore et al. (2002) argued 
that delusions of control could follow from a propensity towards labelling one’s own 
actions as belonging to others, and hallucinations of voices could reflect inner speech 
(Allen et al., 2007). However, whilst this account seems plausible for delusions of 
control, other delusions (e.g., persecutory or grandiose) are less easily accounted for 
by such a failure in physiological mechanisms. Furthermore, this account is subject to 
the same criticism as those relying on other perceptual anomalies; that this alone does 
not seem sufficient to explain the formation and maintenance of the belief.
2,53,2 Dopamine hypothesis
This influential hypothesis suggests that dopamine (DA) plays a key role in the 
manifestation of psychotic symptoms (Kapur, 2003). DA is widely believed to be an 
important mediator of reward pathways, and as such is responsible for the affective 
(attractive/aversive) reactions people experience in response to different external 
stimuli and thus the salience of each stimulus (Kapur, 2003). If this process becomes 
dysregulated, and DA released regardless of the presence of a stimulus, then any 
external objects or internal representations present at that time might become embued 
with an inappropriate level of salience. From this, a delusional web of beliefs may 
form to provide a cognitive explanation for the aberrant salience. As such, the 
dopamine hypothesis acts alongside various psychological processes to contribute to 
delusion formation. One advantage of this approach is that, given the proposed 
process of delusion formation, it allows for individuals with similar dysfunctions to 
react in different ways, thus accounting for the individual variation found with
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delusional beliefs. Furthermore, as people can recover from delusions, this suggests 
that this is not a fixed deficit but rather a result of an abnormal process of belief 
formation.
2.6 SUMMARY
Research into delusions has predominantly focused on those commonly found 
in schizophrenia and delusional disorder (with a particular focus on persecutory 
delusions). A somewhat neglected strand of research concerns those (often 
monothematic) delusions that are generally found in neuropsychiatric conditions (e.g., 
Capgras syndrome). However, research rarely combines delusions from both these 
groups. As such, the models for delusion and/or belief formation proposed as a result 
of these two types of investigations focus on particular phenomena (perceptual 
experiences vs. cognitive biases).
Whilst such models have been useful in conceptualising delusions, as yet, 
these tend to be too specialised when focused primarily on one type of delusion but 
too complex when accounting for the generic processes involved. It is important to 
note that these contributors are not mutually exclusive; both AE and cognitive biases 
could play a role in delusion formation (Freeman et al., 2002; McKay et al., 2007b). 
The importance of each of these biases is likely to vary depending on the type of 
delusion formed, as is reflected by the different emphasis placed on these in different 
models. One element agreed upon by the majority of these approaches is that delusion 
formation occurs as a result of some dysfunction of normal belief formation 
processes. Establishing the characteristics of ‘normal’ beliefs could help to elaborate 
on these processes. The following chapter describes two studies that set out to 
characterise the features of ‘normal’ belief as understood by the general public.
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CHAPTER 3 
CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF BELIEF
3.1 BACKGROUND
Chapters 1 and 2 reviewed the wide ranging literature on belief and delusion. From 
this it is clear that many questions regarding the formation and maintenance of beliefs 
and delusions remain unanswered. One first step towards further investigation of these 
phenomena is to consider how best to approach studies of belief in the general 
population. To do this it is important to establish the key characteristics of belief in 
order to determine whether the assumptions inherent in some current 
conceptualisations of delusions are justified (i.e., whether features, such as the 
stability, coherence and prevalence, of a ‘normal’ belief can be distinguished from 
those of delusion). This chapter describes two preparatory empirical studies 
addressing some methodological and conceptual issues concerning the nature of 
beliefs.
3.1.1 How should we assess reports of ‘belief?
Given that most clinical delusions are typically considered to be a type of 
‘belief, it is of particular interest to establish how people understand or interpret this 
term when they encounter it in the various measures of beliefs, delusions and 
delusional ideation. As yet, no study has formally investigated the characteristics 
associated with this concept, or whether there is a consistent interpretation and usage 
of the term ‘belief throughout the general population. While the consistent use of this 
term seems an inherently plausible assumption, there would be considerable 
methodological difficulties for studies of belief if this was not the case.
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In addition, this study is of theoretical interest, given that both philosophical 
and psychiatric research have referred to the nature of belief, despite the lack of either 
an agreed formal definition or any empirical work to substantiate this concept. Within 
philosophy (see Chapter 1), the validity of the ‘folk psychological’ view of belief has 
been the subject of ongoing debates. Moreover, Chapter 2 described controversies 
relating to the definition of delusion as a form of belief, whereby concerns focused on 
the extent to which the qualities of delusion differed from (what the authors assumed 
to be) the features of a belief. While establishing the general public’s understanding of 
the characteristics of belief does not provide a way to fully overcome these issues, it 
may provide some support for or against previous assumptions concerning the 
features of belief.
An additional and not unrelated issue is that research on delusions, religion 
and other belief-type phenomena has often utilised a variety of terms in their measures 
to describe subjects holding beliefs (e.g., ‘believe’, ‘think’, ‘feel’), and many of these 
have seemingly used such terms interchangeably. No study has as yet confirmed that 
these terms are synonymous, however, leaving their degree of comparability open to 
question.
To address these issues, the aim is to explore two main research questions:
(1) (a) What are the key characteristics or features that people consider the term 
‘belief to imply?
(b) Are these characteristics or features consistently endorsed?
(2) Does people’s use of the term ‘belief differ from their use of other terms (e.g., 
‘think’ and ‘feel’) or are they used synonymously as evidenced by their 
interchangeable use on clinical and research questionnaires?
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Investigation of these questions will allow more accurate conclusions to be drawn 
regarding people’s reports of specific beliefs, particularly by comparison with reports 
that have used similar terms to assess delusions or other beliefs.
3.2 STUDY 1: PEOPLE’S UNDERSTANDING OF ‘BELIEF’
3.2.1 Background
Chapter 1 described growing support for the position that delusions lie on a 
continuum of normal beliefs, where only a minority attain clinical relevance and 
demonstrate any significant morbidity or disability (Blackwood et al., 2001; Claridge, 
1994; Crow et al., 1995; Johns & van Os, 2001; Rutten et al., 2008; Strauss, 1969; van 
Os et al., 2009). In addition, discussion of both the definition and models of delusion 
in Chapter 2 showed that there appears to be considerable support in psychiatry for 
the assumption that delusions are best understood as beliefs resulting from 
dysfunction or abnormal belief processes (e.g., Bentall et al., 2001; Davies et al., 
2001; Freeman, Garety & Kuipers, 2001; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000; Oltmanns & 
Maher, 1988; van Os, 2003). Hence a better understanding of belief in the general 
population would in turn benefit research into delusions.
Much work has been carried out on the prevalence of different beliefs, 
involving health and illness beliefs (e.g., Harvey & Lawson, 2009; Salmon, 
Woloshynowych & Valor, 1996), paranormal phenomena (e.g., Taylor, 2003), 
religious beliefs (Magyar-Russell et al., 2008), psychiatric delusions (Peters, Joseph & 
Garety, 1999), and public and medical beliefs (Jorm & Griffiths, 2006). Assessments 
of illness and health-related beliefs are common, as revealed by several large 
systematic reviews covering thousands of studies, including those investigating the
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beliefs of patients and non-patients for mental health care of anxiety and depression 
(Prins, Verhaak, Bensing & van der Meer, 2009), illness beliefs and health care in 
young people (Haller, Sanci, Sawyer & Patton, 2008), and parents’ beliefs regarding 
childhood vaccination (Mills, Jadad, Ross & Wilson, 2005).
Despite numerous studies, little is known about what constitutes an acceptable 
definition of the term ‘belief or whether the term represents a unitary construct or a 
loose cluster of discrete but superficial similar features. Participant understanding of 
the term ‘belief is typically assumed in most questionnaires. Indeed, no studies were 
found that specifically explored what participants (patients and/or non-patients) 
consider or understood to be the defining properties of a ‘belief. The absence of such 
studies assumes that people hold a relatively consistent interpretation of the term. 
However, this may underestimate differences in pre-existing ‘folk’ uses of the term 
that are likely to have developed over time and depend on experiences or situations in 
which the term is used.
It is possible that many of the respondents think about belief in a different 
manner to that assumed by researchers, given that beliefs often “travel in disguise ” 
under various aliases (e.g., attitudes, values, judgements, axioms, opinions, 
perceptions, preconceptions: Pajares, 1992, p. 309). Indeed, research from cognitive 
anthropology casts doubt on the existence of a universal understanding of this term. 
Needham (1972, p. 188) suggests that belief “does not constitute a natural 
resemblance among men, and it does not belong to the ‘common behaviour o f  
mankind’”. Furthermore, the beliefs of patients and health care professionals have 
been found to differ with regard to distinct health problems (Boot, Meijman & van 
Dulmen, 2009) and cultures (Des Courtis et al., 2008), thus it is useful to know how 
the term ‘belief is understood in the general public.
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Analogous empirical evidence on defining delusion exists and suggests that 
belief can be considered a multidimensional construct (Garety & Hemsley, 1994; 
Harrow et al., 2004). Since deluded patients can rate the characteristics of their beliefs 
in clinical studies (Appelbaum, Robbins & Roth, 1999; Garety & Hemsley, 1987; 
Jones & Watson, 1997), it should be possible to establish what healthy individuals 
understand as the defining features of belief by evaluating a similar set of belief­
relevant properties in the general population (see Freeman, 2008).
To investigate the general public’s understanding of ‘belief, the first study took 
a similar multi-dimensional approach to that used by many researchers attempting to 
define delusions (Appelbaum et al., 1999; Garety & Hemsley, 1987; Oltmanns, 1988). 
This involved coming up with a “list o f  characteristics or dimensions, none o f which 
may be necessary or sufficient ” (Freeman, 2008, p. 24). Although there is no logical 
limit to the number of defining characteristics/ dimensions, a review of the clinical 
literature and philosophy of belief literature (together with feedback from 2 earlier 
pilot studies) suggested a number of relatively distinct defining features. While not 
comprehensive or exhaustive, these defining features provided a reasonably wide set 
of options and were considered relevant by most participants in the two pilot studies.
Using these dimensional features, members of the general public were asked to 
evaluate the relevance of each feature when considering the term ‘belief. The 
definitional features concerned declarative beliefs (i.e., those that participants can 
articulate), as these are the types of belief explicitly focused on by all questionnaires. 
In this study the aim was to establish whether the general public hold a relatively 
coherent and common understanding of the term ‘belief.
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3.2.2 Developing a nature of belief measure
To derive a set of defining properties or features of belief, an initial literature 
review was conducted that compiled a small set of definitional features drawn from 
delusional belief studies, standard dictionaries and reviews of relevant philosophical, 
psychological and clinical literature (e.g., Bell, Halligan & Ellis, 2006a; Campbell, 
1967; Quine & Ullian, 1970; Schwitzgebel, 2006).
3.2.2.1 Pilot Studies
In an initial pilot study, 254 participants were asked to choose one of five 
complex statements, defining multidimensional aspects of what constitutes a belief. 
These sentences comprised aggregations of several discrete component features (e.g., 
‘strong conviction’, ‘considered as true’, ‘personal nature’ and ‘influence on 
thoughts’). While the strongest definition (A strongly held personal conviction about 
the nature o f  the world, that one holds as true and influences the way you act or think) 
was selected as the most appropriate by 43% of participants, there was considerable 
variation between choices (with 23% of participants selecting the second strongest, 
which suggested belief need not have any influence on behaviour, and 6% the 
weakest, which implied belief need not have any influence on behaviour nor stability 
over time). Importantly, the initial results and participant feedback suggested the need 
to decompose belief characteristics into constituent features to facilitate ratings.
Subsequently, thirteen stand-alone defining characteristics were identified (see 
Table 3.1, features A, B, and D-N). A second pilot study using this revised version 
requested 119 new participants to rate the extent to which each feature reflected their 
current understanding and use of the term ‘belief. All 13 features were endorsed by 
the majority of participants (between 77%-100%). Participants were also given the
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option of suggesting additional features and/or amending the existing wording. Most 
were content with the 13 features but 11% suggested some additional components 
and/or modifications, which focused on the stability and the personal nature of belief
Following these suggestions, one additional characteristic (C: ‘a significant 
part of personal core values’) was included Defining properties covered descriptive 
qualities (e.g., ‘a strongly held conviction’), functions (e.g., ‘provide a framework for 
explaining how things are or should be’) and consequences (e.g., ‘influence your 
behaviour’) of holding beliefs. Inevitably, some properties overlapped. Table 3.1 
describes the final 14 characteristics/features and provides a brief summary of the 
background and origins of each feature.
In the final version, participants were asked to “consider each of the following 
characteristics carefully, and rate the extent to which each is an accurate description 
of belief’. Each item from Table 3.1 was then presented in the form ‘To what extent 
are/do beliefs...’ The response options consisted of a three-point Likert scale 
(labelled ‘Not at all’, ‘Partly’ and ‘Totally’).
3.2.3 Participants
For the final evaluation of the belief characteristic scale a stratified random 
sampling technique was used to obtain a large sample from across Britain, with quotas 
set on age, gender and employment status. Data were collected using computer- 
assisted telephone interviewing, carried out by an experienced market research 
company. For further details on the sampling methodology and participant 
characteristics see Chapter 5 (section 5.2). One thousand adults (aged 18 or over) took 
part in the survey. The study was approved by the School of Psychology’s ethics 
committee, and all participants gave verbal consent to the interview.
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Table 3.1. Defining features of a ‘belief
Property
Type
Property Question
[and order in brackets]
Does/ Is a belief...
Description
Functional
features
A. Provides an 
explanation
Provide a framework for 
explaining how things are 
or should be f  4]
Beliefs offer a way of explaining past events and predicting new ones. This property dates back 
to the philosopher Locke, but was subsequently used in influential accounts linking delusions 
and anomalous perceptual experiences (e.g., Maher, 1988).
B. Personal 
interpretation
A personal interpretation 
about an event, or about 
the nature of the world
J2]
Unlike knowledge, beliefs have a personally-relevant element (e.g., some delusional beliefs’
“content is crucially related to the individual’s personal fears, needs or security”: Reed, 1972, 
p. 144). Oltmanns (1988) and Freeman (2008) include personal reference as a defining feature 
of delusion.
C. Constitutes 
part of a 
participant’s 
core values
A significant part of your 
personal core values [14]
For many participants in the pilot studies, beliefs were seen as equated to values or value 
statements (often most clearly seen in the case of moral beliefs) and reflected the extent to 
which beliefs were seen as having a pervasive and a preoccupying influence on participants’ 
experience.
Consequential
effects
D. Influences 
behaviour
Influence your behaviour 
[12]
This is a fundamental assumption of the dispositional approach towards belief taken by some 
philosophers (e.g., Dennett, 1987). Moreover, psychiatric studies report that some patients act 
on delusional beliefs (e.g., Buchanan & Wessely, 2004; Forstl et al., 1991). Also included as a 
key feature of delusion by Appelbaum et al. (1999), Freeman (2008), Harrow et al. (2004) and 
Jones and Watson (1997).
E. Influences
attitudes/
decisions
Shape or colour your 
attitudes and decisions 
]5J
Beliefs may influence attitudes (e.g., towards political parties or religious organisations).
F. Influences 
thoughts
Influence your thoughts
[3]
Some beliefs may be dispositional and almost never come to consciousness but others may be 
very preoccupying (in particular, some delusional beliefs, as included by Appelbaum et al. 
119991, Freeman [20081, Haddock et al. [19991, Jones & Watson [19971 and Oltmanns [19881).
G. Influences 
feelings
Influence the way you feel 
[8]
Beliefs can have significant emotional impact on the holder. Whilst distress is often associated 
with delusion, beliefs can have positive and/or supportive emotional impacts. This feature is 
described by Appelbaum et al. (1999), Freeman (2008), Haddock et al. (1999), Harrow et al. 
(2004), Jones and Watson (1997) and Oltmanns (1988) and was considered by Eisen et al. 
(1998).
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H. Capable of 
articulation
Something you would 
acknowledge or talk 
about publicly f  13J
This feature emphasises the declarative or potentially public nature of beliefs; i.e., the belief 
statements covered in all questionnaires.
Dispositional
characteristics
I. Veracity of a 
given
proposition
Right and/or true [11] Belief is a proposition “mentally asserted or judged by [a person] to be true ” (Campbell, 
1967, p. 217) .This feature was included previously by Jones and Watson (1997). It is not 
possible to consciously hold a false belief and so a key feature of holding a belief remains its 
perceived truth for the individual holding it.
J. Conviction A strongly held 
conviction [I]
As with the influence of a delusion, conviction or certainty varies depending on how relevant 
the belief is and quality of the evidential base. Delusions are often thought of as being held 
with “extraordinary conviction” (Jaspers, 1963) and this has been included in previous sets of 
characteristics of delusion (Appelbaum et al., 1999; Brett-Jones, Garety & Hemsley, 1987; 
Eisen et al., 1998; Freeman, 2008; Garety, Everitt & Hemsley, 1988; Haddock et al., 1999; 
Harrow et al., 2004; Jones & Watson, 1997; Kendler, Glazer & Morgenstem, 1983; Oltmanns, 
1988).
K. Stable Relatively permanent 
across time and different 
situations [7]
This varies depending on the belief. Some may be “firmly sustained” (as suggested in the 
DSM-IV-TR criteria for delusions: APA, 2000), others may be situation dependent (e.g., a 
belief in ghosts when alone at night). This was included as a dimension of delusion by 
Haddock et al. (1999) and considered by Eisen et al. (1998).
L. Resistant to 
change
Resistant to change [10] Some people continue to accept a belief despite being presented with powerful evidence to the 
contrary, i.e., there are no “subjective efforts to resist the belief’ (Oltmanns, 1988, p.5). This 
characteristic was also included by Freeman (2008), who links it in with the above statement 
(11), and by Garety et al. (1988).
M. More than 
memories/ facts
More than memories or 
facts [9]
Some beliefs may overlap with factual knowledge, but many others have an emotional 
component that is not specifically associated with facts per se, and beliefs need not be 
objectively true. Memories per se can be differentiated in that they do not have the state of 
currency (i.e., of being here-and-now) that a stated belief possesses, although clearly to recall a 
belief in consciousness requires that it be accessed from memory.
N. More than 
passing 
thoughts/ 
feelings
More than a passing 
thought or feeling [6]
This feature links to the previous points relating to pervasiveness and preoccupation. Again the 
functional elements described at the start of the table are relevant as potential discriminatory 
features, which could account for the participants’ impression of belief as a stronger term than 
the others.
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3.2.4 Results
3.2.4.1 Number o f components endorsed
Forty-nine percent o f the sample considered all 14 belief components/features either 
‘partly’ or ‘totally’ relevant when defining a belief, with this figure rising to 88% for 
10 (71%) features (see Figure 3.1).
88%
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Figure 3.1. The number o f features endorsed by each participant 
3.2.4.2 Strength o f endorsements
The mean endorsement for each feature was greater than 1 (Partly), indicating that all 
14 features were considered a reasonable fit to what participants considered a belief to 
be. Indeed, each feature was endorsed (either ‘Partly’ or ‘Totally’) by between 79- 
90% of the sample (see Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.2. Percentage endorsing each feature at different strengths
3.2.4.3 Factor analysis
To ascertain common underlying factors, a principal components analysis was carried 
out. To ensure a reliable component structure was determined, the sample was 
randomly split in half, with each half analysed separately and the two solutions 
compared.
Sample 1
Initial analysis o f all items showed these had Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measures 
of sampling adequacy between 0.812-0.934, with an overall KMO of 0.903. The 
Bartlett test for sphericity was significant. The Kaiser criterion of eigenvalue^ 
suggested a three component solution, whereas the scree plot suggested a one 
component solution (see Figure 3.3).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Component
Figure 3.3. Sample 1 scree plot for 14 characteristics of belief
Following the advice of Stevens (1992), given that there was a large sample but 
relatively low communalities, the solution indicated by the scree plot was taken as the 
most appropriate. Therefore, the analysis was re-run with a forced one component 
solution. The single component solution explained 36.2% of the variance.
Sample 2
Initial analysis of the 14 items showed these had Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
measures of sampling adequacy between 0.820-0.941, with an overall KMO of 0.906. 
The Bartlett test for sphericity was significant. The Kaiser criterion again suggested a 
three component solution, whereas the scree plot suggested a one component solution 
(see Figure 3.4)
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Figure 3.4. Sample 2 scree plot for 14 characteristics of belief
Therefore, this analysis was also re-run with a forced one component solution (again 
following Stevens, 1992). Overall, the single component solution explained 34.5% of 
the variance.
As Table 3.2 shows, those features of belief describing influence, and ‘a significant 
part of personal core values’ loaded highest onto the component for both samples.
Table 3.2. Factor loadings for the 14 belief features
Factor loading
To what extent do/are beliefs... Sample 1 Sample 2
Shape or colour your attitudes and decisions 0.708 0.721
A significant part of your personal core values 0.717 0.702
Influence your behaviour 0.703 0.710
Influence your thoughts 0.672 0.685
Influence the way you feel 0.706 0.650
Provide a framework for explaining how things are or should be 0.672 0.634
More than a passing thought or feeling 0.668 0.648
Relatively permanent across time and different situations 0.619 0.639
More than memories or facts 0.579 0.557
True and/or right 0.571 0.566
Something you would acknowledge or talk about publicly 0.511 0.546
Resistant to change 0.460 0.483
A strongly held conviction 0.430 0.387
A personal interpretation about events, or the nature of the world 0.315 0.340
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The features ‘a strongly held conviction’ and ‘a personal interpretation about events, 
or the nature of the world’ only loaded weakly onto this single component, however, 
suggesting that these may not be adequately represented by this factorial solution.
3.2.4.4 Demographic Variables
Non-parametric tests (Kruskal-Wallis or Mann-Whitney) were used to assess whether 
basic demographic variables (Age group; Gender; Socioeconomic group; Education 
[secondary/university/higher]; Ethnicity [white/other]; Member of organised religion 
[yes/no]) influenced the mean endorsement of features of belief. Due to the number of 
comparisons, only effects significant at p<0.0001 are considered (Bonferroni’s 
correction).
Socioeconomic group (x2(3)= 19.78, p<0.0001), education (x2(2)=20.07, p<0.0001) 
and religion were all significant factors relating to mean endorsement of belief 
features. Participants who reported belonging to a religion provided significantly 
higher and/or more endorsements than those who did not (U=76804.5, Ni = 293, N2 = 
700, p<0.0001). Follow up Mann-Whitney tests were carried out to compare between 
levels of socioeconomic group and education.
Socioeconomic group
Individuals in socioeconomic groups A and B showed significantly higher mean 
levels of endorsement than those in group C2 (U=l 1776.0, Ni = 345, N2 = 92, 
p=0.0001) but not compared to those in groups D and E (U=29531.0, Ni = 345, N2 = 
202, p=0.003). All other group comparisons were not significant at p<0.0001. A brief 
summary of the group classification is provided overleaf.
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A & B Modern professional occupations
Such as: teacher, nurse, physiotherapist, social worker, welfare officer, artist, 
musician, police officer (sergeant or above), software designer
Senior managers or administrators
(Usually responsible for planning, organising and co-ordinating work and for 
finance). Such as: finance manager or chief executive
Middle or junior managers
Such as: office manager, retail manager, bank manager, restaurant manager, 
warehouse manager, publican
Traditional professional occupations
Such as: accountant, solicitor, medical practitioner, scientist, civil / 
mechanical engineer
Cl Clerical and intermediate occupations
Such as: secretary, personal assistant, clerical worker, office clerk, call centre
agent, nursing auxiliary, nursery nurse
C2 Technical and craft occupations
Such as: motor mechanic, fitter, inspector, plumber, printer, tool maker, 
electrician, gardener, train driver
D & E Semi-routine manual and service occupations
Such as: postal worker, machine operative, security guard, caretaker, farm 
worker, catering assistant, receptionist, sales assistant
Routine manual and service occupations
Such as: HGV driver, van driver, cleaner, porter, packer, sewing machinist, 
messenger, labourer, waiter / waitress, bar staff
Education
Individuals whose highest educational qualification was secondary level (qualification 
from secondary/high school or NVQ 1-3) provided significantly lower mean 
endorsements than those with university qualifications (e.g., bachelor’s degree or 
equivalent professional qualification or NVQ 4) (U=62206.5, Nj = 549, N2 = 273, 
pO.OOOl) (but not those with a higher university degree (e.g., doctorate, MBA or 
NVQ 5) qualification; U=14801.0, N, = 549, N2 = 68, p=0.005).
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3.2.5 Discussion
The results showed that all 14 features were regarded as relevant by most participants 
when requested to indicate the defining properties of the term ‘belief. Even the 
poorest ranked feature (‘relatively permanent across time and different situations’) 
was endorsed by 79% of participants. However, as a group only 49% endorsed all 14 
features as comprising characteristic properties of belief (i.e., rated all features 
‘Partly’ or ‘Totally’).
As to individual items, 90% of the sample felt that beliefs comprised ‘a 
significant part of [their] personal core values’ and 88% considered beliefs to be ‘a 
personal interpretation about an event, or about the nature of the world’. Thus the 
personal, self-referential nature of belief appears clearly important, as was the 
explanatory nature of belief, with 84% holding beliefs to comprise ‘a framework for 
explaining how things are or should be’. The idea that beliefs were explanatory in 
function was particularly prominent in the study of delusions, where they have been 
suggested to arise from anomalous perceptual experiences (e.g., Maher, 1988).
All five properties relating to the consequential effects of belief (effects on 
thoughts, behaviour, feelings, attitudes/decisions, and public acknowledgement) were 
closely grouped in terms of levels of endorsement, varying between 83-87%. These 
are particularly significant, since delusional beliefs that do not impact onto behaviour 
have been questioned as ‘true’ beliefs (e.g., Berrios, 1991: see Chapter 2).
More participants endorsed ‘a strongly held conviction’ (89% endorsement), 
which implies a personal judgement, than ‘right and/or true’ (81%), which suggests a 
more objective evaluation of the evidence for a belief. This potentially ties in with the 
ideas of the philosopher Kant (1781), who regarded belief as the judgement of the 
truth of a statement using “objectively insufficient but subjectively sufficient”
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justification. Instead, ‘right and/or true’ may be more characteristic of knowledge 
(considered by Kant to be based on both objectively and subjectively sufficient 
evidence) than belief.
The notion that a belief is stable over time and resistant to change features 
highly in mainstream politics, where the degree of stability of voters’ beliefs is 
actively considered in campaigning, as is shown in the strategic attempts to woo 
floating voters (those with less stable beliefs). In contrast, "The loyalty o f voters in 
heartland constituencies is always presumed and rarely questioned” (Hodge, 2005). 
These characteristics may contribute to the fact that 80% felt that a belief was ‘more 
than a passing thought or feeling’, and 81.8% that it was ‘more than memories or 
facts’. These results confirm a clear difference between such terms and belief, and can 
question the interchangeable use of terms in some previous studies. In particular, with 
regard to the work on delusional beliefs, this distinction between ‘feeling’ and 
‘believing’ suggests that using words other than ‘belief can produce differential 
prevalence estimates. That is, using terms such as ‘feel’ to investigate persecutory 
delusions (e.g., on the PDI: Peters, Joseph & Garety, 1999) may not be equivalent to 
using the term ‘believe’ (such as on the CIDI: Robins et al., 1998). Furthermore, 
given that many researchers consider delusion to be a form of belief, the 
appropriateness of using other terms, such as ‘feel’ or ‘think’, in such investigations 
can be questioned. This provides the focus of the second study described later in this 
chapter.
Whilst each of the 14 properties was individually highly endorsed (and the 
principal components analysis suggested that the majority of these loaded onto a 
single component), there was still substantial variety within participants’ 
endorsements. As some participants seem prepared to endorse a proposition as a
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‘belief at a weaker threshold than others, assessing participants’ notion of ‘belief in 
studies of belief prevalence may be of value. This would allow researchers to interpret 
answers accordingly (i.e., a person who thinks of ‘belief as little more than a passing 
thought or feeling could be distinguished from another who reports the same beliefs 
but holds that ‘belief is a strong conviction resistant to change). Notwithstanding the 
recommendation that participants’ endorsements of belief characteristics be assessed, 
as a minimum these results suggest researchers need to use caution when comparing 
between participants’ reports of belief.
Individuals who reported being religious, being in formal education for longer, 
or who came from a higher socioeconomic group were significantly more likely to 
provide more and/or higher endorsements to the properties of belief proposed in this 
study. Socioeconomic group and length of formal education are often linked (in this
•y
study: Pearson’s % (6)= 161.9, p<0.0001), and it is possible that those who have a 
university level education were more prepared to consider the abstract nature of the 
belief properties. Those who identified with a religion may also be more aware of 
strong or influential beliefs than non-religious people, thus they may find it easier to 
assess the impact of belief on their lives.
Although the current study confirmed the general endorsement of the 14 
assessed properties, other properties associated with belief could have been included. 
Furthermore, the study could have been improved by including additional 
discriminatory features not expected to comprise key components of a belief. In 
addition, some items might benefit from further clarification. For example, ‘Are 
‘beliefs’ more than memories or facts?’ could suggest that all beliefs are at least 
memories or facts. Although beliefs clearly comprise a particular subset of 
autobiographical memories (or we would not be able to recall them), not all beliefs are
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considered facts. Instead beliefs might be considered more than facts in that they are 
thought to hold an additional emotional, self-referential or personal value that need 
not be attributed to facts.
In summary, the findings provide support for a relatively coherent set of 
belief-relevant characteristics held by the general public. Although the different 
components suggested do not exhaust all possible properties, the extensive piloting 
carried out and feedback received from over 300 participants provides a reasonable 
list of relevant characteristics. From this we can conclude that, for most participants, a 
belief usually describes a strongly held conviction that has influence over thoughts, 
attitudes and behaviour. Importantly, it describes something more than a passing 
thought or feeling.
Despite general agreement as to the relevance of most of the 14 properties, 
variation was observed for both the level and number of characteristic features 
endorsed. Given that only half of the sample endorsed all 14 properties, it might be 
prudent to establish participants’ understanding of the term ‘belief when evaluating 
and comparing across individuals’ endorsements of particular content-specific beliefs, 
and in particular on clinical measures used to diagnose psychosis.
One finding of this study that has significant methodological implications was 
that participants considered belief to be different from passing thoughts or feelings. 
Given that these terms are often used synonymously in research instruments, it is 
important to establish whether participants’ responses depend on the choice of 
terminology used in the measure. This provides the focus for the next study.
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3.3 STUDY 2: ASSESSING BELIEF: ARE ALL TERMS CONSIDERED 
EQUAL?
3.3.1 Background
It is not uncommon in research on delusions and delusional ideation to employ 
questions that use different terms interchangeably on the assumption that such terms 
are broadly the same and as such are likely to elicit similar responses. Indeed, current 
clinical tools use a variety of different terms when employing self-report to establish 
the prevalence of beliefs and delusions (see Table 3.3). In addition to some measures 
using terms such as ‘think’ and ‘feel’ to assess delusional beliefs, often the 
terminology chosen can vary within a questionnaire. This assumption of equivalence 
may not be unwarranted, given that such terms are used synonymously in certain 
colloquial contexts. The Columbia Guide to Standard American English (1993) states 
that three terms (believe, feel, think) are:
“almost interchangeable when used to express opinions, ideas, or 
feelings: I  believe [think, feel] I ’m coming down with a cold. In most 
uses none o f the three is very explicit, and any precision you hope to 
gain by choosing one over the others is likely to be blurred or lost in 
transmission, at least in all but the most Formal or Oratorical uses. ”
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Table 3.3. Different terms used to assess delusions or delusional ideation
Instrument
Term
Feel Think Believe Worry Are;
Have
Experience;
Consider;
Wonder
Be convinced
CAPE; PDI Y Y Y Y
CIDI Y Y
DSSI Y Y Y Y
MINI Y
PSQ Y
SAPS Y Y Y Y
CAPE: Community A ssessm ent o f  Psychic Experiences (Stefanis et al., 2002);
CIDI: Com posite International Diagnostic Interview (Robins et al., 1998);
DSSI: D elusions-Sym ptom s-States Inventory (Bedford & Foulds, 1978);
MINI: Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (Sheehan et al., 1998);
PDI: Peters et al. D elusions Inventory (Peters, Joseph & Garety, 1999);
PSQ: Psychosis Screening Questionnaire (Bebbington & Nayani, 1995);
SAPS: Scale for the A ssessm ent o f  Positive Symptom s (Andreasen, 1984)
In contrast, others suggest differences in the use of these terms, for example, 
arguing that ‘feel’ is a “weak and informal substitute for think, believe” (Gamer, 
2000, p. 143). Videbeck (2008, p. 116) recommends that psychiatric nurses use the 
term ‘think’ when talking to patients about cognitive issues but ‘feel’ when trying to 
engage them in discussion about their emotions. Indeed, Schuman and Presser (1981, 
p. 301) indicated that there is a “common belief among experienced survey 
researchers that almost any change in question wording will affect question 
marginals”. This includes the suggestion that the term ‘feel’ is associated more with 
attitudes and belief is seen as a more rational, less emotional statement. “Attitude 
questions try to assess how respondents feel about something”, whereas “Belief 
questions often assess what a respondent thinks is true or false...There isn’t any 
implied goodness or badness about the assessment” (Barnes, 2001).
Given the different views expressed in the literature, the aim of the second 
study was to ascertain whether the format of wording could differentiate between
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participants’ responses. To investigate this, participants’ responses to the same 
questions but using three different response mode options (believe, feel, think) were 
directly compared. This provided an indication of the differences or similarities that 
may be elicited by simple variations in wording (commonly used interchangeably on 
different survey measures). The three main research questions (and null hypotheses) 
were as follows:
1. Do participants consider the terms ‘believe’, ‘think’ and ‘fe e l’ to be equivalent in 
terms o f the strength ofpersonal endorsement implied when using each term? 
Intuitively, it seems that participants might consider the term ‘believe’ to be the 
strongest type of personal endorsement over ‘think’ or ‘feel’ (i.e., Strength: 
Believe [B] > Think [T] > Feel [F])
2. Do participants use these terms differently when answering content-specific 
questions?
In keeping with prediction 1, the null hypothesis was that participants would use 
the term ‘believe’ less often to describe their endorsement and ‘feel’ or ‘think’ 
more commonly (i.e., Prevalence: Feel [F] > Think [T] > Believe [B])
3. Does the content o f  the item affect the way these terms are used?
Some items may have different strengths for each term. For example, 
religious/paranormal items may have more equivalent endorsements for ‘believe’ 
and ‘feel’, given the importance of the emotional aspects of these ideas, whereas 
both of these terms may remain stronger endorsements than ‘think’
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3.3.2 Measure
A short questionnaire was developed to evaluate how participants employ each 
of three terms (‘believe’, ‘think’ and ‘feel’) when given a particular statement. This 
comprised two parts: the first asked participants to complete content-specific 
questions for the three terms, and the second to rate the strength they associated with 
each term (having been primed by the first section).
The first part of the questionnaire addressed the latter two research questions 
outlined above (see Appendix I for the full instrument used in this study). This section 
used 37 content-based items adapted from the Cardiff Beliefs Questionnaire (see 
Chapter 4 for the development of these items and Appendix II for the full set of CBQ 
questions). These comprised 10 paranormal and religious items, 12 societal/cultural 
items and 15 delusion-like items. This allowed for an investigation of the use of the 
different terms in the contexts of a range of different content propositions. Participants 
were asked to provide a dichotomous ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer as to whether their position 
regarding each statement X could be represented by ‘I believe X’/ ‘I feel X’/ ‘I think 
X’ (see example below).
Illustrative Example 
A. Some houses are haunted
‘I believe this’ Yes
‘I feel this’
‘I think this’
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In the second part of the questionnaire (addressing the first research question), 
participants were requested to consider how they commonly used each of the 
qualifying terms (believe, think and feel) and to rank these in terms of the typical 
strength of personal endorsement that they imply. Participants could rate each term 
from 1 (‘Very weak endorsement of a statement’) to 5 (‘Very strong endorsement of a 
statement’), providing a measure of their overall sense of the relative strength of each 
of these terms independent of specific content. By placing this question at the end of 
the questionnaire, participants’ answers were informed by how they used the terms 
initially in order to respond to the 37 content-based items.
3.3.3 Sample
Participants (n=166) consisted of first year students studying psychology at Cardiff 
University. For this study, a short verbal introduction was provided and students 
asked to complete the questionnaire. The sample was self-selecting; students who did 
not wish to participate returned an uncompleted questionnaire. One hundred and 
eighty-one students returned the questionnaire, of whom 15 who had incorrectly 
completed the questionnaire were dropped, leaving the final sample of 166. The 
sample was predominantly young (M=18.65, s.d.=1.38, range = 18-31; 2 did not 
disclose their age) and female (N=140, 86.4%; 4 did not disclose their gender).
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3.3.4 Research Question 1: Do participants consider the terms ‘believe’, 
‘think ’ and ‘fe e l ’ as equivalent in terms o f  strength ofpersonal endorsement?
3.3.4.1 Results
Participants were asked to judge how they used ‘believe’, ‘think’ and ‘feel’ in 
terms of the relative strength of personal endorsement (with 5 reflecting the strongest 
endorsement). Overall, people rated ‘believe’ as the stronger term (M= 4.05, s.d. = 
0.97) over ‘think’ (M= 3.65, s.d. = 1.04) or ‘feel’ (M= 3.44, s.d. = 1.10).
These results were compared using Wilcoxon matched pairs tests and the 
ratings for ‘believe’ were significantly higher than for both ‘think’ (z = -3.104, N  - 
Ties = 144, p=0.002, two-tailed) and ‘feel’ (z = -5.254, TV - Ties = 125, p<0.001, two- 
tailed). There was no significant difference between ‘feel’ and ‘think’ rankings (z = - 
1.608, N  - Ties =135, p=0.108, two-tailed).
3.3.4.2 Discussion
The results confirm that the term ‘believe’ was judged by participants to be the 
strongest personal endorsement over and above either ‘think’ or ‘feel’. As such, one 
might expect participants to use the term ‘believe’ more selectively when offered the 
option of applying different terms to propositions. This provided the focus of the 
second research question, involving content-specific beliefs.
3.3.5 Research Question 2: Do participants use the 3 terms differently when 
answering content-based questions?
3.3.5.1. Results
Comparing between terms
Participants were given 37 content-specific questions, and answered by stating 
whether or not they believed, felt and/or thought each statement (a yes/no answer for 
each term). The majority of questions received equivalent answers for all three terms 
(62%). Overall, 31.9% of items were believed, 30.6% of items were felt and 35.2% of 
items were thought. However, there appeared to be differences in the patterns of 
endorsement between belief categories (see Tables 3.4 to 3.6).
Table 3.4. Percentage of participants responding ‘Yes’ to each of the three types of
endorsement (‘believe’, ‘think’ and ‘feel’) for societal/cultural items
Statement presented to participants Believe Feel Think
Positive thoughts and attitudes improve my physical 
wellbeing
91.6 85.5 88
Human activities cause significant global warming 87.8 65.2 94.5
I have free choice or free will 85.3 73.6 85.3
The theory of evolution is correct 82.2 66.3 90.2
Democracy is the best system of government 77.2 65.6 86.7
Euthanasia (ending the life of a person who is 
incurably ill in order to limit suffering) is right
76.4 67.9 83.3
Same sex relationships are right 78.3 59.4 81.1
Abortion is right 61.3 51.5 69.3
Organised religion is one of the main sources of 
human strife
42.1 45 53.1
It is right to use animals for medically related research 37.2 31.3 53.4
It is right to use the death penalty for serious crimes 37.3 30.7 42.8
There is extra-terrestrial life 38.4 21.3 43.9
MEAN 66.3 55.3 72.6
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Table 3.5. Percentage of participants responding ‘Yes’ to each of the three types of
endorsement (‘believe’, ‘think’ and ‘feel’) for paranormal and religious items
Statement presented to participants Believe Feel Think
The soul or spirit survives death 49.1 42.3 41.7
There is a god or gods 38.9 41.7 36.2
The complexity of the world suggests that it was 
purposefully designed by an intelligent creator
37.8 41.5 35.4
Some people communicate with the dead 27.9 25.6 25.5
Black magic and/or witchcraft exists 24.1 16.9 22.3
There are demons or evil spirits 18.9 20 17.7
When I die my soul will be reborn in another body 14.3 14.3 13
Some people are possessed by evil spirits 7.3 7.8 11.5
The position of the stars and planets affects or 
determines my life
7.4 10.4 7.4
Some people change into werewolves 0.6 1.2 1.8
MEAN 22.6 22.2 21.3
Table 3.6. Percentage of participants responding ‘Yes’ to each of the three types of
endorsement (‘believe’, ‘think’ and ‘feel’) for delusion-like items
Statement presented to participants Believe Feel Think
My body or part of my body is misshapen or ugly 49.1 61.3 69.3
My thoughts or actions are not fully under my control 24.7 43.4 36.1
People say or do things that contain special messages 
for me
27.4 36.6 28
There is another person who looks and acts like me 21.1 16.9 24.1
Certain people are out to harm or discredit me 10.4 25 20
I am an exceptionally gifted person that others do not 
recognise
12.7 13.3 15.1
The reflection in the mirror is sometimes not me 1.2 18.9 7.9
Certain people or places are duplicated, i.e. are in two 
different locations at the same time
6.7 11.6 7.9
The world is about to end 6.1 7.9 9.7
People I know disguise themselves as others to 
manipulate or influence me
4.9 10.4 4.9
I am infested by parasites 9.6 1.8 7.8
My relatives or close friends are sometimes replaced 
by identical-looking impostors
1.8 4.2 2.4
Part of my body doesn’t belong to me 0.6 5.5 1.2
I am dead and/or do not exist 1.2 4.8 1.2
Some well-known celebrity is secretly in love with me 1.8 1.8 1.8
MEAN 12.0 17.6 15.8
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For societal/cultural items (see Table 3.4), ‘Think’ was the most commonly 
endorsed term in nearly every case, followed by ‘believe’, and ‘feel’ having the 
lowest frequency of ‘yes’ responses. In contrast, ‘believe’ was often the lowest (or 
equal lowest) endorsed term (with two exceptions) for delusion-like items (Table 3.6), 
with ‘feel’ receiving the highest levels of endorsements. There did not appear to be 
much difference in the use of any of the three terms for paranormal and religious 
items (Table 3.5).
Although the majority of answers were given the same responses, it was 
interesting to compare whether there were any differences in the use of the terms for 
those items that were endorsed differently. To test these results on an individual level, 
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests were used to compare the number of times individuals 
endorsed items using each term.
Societal/cultural
Significant differences in endorsements were found between all terms for
societal/cultural content statements (T: Think; B: Believe; F: Feel) in the following
manner:
T v. B: Z = -5.857 (p<0.001)
F v. B: Z = -7.487 (p<0.001)
F v. T: Z = -9.070 (p<0.001)
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Delusion-like
For these items, significant differences were found between ‘believe’ and both of the 
other two terms but there was no significant difference between endorsements for 
‘feel’ and ‘think’:
T v. B: Z = -5.008 (p<0.001)
F v. B: Z = -5.493 (p<0.001)
Fv.T:  Z = -1.556 (p=0.120)
Paranormal and religious
For these items no significant differences were found:
Tv.B:  Z =-0.799 (p=0.424)
F v. B: Z = -0.263 (p=0.792)
Fv.T:  Z = -0.372 (p=0.710)
Comparing between categories
As well as comparing between terms, the aim was to test whether the above pattern of 
results (suggesting differences between categories) was significant. To measure 
endorsement difference between two terms for each category (societal/cultural, 
paranormal and religious, and delusion-like), the frequency of both types of non­
identical endorsements (e.g., (1) ‘believe’ but not ‘think’ and (2) ‘think’ but not 
‘believe’) was calculated for items within the relevant category, and the second total 
subtracted from the first. This was then divided by the number of items in the 
category, to standardise the results for comparison across categories. Wilcoxon signed 
ranks tests were then conducted on these scores to compare the pattern of results.
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‘Believe' versus ‘Think’
Figure 3.5 shows that for delusion-like (DL) and societal/cultural (SC) items, if a 
participant endorsed ‘believe’ they were more likely to also endorse ‘think’ than vice 
versa, although there were occasions when they endorsed ‘believe’ in the absence of 
‘think’. For paranormal and religious items (P&R), there was no obvious pattern, with 
participants answering yes to ‘believe’ and no to ‘think’ as often as vice versa.
□ Think but do not believe B Both believe and think/ Neither believe nor think □ Believe but do not think
100% 
® 90%
g 80%
g- 70% 
£ 60% 
o 50% 
g> 40% 
|  30%
g 20% 
® 10% 
0%
Figure 3.5. Percentages o f each type of response for ‘think’ and ‘believe’ by content 
(SC: Societal/cultural; P&R: Paranormal and religious; DL: Delusion-like)
The Wilcoxon tests revealed that paranormal and religious showed a significantly 
different pattern to SC and DL, whereas DL and SC are not significantly different 
from each other:
DL v. P&R: Z = -3.925 (p<0.001)
DL v. SC: Z = -2.186 (p=0.029)
P&R v. SC: Z = -4.754 (p<0.001)
Content of items
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‘Feel’ versus ‘Think’
Figure 3.6 shows that for SC items, if a participant endorsed ‘feel’ they were more 
likely to also endorse ‘think’ than vice versa. For P&R and DL items, there was no 
more likely pattern, with participants answering yes to ‘feel’ and no to ‘think’ as often 
as vice versa.
□ Think but do not feel s Both feel and think/ Neither feel nor think ■ Feel but do not think
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Figure 3.6. Percentages of each type of response for ‘think’ and ‘feel’ by content
The endorsements for SC show a significantly different pattern to the other categories, 
whereas DL and P&R are not significantly different from each other:
DL v. P&R: Z = -0.116 (p=0.908)
DL v. SC: Z = -9.056 (p<0.001)
P&R v. SC: Z = -7.506 (p<0.001)
SC P&R DL
Content of items
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'Believe’ versus T e e l’
Figure 3.7 shows that for SC items, if a participant endorsed ‘feel’ they were more 
likely to also endorse ‘believe’ than vice versa. For religious and paranormal items, 
there was no more likely pattern, with participants answering yes to ‘believe’ and no 
to ‘feel’ as often as vice versa. For delusion-like items, the opposite pattern occurred, 
with more items being felt but not believed than believed but not felt.
■ Feel but do not believe H Both believe and feel/ Neither believe nor feel □  Believe but do not feel
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Content of items
DL
Figure 3.7. Percentages o f each type of response for ‘feel’ and ‘believe’ by content
The pattern o f endorsement for all three terms is significantly different for ‘believe’ 
and ‘feel’:
DL v. P&R: Z = -3.459 (p=0.001) 
DL v. SC: Z = -8.794 (p<0.001)
P&R v. SC: Z = -5.571 (p<0.001)
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3.3,5.2 Discussion
As clearly shown by Figures 3.5-3.7, participants frequently used the terms 
‘believe’, ‘think’ and ‘feel’ interchangeably, as has been assumed in previous research 
and as is evidenced by certain colloquial uses. Indeed, given the widespread 
synonymous use of these terms, it is reassuring that the results support this intuition to 
a considerable extent. However, this was not the pattern for all cases, with different 
responses for different terms being given 38% of the time. This suggests that there are 
differences in the use of these terms, worth further consideration.
Given the findings of the first research question, which suggested that 
‘believe’ was considered by participants to imply a stronger endorsement than either 
‘think’ or ‘feel’, it was predicted that participants would use the term ‘believe’ more 
stringently. The results from the second study confirmed this pattern for endorsements 
of delusion-like items, whereby ‘believe’ was indeed used less often than either ‘feel’ 
or ‘think’. However, when looking at other belief types this pattern did not always 
hold.
The findings confirm that the content of the question influences the adoption 
of different terms for endorsement. ‘Think’ was the most commonly used term with 
societal/cultural items, followed by ‘believe’ and then ‘feel’. The low responses rates 
to ‘feel’ in this group may reflect less personal connection with the content items. As 
these questions relate to general issues, it may be that people did not have as strong 
emotional responses to the items, and therefore the more emotive term ‘feel’ is 
endorsed less. By contrast, paranormal and religious items show no differences in the 
rates of endorsements of all three terms (‘believe’, ‘think’ and ‘feel’). The lack of 
differences may be due to the presence of religious beliefs in this group. It is possible 
that people consider religious belief to form a greater part of their identity than the
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other forms of belief assessed here, and so these items had greater consistency -  with 
participants either holding all or none of the options.
One potential limitation of this study was that by highlighting the comparison 
between these terms, the differences between terms were emphasised. However, to 
provide a reliable comparison between terms, it was necessary to use a design in 
which the same participants completed the questions for each term. Furthermore, this 
should not affect the pattern of the results discussed here.
The major implication of these findings is the need for caution when different 
words are used to elicit responses for different questions. One particularly relevant 
area relates to the assessment of delusional beliefs. In this context area, estimates of 
the prevalence of delusions and delusion-like beliefs vary widely (Eaton et al., 1991; 
Freeman et al., 2005; Kendler et al., 1996; Olfson et al., 2002; Peters, Joseph & 
Garety, 1999; Poulton et al., 2000; Scott et al., 2005; van Os et al., 2000), and perhaps 
some of this variation could be due to the interchangeable use of different terms 
(including ‘believe’, ‘think’ and ‘feel’), sometimes within a single instrument. 
Furthermore, this (albeit small) study highlights the need to further investigate the 
nuances of participants’ understanding of each of these terms.
3.4 SUMMARY
This chapter has provided some evidence regarding the implications of using different 
terms when assessing beliefs in questionnaire research. By taking a dimensional 
approach, the findings of the first study avoided some of the limitations inherent in 
attempting a formal definition that might only account for a proportion of what 
participants regard as belief. In terms of identifying characteristic properties of 
‘belief in the general public, the study revealed a reasonably consistent endorsement
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of properties involving a relatively stable personal conviction, for an explanatory 
purpose, and capable of influencing behaviour. The second study builds on these 
findings by comparing the use of the terms ‘believe’, ‘think’ and ‘feel’ on 
questionnaires. Although these terms were often used interchangeably by participants, 
this was not always the case, and participants considered the term ‘believe’ to imply a 
stronger endorsement. Overall, the findings recommend caution at a clinical level 
when comparing between individual participants’ endorsements of ‘believe’ 
questions, and also when comparing responses to questions that use different terms to 
probe specific propositions in clinical and health questionnaires.
These studies are particularly relevant to measures of delusions and delusional 
ideation. Existing measures will be discussed in the following chapter, and a new 
instrument designed to assess delusion-like beliefs, alongside other beliefs and 
experiences, will be introduced.
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CHAPTER 4
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CARDIFF BELIEFS 
QUESTIONNAIRE (CBQ) 
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The last chapter described the results of studies investigating public understanding of 
the term ‘belief. These suggested that there is a broad agreement as to the key 
characteristics of belief, and in particular with regard to the personal nature of these 
propositions, their stability, conviction and influence. Furthermore, the study 
examining the distinction between the terms ‘believe’, ‘think’ and ‘feel’ found that 
whilst in general these terms are often used interchangeably, most participants 
explicitly distinguished between these terms and their use when asked about their 
respective strength of endorsement in general (i.e., independent of context). These 
findings suggest caution when using such terms in assessment measures. In 
addressing the aims of this chapter, some of the lessons relating to methodological 
issues from the previous studies are incorporated, as part of the motivation and 
development of a new standardised measure to assess delusions/delusion-like beliefs.
4.1.1 Background
Chapter 1 introduced the ‘continuum of delusion’ hypothesis (Claridge, 1994; Crow, 
1995; Johns & van Os, 2001; Strauss, 1969), which claims that delusional beliefs are 
just one form of belief that constitute part of a belief continuum, and therefore it 
would not be unusual for similar beliefs to be found in the non-clinical population. 
While there is convincing evidence from several studies supporting the continuum
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account (Barrett & Etheridge, 1992; Eaton et al., 1991; Freeman et al., 2005; Johns et 
al., 2002; Johns et al., 2004; Kendler et al., 1996; Ohayon, 2000; Olfson et al., 2002; 
Posey & Losch, 1983; Poulton et al., 2000; Scott et al., 2005; Slade & Bentall, 1988; 
Tien, 1991; van Os et al., 2000) (reviewed in Chapter 1), differences in assessment 
instruments employed (e.g., clinical vs. non-clinical, different use of wording, and 
explicit use of psychiatric terms) have understandably led to different prevalence 
estimates (Johns et al., 2004). Moreover, many studies fail to examine the range of 
clinical delusions that may present or the prevalence of non-clinical beliefs, or to 
ascertain the relationships between types of belief or between beliefs and experiences. 
The latter point is particularly relevant given Quine and Ullian’s (1970) contention for 
belief coherence (as outlined in Chapter 1); whereby new or incoming beliefs are 
assumed to be consistent with an individual’s existing ‘web of beliefs’ (see Chapter 
7). Assessing different belief types on the same measure provides insight into the 
different kinds of beliefs that may co-exist within an individual’s set or web of 
beliefs.
This chapter describes the development of the Cardiff Beliefs Questionnaire (CBQ), a 
new instrument that attempts to improve on previous measures, when assessing the 
presence, level of endorsement and interconnections of delusional-type beliefs in non- 
clinical samples. Chapters 5-7 will describe the empirical findings of the CBQ and 
related studies when applied to a large stratified general population sample.
4.1.2 Current measures of delusional beliefs
The diagnosis of delusion (considered as one form of anomalous or illness- 
related belief) is typically based on extensive clinical psychiatric interview. This
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allows the clinician to construct a detailed picture of the anomalous belief(s) while 
exploring the background, context, social and functional consequences. Over the past 
20 years several measures (both clinical and non-clinical) have been developed (see 
Table 4.1) to aid assessment of forms of delusion. As well as detailed structured 
interviews, designed to establish the clinical relevance of delusional beliefs, measures 
have been developed to address ideas with a similar content to delusions (e.g., beliefs 
in being persecuted) (delusional ideation or delusion-like beliefs).
Self-reported data (elicited upon questioning) are the mainstay of much 
clinical research, however, a number of factors can undermine the validity of this type 
of data (Harrell, 1985), including:
(1) Factors in the questioning situation that may influence the response (e.g., question 
wording and order, and degree o f anonymity, etc.)
(2) Inability o f  the participant to provide correct information (e.g., respondent never 
knew or has forgotten the answer)
(3) Unwillingness o f  the participant to provide the relevant information, given that 
their answers may present them in a socially unacceptable manner
In particular, the validity of using self-report measures to identify psychiatric 
symptoms has been questioned by Eaton et al., (1991) and Kendler et al. (1996), as 
has the validity of using clinical instruments in non-clinical samples (Henderson, 
1996). Some of these concerns and related issues will be considered in turn.
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Table 4.1. Some of the clinical and non-clinical measures used to assess delusions or
delusional ideation
Administration Assessment Name
Self-report
questionnaire
Non-clinical
delusional
ideation
Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences 
(CAPE: Stefanis et al., 2002)
Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI: Peters, 
Joseph & Garety, 1999)
Persecutory
ideation/
paranoia
Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (G-PTS: 
Green et al., 2008)
Paranoia Scale (PS: Fenigstein & Vanable, 
1992)
Paranoia/Suspiciousness Questionnaire (PSQ: 
Rawlings & Freeman, 1996)
Persecution and Deservedness Scale (PaDS: 
Melo et al., 2009)
Persecutory Ideation Questionnaire (PIQ: 
McKay et al., 2006)
State Social Paranoia Scale (SSPS: Freeman, 
Pugh et al., 2007)
Schizotypy Magical Ideation Scale (MIS: Eckblad & 
Chapman, 1983)
Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and 
Experiences (O-LIFE: Mason et al., 1995)
Rust Inventory of Schizotypal Cognitions 
(RISC: Rust, 1987)
Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ: 
Raine, 1991)
Schizotypal Traits Questionnaire (STQ: 
Claridge & Broks, 1984)
Clinical
psychotic
symptoms
Delusions-Symptoms-States Inventory (DSSI: 
Bedford & Foulds, 1978)
Psychosis Screening Questionnaire (PSQ: 
Bebbington & Nayani, 1995)
Diagnostic
interview
Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms 
(SAPS: Andreasen, 1984)
Range of
clinical
disorders
Composite International Diagnostic Interview 
(CIDI: Robins etal., 1998)
Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview 
(MINI: Sheehan et al., 1998)
NIMH Diagnostic Interview Schedule (DIS: 
Robins et al., 1981)
Present State Examination (PSE: Wing, 
Sartorius & Cooper, 1974)
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-III-R 
(SCID: Spitzer et al., 1992)
Sleep-Eval (Ohayon, 1999)
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(i) Fixed response measures: One difficulty for large scale representative 
studies is the use of measures requiring responses on Likert scales, with standard 
(usually labelled) points from which a respondent must choose (sometimes as simple 
as selecting ‘yes’ or ‘no’). While financial and logistical restrictions mean that full 
interviews are often not possible (or desirable) for these types of studies, the use of a 
small number of constrained response scales to assess symptoms raises concerns that 
these fail to capture the full range of potential responses. In particular, it can limit the 
researchers’ ability to distinguish between a delusional or reality-based belief with the 
same content (e.g., a report of a partner’s infidelity may in fact be accurate or an 
unfounded belief, but would require further investigation to distinguish between these 
options). In addition, reported beliefs may not be classed as delusional if they are (1) 
culturally sanctioned, (2) understandable solely in terms of the individual’s family or 
social context, or (3) involve a misunderstanding of the question. Kessler et al. (2000) 
suggest this last scenario could be a particular problem when applied to a non-clinical 
group, as the bizarre nature of some of the delusions may increase the chances of the 
questions being misinterpreted (i.e., people may attempt to ‘normalise’ the question to 
something more akin to their own experiences). On the other hand, the plausibility of 
a belief may still be in doubt even after a detailed interview with an experienced 
clinician (David, 1999), and in most cases it is impossible to establish the essential 
‘veracity’ of the evidence underlying many beliefs, however implausible. As Young 
(2000, p.47) points out, “there is often no attempt to check whether such things 
actually are happening to people who say they are being persecuted. Instead, it is 
usual for the intuitive implausibility o f  a belief to medical staff to form the primary 
yardstick”. Although the risk of misinterpretation can be reduced in those studies that
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involve a more detailed assessment of participants’ beliefs, it remains a potential 
concern whenever beliefs are assessed.
(ii) Declarative beliefs and insight'. Chapter 3 described how most individuals 
appear to hold a similar concept of what constitutes a ‘belief, considering a belief to 
be a personal and essentially private process, which can affect and be affected by 
other cognitions, emotions and behaviour. As discussed in Chapter 1, asking people to 
reveal their beliefs assumes that participants (1) understand (the question), (2) know 
(i.e., are capable of recalling and describing) the beliefs and (3) are willing to attribute 
these to themselves. Notwithstanding well-established frailties of introspection 
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) and limited explicit control over our cognitive processes 
(Halligan & Oakley 2000; Wegner, 2002), the most common (and obvious) method 
for assessing such private convictions/propositions remains questionnaires, which 
clearly require declarative responses.
Such methods have limitations given the potential susceptibility to deception, 
misinterpretation and self-presentational strategies (Bames-Holmes et al., 2006). That 
said, simply asking participants remains the method of choice when trying to assess 
others’ beliefs (whether clinically or non-clinically). Specific problems arise, 
however, when asking people suffering from mental illness for self-reports, as they 
may not be capable of providing an accurate report. David (1990) discusses the 
multidimensional problem of insight, differentiating between situations where patients 
(a) may not be aware that they are ill, or (b) may not recognise that psychotic 
symptoms are abnormal or (c) may not acknowledge the need for or comply with 
treatment. Indeed, self-report can easily be affected by poor insight, suspiciousness, 
recent life events, or affective bias (Verdoux et al., 1998). In experiments looking at 
quality of life judgements, Atkinson, Zibin and Chuang (1997) showed that
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schizophrenic patients judged their quality of life to be better than average, whereas 
independent observers considered it below average.
(Hi) Clinical vs. non-clinical measures: Given the assumption of the 
continuum account that the contents of ‘normal’ (i.e., non-clinical but delusion-like) 
beliefs overlaps with that of beliefs diagnosed in mainstream psychiatric conditions, it 
seems reasonable to use clinical measures to ascertain the prevalence of delusion-like 
beliefs in non-clinical samples (e.g., CIDI [Robins et al., 1998; used by: Kendler et 
al., 1996; Scott et al., 2005; van Os et al., 2000]; DIS [Robins et al., 1981; used by: 
Eaton et al., 1991; Poulton et al., 2000; Tien, 1991]; MINI [Sheehan et al., 1998; used 
by Olfson et al., 2002]; PSQ [Bebbington & Nayani, 1995; used by Johns et al., 2002; 
2004]). However, participants’ knowledge of the explicit purpose of these measures 
(namely to diagnose psychiatric disorder) and the clinical vocabulary used can be 
expected to limit full participation.
(iv) Social acceptability: There remains a critical issue concerning the validity 
of self-reported data, particularly where these concern mental illness, given the 
understandable unwillingness of participants (clinical and non-clinical) to provide 
responses that present themselves in a socially unacceptable manner (Byrne, 2000; 
Corrigan, 2000). Social desirability theory (Edwards, 1957) suggests that the more 
highly stigmatised and negatively sanctioned a behaviour, the stronger the tendency to 
under-report it. On the other hand, behaviours that are seen as culturally desirable tend 
to be over-reported, i.e., individuals provide the perceived-to-be more socially 
acceptable response. In particular, older people and women are more likely to respond 
in a socially desirable manner (Ray & Lovejoy, 2003; Thomsen et al., 2005). Thus if 
participants are aware of the associations with psychotic symptoms, they are less 
likely to endorse items for fear of being labelled mentally ill.
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Stigma associated with mental illness is well-recognised as an important factor 
influencing access to mental healthcare in the general population (White et al., 2006). 
Even within the psychiatric profession (which has high rates of mental illness: Caplan, 
1994), staff are reluctant to disclose mental illness to colleagues or professional 
organisations (White et al., 2006). A pilot study for a large health screening study of 
military personnel revealed that many had not honestly answered items in the 
questionnaire for reasons of lack of trust in medical confidentiality, stigmatisation and 
fears that the process would jeopardise career prospects (French et al., 2004).
To moderate the effects of clinical language, some researchers have developed 
more clinically neutral measures of ‘delusional ideation’ (Peters, Joseph & Garety, 
1999; Peters et al., 2004; Verdoux et al., 1998). This was one of the motivations 
behind the development of the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI: Peters, Joseph 
& Garety, 1999), much of whose content is taken from the Present State Examination 
(Wing et al., 1974). The PDI measures the less clinically explicit ‘delusional 
ideation’, which has been used to support the continuum hypothesis (Peters, Joseph & 
Garety, 1999). Peters et al. used normalised vocabulary, and indicate in the 
introduction that the “experiences” under investigation are assumed to be more 
common than previously supposed. Studies have shown that the use of such 
introductions and neutral vocabulary appear to significantly decrease the under­
reporting of potentially embarrassing and social unacceptable questions (Vinokur et 
al., 1979).
(v) Terms chosen to assess delusion/delusional ideation: Moreover, Peters, 
Joseph and Garety (1999) used items that were “cast into a format that was thought to 
capture their ‘normal ’ equivalents ” (p. 555), for example, ‘Do you ever feel as if  
there is a conspiracy against you?’ for persecutory beliefs [emphasis added].
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However, the majority of authors suggest that belief is the basis of delusion (Davies et 
al., 2001; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000; van Os, 2003) and the findings of Chapter 3 
highlight some potential difficulties of interpretation when equating terms such as 
‘belief and ‘feel’. Thus a more direct probe of delusion-like belief is desirable, given 
the uncertain boundaries between holding a belief and having an experience.
(vi) Range o f  beliefs assessed: Most of these non-clinical measures (as with 
many existing clinical measures described above) focus almost exclusively on the 
delusions commonly found in schizophrenia, namely non-bizarre delusions (e.g., 
persecutory beliefs) and some bizarre delusions concerning thought and action 
control. According to the DSM-IV, delusions are bizarre if they are “clearly 
implausible and not understandable and do not derive from ordinary life experiences” 
(APA, 2000, p. 275). Many well-documented monothematic bizarre delusions, 
typically those associated with neuropsychiatric disorders (e.g., Capgras, Cotard, 
reduplicative paramnesia, mirrored-self misidentification), have been the subject of 
considerable research recently but have not been fully investigated in general 
population studies (Coltheart, 2007; Davies et al., 2001; Ellis & Lewis, 2001; Stone & 
Young, 1997).
4.1.3 Paranormal, religious and other ‘normal’ beliefs
One subject area where prevalence data for the general public do exist is for 
religious and paranormal beliefs. Religious beliefs continue to be common, despite 
survey results confirming that the U.S. (following Europe) has become less religious 
(Financial Times/Harris Interactive, 2006; Pew Forum Survey, 2006; Taylor, 2003). 
Paranormal beliefs are similarly prevalent, with Moore (2005) reporting that 
paranormal beliefs were endorsed by 73% of the US population.
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Although different, religious beliefs and paranormal beliefs are considered to 
share a number of common aspects including high intuitive thinking, low analytical 
thinking, number of mystical experiences and positive attitude toward the supernatural 
(Aamio & Lindeman, 2007). Moreover, both are predominantly non-materialistic in 
that they do not conceive of the world as a place controlled exclusively by sequences 
of natural physical or biological laws. Instead, to provide meaning and coherence for 
what appears random and chaotic, both hold with the precept of a supernatural 
presence that can influence or control the course of their lives. This view is supported 
by research that shows that believers in superstitious, magical, and paranormal beliefs 
accepted more violations of core ontological distinctions about physical, 
psychological, and biological phenomena than skeptics did and that these core 
ontological confusions could discriminate believers from skeptics better than intuitive 
thinking, analytical thinking, or emotional instability (Lindeman & Aamio, 2006). 
Such beliefs are viewed by the skeptical scientific community as being non-evidential 
and irrational (Dawkins, 2006; Dennett, 2006), e.g., being grouped for research 
purposes as both “transcend the explanatory power o f mainstream science ” (Gray, 
1991, p.7).
As might be predicted given this overlap, there is evidence of association 
between paranormal and religious beliefs (e.g., Irwin, 1985). However, findings in 
this area vary widely, with some authors reporting no relationship (e.g., Rice, 2003), 
or even negative associations (Persinger & Makarec, 1990). These varying results 
highlight the need for further investigation of the relationship between religious and 
paranormal beliefs. Furthermore, they illustrate the pitfalls of research in this area, 
where there is no agreed definition of what constitutes a paranormal belief.
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Although many of these types of belief (given their popularity) are 
traditionally regarded as ‘normal’, they also share certain characteristics with 
delusional type beliefs. Indeed, problems with the definition of delusion (see Chapter 
1) have led to some controversy over how to deal with the issue of religious beliefs. 
Freud (1964) famously regarded all religious beliefs as delusional (although many 
clinicians would disagree). Furthermore, evidence linking delusional and religious 
belief comes from studies suggesting that members of new religious movements 
(NRMs) report higher levels of delusional ideation than other non-clinical 
populations, but significantly not the levels of distress or preoccupation found in 
clinical patients (Day & Peters, 1999; Peters, Day, McKenna & Orbach, 1999; Smith, 
Riley & Peters, 2009).
Similarly, while paranormal beliefs are still regarded as unusual by some, they 
are typically not generally seen as incomprehensible or bizarre, as are some delusional 
beliefs. In other words, many religious and paranormal beliefs are generally 
considered socially acceptable, as witnessed by a review of market research polls 
(e.g., Gallup & Newport, 1991; Rice, 2003; Taylor, 2003) and increasing popularity 
of science fiction and fantasy novels and films (e.g., Harry Potter, Star Wars, and 
Lord o f the Rings: currently the 1st, 3rd and 4th highest grossing film series 
respectively). Nevertheless, people who report paranormal experiences tend to have 
higher than usual levels of psychiatric symptoms (McCreery & Claridge, 1995), and, 
conversely, those with mental illness often hold unusually strong convictions 
regarding supernatural forces (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983; Thalboume, 1994a, b). 
Similarly, Lawrence and Peters (2004) found that people who reported strong belief in 
the paranormal scored higher on delusional ideation, as measured using the PDI.
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Moreover, neurophysiological evidence linking paranormal beliefs to 
delusions comes from studies that found that those who hold paranormal beliefs show 
increased right hemisphere activation during verbal (Brugger, Gamma et al., 1993) 
and visual (Brugger, Regard et al., 1993) tasks and at rest (Pizzagalli et al., 2000), as 
well as a reduction in the left hemisphere dominance for language (Leonhard & 
Brugger, 1998). Crow (1997) has argued that this brain pattern is also found in 
patients with psychosis. Whilst lacking conclusive evidence, these findings provide 
additional support for a link between paranormal and delusional beliefs.
Given views of paranormal and religious beliefs as irrational and unscientific 
(Dawkins, 2006; Dennett, 2006), the distinction (both clinically and socially) between 
these and beliefs considered delusional seems to depend primarily on prevalence and 
consequences -  namely the number of people who appear or claim to hold these 
beliefs, and the social and health-related effects such beliefs have on the individual or 
society. This is reflected by the final criterion of the APA’s (2000) definition of 
delusion, which explicitly excludes religious beliefs ( 'The belief is not one ordinarily 
accepted by other members o f the person’s culture or subculture (e.g. it is not an 
article o f  religious faith) ’). There has been substantial criticism made of this criterion, 
however, as discussed in Chapter 2. For example, without empirical evidence of the 
types of beliefs held within a non-clinical population, it is not clear that this criterion 
could be consistently operationally employed (save in the case of bizarre, logically- 
impossible beliefs: Bell, Halligan & Ellis, 2003). In particular, there is a lack of 
research investigating ‘normal’ beliefs other than those with a religious basis (e.g., 
moral beliefs or beliefs regarding global warming).
The links between socially tolerated beliefs (i.e., paranormal or religious) and 
those that are clinically delusional provide “a particular challenge to those who
117
believe in an easy distinction between normal and abnormal beliefs ” (Bentall, 2000, 
p. 83). Indeed, if one follows Quine and Ullian’s (1970) proposal for a web of beliefs 
(see Chapter 1), it is important to examine the links between delusion-like beliefs and 
the (assumed-to-be) more common beliefs regarded by the scientific community as 
non-rational, such as paranormal or religious ideas (see Chapter 7). To explore this 
further, it is necessary to examine the interactions between, and distributions of, these 
different belief types within the same individuals.
4.2 DEVELOPMENT OF CBQ
4.2.1 Questionnaire rationale
To try and address some of the limitations of previous measures, and in 
particular, the social stigma attached to reporting psychotic-like beliefs, a new 
measure, the Cardiff Beliefs Questionnaire (CBQ), was developed. The CBQ was 
designed to be a self-report measure (similar to the PDI) that explicitly assesses 
beliefs, including those with delusion-like content, and avoids psychiatric terms. The 
term ‘delusion-like belief (DLB) is used, given that ‘delusional ideation’ lacks a 
formal standard definition (and in any case has been used interchangeably with 
‘delusion’: Wang & Lee, 1997). Moreover, unlike other non-clinical measures (PDI: 
Peters, Joseph & Garety, 1999; CAPE: Stefanis et al., 2002), which use a variety of 
terms (e.g., ‘feel’, ‘think’ or ‘worry’) interchangeably in their questions, all relevant 
CBQ questions used the term ‘belief to avoid ambiguity (e.g., ‘feel’ may highlight 
affective features).
The CBQ (in addition to avoiding reference to any clinical terms) captures a 
wider range of beliefs (including delusion-like beliefs) than previous assessments, and
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critically embeds relevant questions within a general societal or cultural context by 
including moral, paranormal and religious beliefs. Unlike previous measures of 
delusions or delusional ideation, the CBQ also includes a range of bizarre delusion­
like beliefs.
Questions covering more common, less stigmatising beliefs serve to de- 
emphasise the psychiatric associations and encourage participants to engage more 
honestly with the questions. In addition, the inclusion of these other belief types 
allows further investigation of the web of belief hypothesis (Quine & Ullian, 1970). A 
small number of experiences analogous to (auditory/visual) hallucinations 
(‘hallucination-like experiences’: HLE) were also included to allow an evaluation of 
possible links between beliefs and experiences. As such, the CBQ has the advantage 
that it covers a range of both beliefs and experiences, which is not the case for many 
non-clinical measures (see Table 4.2).
4.2.2 Questionnaire description
The Cardiff Beliefs Questionnaire (CBQ) includes 58 questions covering a wide range 
of beliefs and a smaller number of experiences and meta-beliefs. The belief items 
(n=46) consist of 17 delusion-like beliefs (10 of which were considered bizarre by the 
DSM criteria), 10 paranormal and religious beliefs and 19 societal/cultural beliefs. 
The remainder comprise 8 anomalous experience questions and 4 questions targeting 
meta-beliefs (i.e., participants’ insight into their propensity to hold beliefs). The CBQ 
is described below, and a full list of questions included in Appendix II.
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Table 4.2. Comparison of CBQ and other general delusion/delusion-like belief measures
CBQ CAPE & PDI CIDI DSSI MINI PSQ SAPS
Assessment Non-clinical
delusion-like
beliefs
Non-clinical
delusional
ideation
Clinical
psychotic
symptoms
Clinical
psychotic
symptoms
Clinical
psychotic
symptoms
Clinical
psychotic
symptoms
Clinical
psychotic
symptoms
Probe term(s) used ‘Believe’ Mixture
(Predominantly
‘feel’)
Mixture
(Predominantly
‘believe’)
Mixture
(Predominantly
‘feel’)
‘Believe’ ‘Feel’ Mixture 
(Predominantly 
direct, i.e., 
‘are’/‘have’)
Paranormal beliefs included Yes Yes' No No No No No
Religious beliefs included Yes Religious
delusions
No No No No Religious
delusions
Societal/cultural beliefs 
included
Yes No No No No No No
Hallucinations/ HLE 
included
Yes Yes' Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Paranormal experiences 
included
Yes Yes1 No No No No No
a
Non-bizarre delusions/DLB Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Delusions/DLB of control Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Bizarre delusions/DLB (e.g., 
misidentification)2
Yes Yes3 Yes No No No No
Self-appraisals (e.g., 
superstitiousness)
Yes No No No No No No
The items are scored as part o f  the scale with delusional ideation
2 The bizarre/non-bizarre distinction is made here on the basis o f  question content alone. Therefore, this does not take into account that during interviews respondents could 
elaborate on initially non-bizarre questions and describe a bizarre set o f  beliefs (e.g., the MINI has options for interviewers to code responses as ‘y es’ or ‘yes - bizarre’)
3 One/two items: CAPE & PDI: General misidentification ( ‘some people are not what they seem to b e’); CAPE: Capgras
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4.2.3 Questionnaire development
The final version of the CBQ was developed following a long iterative 
process, involving feedback from three earlier pilot versions and a total of 559 
participants (see Table 4.3). Each version was reviewed following each pilot and 
ambiguous or unrepresentative items were revised or removed. As Table 4.3 shows, 
the majority of revisions involved non-clinical beliefs, although minor grammatical 
changes to the wording of other items were also made. The major change to DLB 
items occurred between versions 2 and 3, when three new items (addressing 
somatoparaphrenia, subjective doubles and nihilism) were added. The final version 
was therefore very similar to version 3, albeit with minor changes in wording and the 
addition of 7 new societal/cultural belief items to ensure a balance in the ratio of non- 
clinical to clinical-like items. The key developments covered by the pilot studies are 
summarised below. (Full lists of revisions made to the questionnaire items following 
the pilot studies are presented in Tables (i)-(v) in Appendix III.)
Questions regarding “actual vs. possibility ”
One of the main revisions to the initial scale following piloting the first version on 
254 participants was to ensure that questions were consistently framed in a direct 
format rather than as “potential” or “possibility” judgements (i.e., items were phrased 
‘do you believe that people are possessed by evil spirits?’ rather than ‘do you believe 
that people can be possessed by evil spirits?’ as in the first version). This provided for 
a better comparison between questions, particularly in the case of the delusion-like 
belief questions, where it was felt that these should be based on current beliefs, rather 
than abstract hypothetical judgements or possibilities.
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Table 4.3. Participant sample characteristics for the three pilot studies and final large study
N Recruited from... Method of 
administration
Age Gender
% female
Question numbers 
(and changes)
Pilot 1 254 Open University conference; 
University volunteer panel; 
Secondary schools (staff); 
Student societies
Paper and pen Range: 18-68; 
Mean = 36.7; 
s.d. = 13.8
68.0% Version 1: 
14 DLB;
5 PB;
6 SCB
Pilot 2 119 University volunteer panel Paper and pen Range: 18-48; 
Mean = 21.6; 
s.d. = 4.9
76.3% Version 2:
14 DLB;
8 P&RB (+3 RB, -2 PB, +2 PB); 
10 SCB (-3,+7)
Pilot 3 186 First year undergraduates in 
psychology
Paper and pen Range: 18-38; 
Mean = 18.8; 
s.d. = 2.1
89.6% Version 3 :
17 DLB (+3); 
10 P&RB (+2); 
2 SCB (-1.+3)
Final
study
1000 Stratified random sample of 
British adults
Telephone Grouped: 
18-29(19.4%); 
30-44 (29.2%); 
45-59 (24.5%); 
60+ (26.9%)
52.1% Version 4:
17 DLB;
10 P&RB;
19 SCB (+7)
DLB: Delusion-like beliefs; PB: Paranormal beliefs; RB: Religious beliefs; SCB: Societal/cultural beliefs; + added; - removed
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Current vs. lifetime focus
A second main change concerned the format of the questions. Initially participants 
were requested to answer ‘Do you believe, or have you believed...’. As this tended to 
emphasise both current and lifetime positions (the latter also involving long term 
memory), this was changed to ‘Do you believe...’ to emphasise currently held beliefs. 
This provides an estimate of the number of people holding the belief at the time of 
being interviewed rather that depending on past recollections which might involve 
occasions and periods when they did or did not believe. This also provided for 
analysis of differences across age groups and in particular to determine whether 
younger people were more likely to hold delusion-like beliefs, as is the case with 
delusional ideation (Verdoux et al., 1998).
Personally relevant nature
The major change between versions 2 and 3 (described in Tables (i)-(iii), Appendix 
III) was that items were now revised to emphasise their personally relevant nature. It 
was noted that all the delusion-like items except the pair addressing reduplicative 
paramnesia were personally relevant (e.g. ‘Do you believe that your relatives have 
been replaced by similar looking people?’), whereas none of the other belief type 
questions had this personal emphasis. Those items which could be adapted to focus on 
an individual were changed to increase the similarity between the delusion-like and 
other questions on the CBQ.
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Leading questions
A small revision between versions 2 and 3 attempted to ensure that questions did not 
appear to lead participants’ responses. This applied particularly to the moral 
questions, which had previously required individuals to say whether they believed that 
a statement was right. These were adapted to ask instead whether each statement was 
right or wrong, with a new answer scale, from ‘Strongly believe it is right’ through to 
‘No opinion’ and on through to ‘Strongly believe it is wrong’.
Belief coherence
A main revision to version 3 of the CBQ was the inclusion of five pairs of beliefs that 
could be used to directly assess participants’ belief coherence on the assumption that, 
if beliefs are core personally-relevant propositions that are strongly endorsed, they 
should show some internal consistency. This reflects the arguments made in Chapter 
1, whereby a criterion of ‘belief should be that it is logically coherent with other 
beliefs held by an individual. The five pairs are described below:
a) If a participant answered believe (at any level) to a question: ‘To what 
extent do you believe in reincarnation (i.e. that when you die your soul is 
reborn in another body)?’, it was predicted that they should also answer 
positively to ‘To what extent do you believe that the soul or spirit survives 
death?’
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b) If a participant responded believe (at any level) to the question: ‘To what 
extent do you believe that some people communicate with the dead?’, it was 
expected that they should also answer believe to ‘To what extent do you 
believe that the soul or spirit survives death?’
c) If a participant answered believe (at any level) to the question: ‘To what 
extent do you believe that earth has been visited by aliens from other solar 
systems?’, it was expected that they should also answer believe to ‘To what 
extent do you believe in extra-terrestrial life?’
d) If a participant responded believe (at any level) to the question: ‘To what 
extent do you believe that some people are possessed by evil spirits?’, it was 
expected that they should also answer believe to ‘To what extent do you 
believe in demons or evil spirits?’
e) If a participant answered believe to either of the questions: ‘To what extent 
do you believe in the theory of evolution?’ or ‘To what extent do you believe 
that humans share a common ancestor with apes?’, then it was expected that 
they should answer believe to the other.
These pairs were also used to further investigate the web of belief hypothesis (Quine 
& Ullian, 1970), and to investigate the assumption that all beliefs held by an 
individual are consistent with each other (see Chapter 7).
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4.2.4 Question content
4.2.4,1 Delusion-like beliefs (DLB)
Delusion-like beliefs were based on the major thematic delusions found in 
mainstream psychotic and neuropsychiatric conditions. Items addressing DLB were 
adapted from DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000), existing clinical measures (Bebbington & 
Nayani, 1995; Peters, Joseph & Garety, 2004; Robins et al., 1998; Sheehan et al., 
1988) and relevant examples from the cognitive neuropsychological research 
literature (Bell, Halligan & Ellis, 2006b; Davies & Coltheart, 2000; Ellis & Young, 
1990). To ensure coverage of a broad range, items were chosen to be representative of 
each delusional theme. These included five questions relating to the major subtypes of 
delusional disorder (APA, 2000); one item each for persecutory, erotomanic and 
grandiose ideas, and two different aspects of the somatic subtype (body dysmorphia 
and parasitosis). Two other items assessed the non-bizarre ideas of reference and 
nihilistic beliefs.
In addition, ten questions specifically addressed bizarre themes (as defined by 
DSM-IV). This type of delusion has been comparatively under-researched in non- 
clinical samples, due to the assumption that the bizarreness of these ideas makes them 
unlikely to be found in general populations. However, given the emphasis on the 
content of beliefs for diagnosing schizophrenia (with different requirements 
depending on the bizarre/non-bizarre distinction), it was valuable to determine the 
degree to which bizarre beliefs are present. Bizarre items covered beliefs of external 
control, thought insertion, Capgras syndrome, Cotard syndrome, Fregoli syndrome, 
reduplicative paramnesia (of both person and place), mirrored-self misidentification, 
subjective doubles and somatoparaphrenia.
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4.2.4.2 Paranormal and religious beliefs
Rice (2003) drew a distinction between classic paranormal beliefs (e.g., in 
ESP) and religious beliefs, often considered to be a subset of paranormal beliefs. In 
terms of the relationship between these beliefs, there exist two opposing hypotheses in 
the literature. One predicts a negative relationship between these two, given that 
paranormal beliefs may fulfil the spiritualist needs of those without religion (Emmons 
& Sobal, 1981) and/or because mainstream religious doctrines contribute to rejecting 
such beliefs (Sparks, 2001). On the other hand, a positive relationship between these 
two types of beliefs could be expected, given that both consist of “beliefs in physical, 
biological or psychological phenomena that feature fundamental or core ontological 
properties of another ontological category” (Lindeman & Aamio, 2006, p. 586-7). In 
other words, both relate to beliefs in the existence of phenomena that cannot be 
explained by current scientific theories.
Indeed, studies have found support for both (contradictory) predictions, which 
might in part be explained by the lack a single well-validated measure of religiousness 
(or an agreed definition of paranormal beliefs). For example, Orenstein (2002) found 
that church attendance was related to content-specific religious beliefs but not to 
certain classic paranormal beliefs. Similarly, Thalboume and O’Brien (1999) tested 
three different religiosity scales against a measure of paranormal beliefs (the 
Australian Sheep-Goat Scale: Thalboume & Delin, 1993), and found a close to 
significant negative correlation, no correlation and a significant positive correlation 
between the different scales. Finally, Tobacyk and Milford (1983) found that religious 
beliefs were positively correlated with beliefs in precognition and witchcraft, but 
uncorrelated with beliefs in telepathy or extraordinary life forms.
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The relationship between these two sets of belief used in the CBQ was 
therefore investigated, and will be outlined further in the following section describing 
the CBQ’s psychometric credentials. As the paranormal and religious beliefs did 
indeed form a reliable scale, these beliefs will be described together.
Questions concerning paranormal and religious beliefs were constructed from 
reviews of published market research polls (Gallup & Newport, 1991; Rice, 2003; 
Taylor, 2003) and paranormal belief measures (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983; 
Thalboume & Delin, 1993; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). Following Lindeman and 
Aamio (2006, pp. 586-7), this group of beliefs was defined as “beliefs in physical, 
biological or psychological phenomena that feature fundamental or core ontological 
properties of another ontological category” (e.g., ‘Do you believe that some people 
communicate with the dead?’).
4.2.4.3 Societal/cultural
Finally, the last group of beliefs were classified as societal/cultural beliefs (of which 
paranormal and religious beliefs can, depending on one’s viewpoint, be considered a 
subset) and included scientific, political and moral items (e.g., ‘Do you believe that 
humans cause significant global warming?’). Importantly, the large number of non- 
clinical belief questions, while interesting in their own right, were strategically 
inserted to provide a balanced context that encouraged participants to respond more 
truthfully and allowed exploration of the links between delusion-like beliefs and other 
belief types.
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4.2.4.4 Anomalous experiences
In addition, 8 anomalous experience items were included, of which 4 items 
focused on common paranormal experiences, selected from reviews of published 
market research polls (Gallup & Newport, 1991; Rice, 2003; Taylor, 2003) and 
measures of paranormal phenomena (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983; Thalboume & 
Delin, 1993; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983), to ensure that items comprised a wide range 
of experiences. In addition, two items (relating to changed feelings towards others and 
towards objects) were chosen to evaluate specific hypothesised links between 
anomalous experiences and beliefs (described in Chapter 6). The final 2 items targeted 
visual and auditory hallucination-like experiences to allow a more direct evaluation of 
their association with delusion-like beliefs.
Although many more hallucinatory items have been included in some studies 
(e.g., Laroi & van der Linden, 2005), the number of hallucination-like items is not 
that dissimilar from those included in several other studies (e.g., Johns et al., 2002, 
2004; Verdoux et al., 1998). Moreover, the two clinically related items cover the most 
common types of hallucinations by modality. Cutting (1990) estimated auditory 
hallucinations occurred in 55% of participants and visual in 15%. These are also 
amongst those most commonly associated with psychotic disorder (along with haptic 
hallucinations: Ohayon, 2000). Moreover, although different versions of the more 
comprehensive Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (Launay & Slade, 1981) yield 
different factor structures, visual and auditory hallucinations remain the two most 
consistent factors, with others consisting of non-hallucinatory factors relating to vivid 
thoughts and daydreaming or sleep-related experiences (Laroi & van der Linden, 
2005; Morrison et al., 2000; Morrison et al., 2002).
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4.2.4.5 Self-appraisals and insight
A final feature of the CBQ was to briefly investigate individual’s self­
appraisals of their beliefs and in particular their collective judgement of the likelihood 
of holding delusion-like beliefs or hallucination-like experiences. In the CBQ 
participants are asked to rate the extent to which they consider themselves (a) 
‘superstitious (i.e. likely to believe certain events occur through mysterious or magical 
means)’, (b) ‘a religious person’, (c) ‘likely to believe in things that others do not’ 
and/or (d) ‘tolerant of people with different beliefs’.
4.2.5 Questionnaire scale
Unlike previous questionnaires, CBQ questions only involved current beliefs 
to avoid relying on participants’ memory (asking ‘Do you believe...’), with 
participants responding using a 5-point Likert scale: ‘-1’ (‘Do not believe’), ‘0’ 
(‘Don’t know’), ‘1’ (‘Weakly believe’), ‘2’ (‘Moderately believe’), ‘3’ (‘Strongly 
believe’).
In contrast, experience questions probe both current and lifetime experiences 
(e.g., ‘Have you seen...’), as one aim was to investigate whether a past or current 
anomalous experience could have led to an anomalous belief. Participants responded 
using a 4-point Likert scale, with the options 0 (‘Never’), 1 (‘Rarely’), 2 
(‘Sometimes’) and 3 (‘Often’). The insight questions used a scale with the response 
options 0 (‘Not at all’), 1 (‘Quite’) or 2 (‘Very’). To minimise response bias and 
ensure participants’ attention, the scales were configured by alternating endpoints 
indicating the presence or absence of the belief or experience.
Similar to the introduction used by Peters, Joseph & Garety (1999) to help 
neutralise the effects of some of the questions, it was explained to all participants that
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the study ‘included “a wide range of beliefs and experiences that some people may 
find unusual but which are more common than most people realise”. Participants, 
moreover, were asked not to consider beliefs or experiences that might be attributed to 
the influence of drugs or alcohol.
4.3 PSYCHOMETRIC CREDENTIALS: RELIABILITY AND 
VALIDITY OF CBQ
4.3.1 Test-retest reliability
Test-retest reliability provides an index of score consistency over time and was 
derived by inviting the same respondents to complete the CBQ on two different 
occasions. Seventy-six participants (aged 18-48: M=21.4, s.d.=4.91) completed 
version 2 of the CBQ on two separate occasions, on average one month apart. These 
participants comprised a subset of the sample of 119 described in Table 4.3. Fifty 
participants filled out a paper-and-pencil version in both sessions while (to lessen the 
burden on participants and encourage a higher response rate) the remaining twenty-six 
received the questionnaire and responded by email for the second session. Previous 
studies suggest that responses to questionnaires are not affected by changes from 
paper-and-pencil to electronic methodology (e.g., Davis, 1999; Vallejo et al., 2007), 
and indeed there was no difference in means between the two groups. A strong 
correlation was found between participants’ responses for the two sessions (r=0.865,
p<0.001).
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4.3.2 Factor Analysis
To ascertain common underlying factors, a principal components analysis (PCA) was 
carried out on both of the two belief groups expected to form reliable scales (i.e., 
delusion-like and paranormal and religious). To ensure a reliable component structure 
was determined, the sample was randomly split in half, with each half analysed 
separately and the two solutions compared.
Delusion-like beliefs
Sample 1 (n=448)
Individual items had KMO measures of sampling adequacy varying between 0.807- 
0.895. The overall KMO was 0.848 and the Bartlett test for sphericity was highly 
significant, confirming that the data were suitable for PCA. The Kaiser criterion of 
eigenvalue>l suggested a four component solution, whereas the scree plot suggested a 
one component solution (see Figure 4.1). Following Stevens (1992), the solution 
indicated by the scree plot was taken as the most appropriate (as there was a large 
sample but relatively low communalities).
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Figure 4.1. Sample 1 scree plot for DLB items
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Overall, a single component solution explained 25.2% of the total variance. Table 4.4 
shows the factor loadings for this component.
Sample 2 (n=461)
The Kaiser criterion of eigenvalue>l again suggested a four component solution, 
whereas the scree plot suggested a one component solution (see Figure 4.2).
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Figure 4.2. Sample 2 scree plot for DLB items
Individual items had KMO measures of sampling adequacy varying between 0.797- 
0.934. The overall KMO was 0.864 and the Bartlett test for sphericity was highly 
significant, confirming that the data were suitable for PCA. Overall, a single 
component solution explained 27.1% of the total variance. Table 4.4 shows the factor 
loadings for this component.
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Table 4.4. Factor loadings for DLB items
To what extent do you believe...
Factor loading
Sample 1 Sample 2
That part of your body doesn't belong to you? 0.564 0.658
That some people are duplicated, i.e. are in two places at the 
same time? 0.601 0.562
That the reflection in the mirror is sometimes not you? 0.513 0.608
That certain places are duplicated, i.e. are in two different 
locations at the same time? 0.525 0.588
That people say or do things that contain special messages 
for you? 0.533 0.571
That relatives or close friends are sometimes replaced by 
identical-looking impostors? 0.547 0.550
That some well-known celebrity is secretly in love with 
you? 0.545 0.552
That you are dead and/or do not exist? 0.477 0.592
That people you know disguise themselves as others to 
manipulate or influence you? 0.567 0.493
That your thoughts are not fully under your control? 0.497 0.498
That certain people are out to harm or discredit you? 0.459 0.533
That there is another person who looks and acts like you? 0.495 0.487
That you are not in control of some of your actions? 0.513 0.443
That you are infested by parasites? 0.479 0.438
That you are an exceptionally gifted person that others do 
not recognise? 0.362 0.459
That the world is about to end? 0.373 0.415
That your body or part of your body is misshapen or ugly? 0.431 0.271
It is clear from Table 4.4 that while most DLB items loaded highly onto this 
component, this was not true for all 17 items. As the purpose of conducting these 
analyses was to establish whether it would be appropriate to combine these items into 
one scale, these results suggest that some items would not contribute reliably to such a 
scale. Given this aim, it was decided that when creating a total DLB score (described 
in Chapter 5), items with loadings from one sample of below 0.4, or average items 
less than 0.45 would be dropped (these criteria define the last three items in Table 4.4, 
leaving 14 DLB items). These relatively stringent criteria helped to ensure that 
reliable comparisons can be made using a DLB scale.
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Paranormal and religious beliefs
In a similar manner to that for the DLB, two PCA were carried out on P&RB items to 
assess the dimensionality of this scale.
Sample 1 (n=455)
Initial analysis of the 10 items showed these had Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
measures of sampling adequacy between 0.795-0.856, with an overall KMO of 0.832. 
The Bartlett test for sphericity was significant. The Kaiser criterion of eigenvalue>l 
suggested a three component solution, whereas the scree plot suggested a one 
component solution (see Figure 4.3)
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Figure 4.3. Sample 1 scree plot for P&RB items
Therefore, the analysis was also re-run with a forced one component solution (again 
following Stevens, 1992). Overall, the single component solution explained 36.4% of 
the variance. Table 4.5 shows the factor loadings for this component.
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Sample 2 (n=458)
Individual items had KMO measures of sampling adequacy varying between 0.764- 
0.860. The overall KMO was 0.808 and the Bartlett test for sphericity was highly 
significant, confirming that the data were suitable for PCA. The Kaiser criterion again 
suggested a three component solution, whereas the scree plot (see Figure 4.4) 
suggested a one component solution. Following the methods outlined above, a single 
component solution was chosen, which explained 34.9% of the total variance. Table
4.5 shows the factor loadings for this component.
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Figure 4.4. Sample 2 scree plot for P&RB items
Using the same criteria as described above for DLB items, items with loadings from 
one sample of below 0.4, or average items less than 0.45 were dropped (these criteria 
define the last two items in Table 4.5). Thus the remaining 8 P&RB items will be used 
when calculating scores for this belief group.
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Table 4.5. The factor loadings for P&RB items
To what extent do you believe...
Factor loading
Sample 1 Sample 2
That the soul or spirit survives death? 0.712 0.742
In demons or evil spirits? 0.666 0.712
That some people communicate with the dead? 0.687 0.664
That some people are possessed by evil spirits? 0.655 0.643
In reincarnation (i.e. that when you die your soul is 
reborn in another body)? 0.677 0.603
In black magic or witchcraft? 0.592 0.579
In a god or gods? 0.604 0.533
In "intelligent design" (i.e. that the complexity of the 
world suggests that it was purposefully designed by an 
intelligent creator)? 0.571 0.467
In astrology (i.e. that the position of the stars and 
planets affects or determines your life)? 0.422 0.469
Some people transform into werewolves? 0.328 0.402
4.3.3 Internal consistency
Internal consistency provides a measure of the reliability of different questionnaire 
items and permits an estimate of how consistently individuals respond to the items 
within a scale. The Cronbach alpha coefficient measures the extent to which item 
responses obtained at the same time correlate highly with each other. Given the 
dimensionality indicated by the factor analyses, these internal consistency tests were 
carried out on the final 14 DLB items and 8 P&RB items. We also carried out tests for 
societal/cultural items (although these were not designed to cohere into a single scale), 
to determine whether items were sufficiently related as to allow comparisons between 
types of belief endorsement.
Using the large final sample described in Table 4.3 (n=1000), both the CBQ 
delusion-like and paranormal and religious items demonstrated good internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alphas of 0.79 and 0.80 respectively). The item-whole
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correlations ranged between 0.35-0.50 for delusion-like items and 0.42-0.63 for 
paranormal and religious. Split-half reliability analysis indicated relatively good 
correlations of 0.82 for delusion-like and 0.81 for paranormal and religious (using the 
Spearman-Brown correction). Thirteen of the societal/cultural items, given the wide 
range of beliefs covered in this category, yielded a less stable, but nevertheless 
adequate scale, with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.65. Item-whole correlations ranged 
between 0.16-0.45, and the corrected split-half reliability produced a reasonable 
correlation of 0.69.
4.3.4 Construct validity
Construct validity measures whether a new scale measures or correlates with a 
theorised or psychological construct or similar existing measures. The Oxford- 
Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE: Mason et al., 1995) is an 
established measure of psychosis-proneness, and has previously been used when 
evaluating the construct validity of the PDI, which addresses delusional ideation 
(Peters et al., 2004). It is divided into four subscales (unusual experiences [UE], 
cognitive disorganisation [CD], introvertive anhedonia [IA] and impulsive 
nonconformity [IN]) thus allowing one to establish which aspects of psychosis a new 
scale taps into. This provides a strong evaluation of construct validity (for the DLB 
items in particular) as, with a scale such as the CBQ, looking at beliefs similar to 
positive symptoms of psychosis, one would expect correlations with these aspects of 
the scale (unusual experiences) but not or to a lesser extent with the others. This 
reflects the distinction between congruent validity (when a scale correlates with 
predicted constructs) and discriminant validity (when a scale does not correlate with 
constructs it has no theoretical reason to correlate with).
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One hundred and sixty-nine participants completed both the O-LIFE and 
version 3 of the CBQ (the majority of the 186 participants who completed version 3: 
see Table 4.3). Participants’ age ranged from 18-29 (M=18.6, s.d.=1.45), and the 
majority were female. CBQ scores (for (1) delusion-like beliefs, (2) paranormal and 
religious beliefs and (3) societal/cultural beliefs) were calculated by summing 
participants’ positive responses to the relevant belief items (i.e., an item scored ‘0’ for 
‘Don’t know’/‘Do not believe’, 1 for ‘Weakly believe’, 2 for ‘Moderately believe’ 
and 3 for ‘Strongly believe’).
These scores were correlated against all four O-LIFE scales (only those 
significant at p<0.001 [Bonferroni’s correction] were considered). Congruent validity 
was established as the O-LIFE unusual experiences scale significantly correlated with 
delusion-like and paranormal and religious beliefs (p=0.35 and p=0.36 respectively), 
as might be expected, but not with societal/cultural beliefs. The other O-LIFE scales, 
as expected given their predicted relevance, did not correlate with the CBQ belief 
scores (see Table 4.6), demonstrating discriminant validity.
Table 4.6. The non-parametric correlations between CBQ and O-LIFE scores
O-LIFE O-LIFE O-LIFE O-LIFE
(UE) (CD) (IA) (IN)
DLB Score 0.35 (*) 0.19 0.03 0.18
P&RB Score 0.36 (*) 0.09 -0.07 0.14
SCB Score -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 0.17
DLB: Delusion-like belief; P&RB: Paranormal and religious belief; SCB: 
Societal/cultural belief 
* Correlation significant at p<0.001
Thus the paranormal and religious beliefs and delusion-like beliefs on the CBQ were 
both significantly associated with positive symptomatology scores, in particular those 
relating to aberrant beliefs and experiences.
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4.4 SUM M ARY
This chapter highlighted the need for a more wide-ranging analysis of both 
clinical and non-clinical beliefs; first, to further investigate those beliefs with similar 
content to delusions; and second to explore the prevalence of ‘normal’ beliefs within 
the general population. However, there remain concerns regarding the use of clinical 
measures in the non-clinical populations, and also whether regarding belief and 
experience as interchangeable is appropriate.
As a result, the Cardiff Beliefs Questionnaire (CBQ) was developed, to 
address a range of beliefs using neutral, non-clinical language throughout. Following 
extensive piloting, the CBQ demonstrated good reliability and validity. Thus the CBQ 
allows us to further explore the prevalence and relationships between different types 
of belief, and as such will be the basis of the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 5
PREVALENCE OF DELUSION-LIKE AND OTHER BELIEF 
TYPES IN THE GENERAL POPULATION  
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 4 described the reasons underlying and subsequent process of new 
questionnaire development with a view to measuring the prevalence of delusion-like 
beliefs together with other forms of belief. The current chapter describes the findings 
of a large study where the final version of the CBQ was used in a large stratified 
sample of British adults. In particular, the study addresses the prevalence of each 
belief type, the relationships between these different kinds of belief and the extent to 
which participants’ self-appraisals of their beliefs could predict content-specific 
endorsements.
5.1.1 Background
Clinical psychosis remains comparatively rare, with a recent study estimating 
lifetime prevalence of broadly defined psychosis at 3.48% (Perala et al., 2007). 
Individuals presenting at psychiatric clinics therefore represent the more serious 
consequences of mental illness, and, in particular, those subjects for whom the 
symptoms have functional consequences involving significant disruption to their lives 
and/or those of family and friends. Most patients presenting with psychotic illness 
will typically report delusions, considered to be one of the most significant 
aetiological factors within psychiatric diagnosis and once thought as ‘psychologically 
irreducible’ (Jaspers, 1963). The presence of a bizarre delusion alone is often
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sufficient to diagnose schizophrenia (once the belief has been held for a 6 month 
period, and where the belief significantly impairs the individual’s everyday 
functioning).
Despite the fact that established psychiatric definitions of delusion claim that 
such beliefs are not ‘those ordinarily held by other members of a person's culture’, 
psychiatrists have little by way of an evidence base from which to rule in or out the 
likelihood of others in a patient’s culture holding similar beliefs, in particular as it 
seems these can occur without functional consequences. As described in Chapter 1, 
drawing such a conclusion becomes more difficult given that it has been shown that 
“many people in the general population express beliefs that resemble the delusions of 
patients with a clinical diagnosis of psychotic disorder” (Delespaul & van Os, 2003, p. 
286). Indeed, general population studies estimate lifetime prevalence of delusions at 
around 15% (Rutten et al., 2008) with an average annual prevalence rate of 5% (van 
Os et al., 2009).
5.1.2 Previous Research
A variety of clinical and non-clinical instruments have been used to assess the 
prevalence of delusions (some of which have been discussed in Chapter 4) making it 
difficult to establish a reliable estimate for delusion-like beliefs or delusional ideas in 
the general public. Although delusional ideas are commonly found in non-clinical 
populations, published lifetime prevalence estimates appear relatively small. Van Os 
et al. (2000) found that 3.3% of the general population held psychiatrist-rated 
delusions, although a further 8.7% held what were described as ‘not clinically 
relevant’ delusional beliefs and another 3.8% reported plausible explanations for their 
delusion-like ideas. However, higher estimates of annual prevalence (using less strict
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definitions of delusion) have been reported. Poulton et al. (2000) reported that 20.1% 
of a 26-yr-old cohort endorsed delusions on a self-report measure and Scott et al. 
(2005) found that 11.7% of a representative sample of Australian adults reported one 
or more psychosis screening items.
Despite these higher figures, recent meta-analysis suggests an average annual 
prevalence rate of approximately 5% for delusions (van Os et al., 2009). Difficulties 
arise when reviewing the literature, however, as there is considerable variation in the 
range of symptoms targeted, definitions of ‘delusion’ employed, assessment measures 
used, and the time periods covered in different studies (see Table 5.1 for a summary). 
Kendler et al. (1996), for example, investigated lifetime prevalence, reporting that 
while 28.4% of respondents endorsed at least one psychosis probe (including items 
addressing hallucinations), only 2.2% or less of the population were affected by 
psychotic illness (see Freeman [2006] for a review of the difficulties of comparing 
studies in this area).
5.1.3 Research Aims
Given some of the difficulties when using clinical measures in non-clinical 
populations (see Chapter 4), Peters et al. (1999, 2004) developed the Peters et al. 
Delusions Inventory (PDI) as a less clinically explicit measure, assessing delusional 
ideation. This has received wide usage with studies employing this measure finding 
that around 10% of healthy individuals score above the mean for deluded patients 
(Peters, Joseph & Garety, 1999; Peters et al., 2004; Verdoux et al., 1998). 
Furthermore, median scores of 8 for healthy participants on the PDI-40 (Peters, 
Joseph & Garety, 1999) and 6 on the PDI-21 (Peters et al., 2004) show that the 
majority of these non-clinical samples endorsed at least one psychosis-based item.
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Table 5.1. Selected studies used to investigate delusional beliefs in non-clinical populations. (See Table 4.1 [Chapter 4] for instrument references)
Focus Author(s) N Instrument Sample Prevalence
Psychosis
Currently
present
Olfson et al. 
(2002)
1005 MINI US adults (attending an 
urban general medical 
practice)
10.6% persecutory; 4.7% reference
Past Month
Eaton et al. 
(1991)
810 DIS self-report and
psychiatrist-assessed
interviews
US adults 6-10% overall:
2% bizarre; 4-8% paranoid/ grandiose
Annual
Prevalence
Poulton et al. 
(2000)
761 DIS
(Longitudinal study)
26-yr-old New 
Zealanders
20.1%
Scott et al. 
(2005)
10641 Screening items from 
CIDI
Australian adults 11.7% overall:
5.9% thought insertion/withdrawal; 4.8% 
persecutory/ reference; 3.4% grandiose
Onset over 
past year
Tien &
Anthony
(1990)
4994 DIS Adults (aged 18-49) 
selected from a US 
survey, 1 yr after 
reporting no symptoms
2.6% being watched/spied on; 1.6% being 
followed; Between 0.2-0.6% for mind control/ 
reading, ideas of reference, people plotting 
against one
Lifetime
Prevalence
Ohayon &
Schatzberg
(2002)
18980 Sleep-Eval European adults 1.9% clinically evaluated
van Os et al. 
(2000)
7076 CIDI Interviews Dutch adults 12.3% overall:
3.3% ‘true’ clinically rated delusions
Delusional
Ideation
Lifetime
Prevalence
Peters, Joseph 
& Garety 
(1999)
292 PDI-40 Healthy British adults 
(n=272), psychotic 
patients (n =20)
10% of healthy individuals scored above the 
mean for deluded patients
Peters et al. 
(2004)
477 PDI-21 Healthy British adults 
(n=444), psychotic 
patients (n =33)
11% of healthy individuals scored above the 
mean for deluded patients
Verdoux et al. 
(1998)
462 PDI-21 French adults (attending a 
general medical practice)
Between 5-70% of all items:
25.5% persecutory; 12.1% grandiose; 5.6% 
reference; 8.6% control
144
The need to improve on existing non-clinical measures further, so that they 
can be more applicable to studies estimating delusion-like beliefs in non-clinical 
samples, provides a major reason for developing the CBQ (as described in Chapter 4). 
Given concerns regarding different measures (described in Chapter 4), another aim of 
the CBQ was to capture a wider range of beliefs (including delusion-like beliefs) and 
embed the target delusion-like questions within more general societal or cultural 
beliefs (including moral, paranormal and religious beliefs). This strategy was intended 
to de-emphasise the psychiatric associations and encourage participants to engage 
more honestly with the questions. In addition, the inclusion of a range of bizarre 
delusion-like beliefs distinguishes the CBQ from previous clinical and non-clinical 
measures of delusions and/or delusional ideation. With these factors in mind the main 
aims of the current study described in this chapter were as follows:
(a) By avoiding clinical language and locating delusion-like beliefs (DLB) 
within a broader non-clinical belief context, the aim was to encourage 
participants to endorse items honestly and openly and hence derive a more 
complete indication of the levels of delusion-like beliefs in the general 
public.
(b) By investigating a wider range of delusion-like-items and in particular 
including bizarre beliefs (commonly associated with neuropsychiatric 
disorders), another aim was to estimate and compare the prevalence of 
both bizarre and non-bizarre delusion-like beliefs. The expectation was 
that bizarre beliefs would be reported to a lesser extent than the non- 
bizarre beliefs.
145
(c) A third aim was to provide clinicians with a clinically relevant benchmark 
to compare those holding clinically relevant beliefs (delusions) with those 
in society holding similar beliefs, given that the standard psychiatric 
glossary considers that such beliefs should not be commonly endorsed by 
other members of a person’s culture. An association between delusion-like 
and paranormal and religious beliefs was predicted but not for delusion­
like and general societal/cultural beliefs.
(d) Assuming a psychosis continuum, a fourth aim was to establish whether 
the same demographic characteristics found in clinical groups could also 
be observed in non-clinical groups (van Os et al., 2009). To investigate 
this, several demographic probes, previously found to relate to delusion 
(e.g., van Os et al., 2000) were included.
(e) A further aim was to establish whether participants’ self-ratings of their 
meta-beliefs (e.g., religiousness) were related to endorsements for 
different belief types, allowing an evaluation of the insight non-clinical 
participants hold into their belief processes.
(f) The final aim was to examine the belief scores (for each of the three belief 
types) of a small group of patients to ascertain the degree to which these 
were similar or distinct from those of age and gender matched controls.
5.2 STUDY DESCRIPTION
5.2.1 Participants
The sample comprised 1000 British adults (aged 18 or over). Data were collected 
using computer-assisted telephone interviewing, carried out by an experienced market
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research company (MRUK), with quotas set on age, gender and employment status 
(see Table 5.3, section 5.4, for a demographic breakdown of the sample). Telephone 
interviews were chosen specifically given that they are considered more conducive to 
honest responding compared to face-to-face interviews and given the potentially 
sensitive nature of some questions (Frey & Oishi, 1995). The survey was conducted 
using random digit dialling, so as to include unlisted numbers in the potential sample. 
Calls were made predominantly in the evenings or at weekends, to target as wide a 
range of potential participants as possible. To achieve quotas, hard-to-reach groups, 
such as young males, were targeted within the household. Call backs were carried out 
if respondents asked for an alternative time, or if contact was not made (i.e., no reply, 
answer phone, line engaged). The interviewers were asked to make an explicit 
judgement as to whether each individual had sufficient comprehension of English and 
capacity to answer the questions before proceeding.
5.2.2 Measure
Participants completed the final version of the CBQ, described in Chapter 4. 
This included 46 belief items, consisting of 17 delusion-like beliefs (10 of which were 
considered bizarre by the DSM criteria), 10 paranormal and religious beliefs and 19 
societal/cultural beliefs. Participants were asked to rate their current beliefs using the 
options: ‘Do not believe’, ‘Don’t know’, ‘Weakly believe’, ‘Moderately believe’, or 
‘Strongly believe’. In addition, participants were asked four meta-beliefs questions, to 
examine the associations of these with the content beliefs.
Some adaptations were made to the CBQ to render it more suitable for 
telephone interview administration. The moral belief questions were answered using 
the same responses as the other items to avoid changing scales (this meant changing
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the phrasing to ‘do you believe that X is right?’ rather than ‘right or wrong?’). In 
addition, reversing polarity on the individual scales (i.e., alternating presenting ‘Do 
not believe’ and ‘Strongly believe’ as the first option) was not used due to concerns, 
confirmed by MRUK, that this might confuse respondents.
The following analysis will consider results for each of the three belief content types 
in turn, beginning with DLB.
5.3 DELUSION-LIKE BELIEFS (DLB)
5.3.1 Prevalence
The three large scale pilot studies previously described (see Chapter 4) were 
carried out to develop and refine the final version of the CBQ questionnaire in 
advance of applying it to the large stratified British sample. The percentage of 
participants from the first pilot (n=254) endorsing one or more of the original 14 DLB 
items was 69%, with a similar level of 71% found in pilot 2 (n=119). In pilot 3 
(n=186), the number of DLB questions increased to 17, following the inclusion of 
items addressing somatoparaphrenia, subjective doubles and nihilism, and the 
percentage endorsing one or more of these items rose to 90%. This confirms that 
overall prevalence is highly dependent on the number of DLB items chosen (as well 
as the nature of the items included), and highlights one of the key issues when 
comparing between estimates using different measures.
148
130
120
110
100
>»oco3
Iu.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
No of DLB
Figure 5.1. The distribution of the number of delusion-like beliefs (DLB) endorsed at 
any strength
The results from the large scale final sample were broadly similar (see Figure 
5.1). One or more of the 17 delusion-like beliefs were strongly endorsed (rated ‘3’) by 
38% of participants, with this figure rising to 91% endorsement when the entire rating 
range (1-3) was included. More than one DLB was strongly endorsed by 17%, and 
77% of participants endorsed more than one at any belief strength. Comparing non- 
bizarre delusion-like beliefs (e.g., ideas of reference) and bizarre delusion-like beliefs 
(e.g., beliefs of control or misidentification), results showed both were given similar 
levels of endorsement, being strongly endorsed by 25% and 26% respectively (and 
endorsed to some degree by 79% and 78% respectively).
Table 5.2 shows that beliefs concerning one’s body being misshapen or ugly 
and of not being in control of one’s actions were by far the most common with both 
being strongly endorsed by 11 % (and endorsed at any strength by 46% and 44% 
respectively). The pattern of responses was fairly consistent when comparing between 
belief at any strength and strong belief (with one exception: beliefs about being an
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exceptionally gifted person (the tenth most reported strongly held belief [4%]) but the 
third most reported at any strength [41%]). Even bizarre delusional themes thought of 
as clinically rare (such as Capgras syndrome and Cotard syndrome, were endorsed by 
a small but notable number of this sample (0.4% and 0.9% strongly, 5.8% and 5.4% at 
any strength) amounting to 58 and 54 participants respectively.
Table 5.2. The percentage of the 1000 participants endorsing delusion-like beliefs 
weakly [W], moderately [M] or strongly [S] in the final study (AS: at any strength)
Percentage N um ber
D elusion-like b elie f reporting b elie f reporting
* Bizarre delusion-like beliefs W M S b elief 04S)
You are dead and/or do not exist* 3.2 1.3 0.9 54
Relatives or close friends are sometimes replaced by identical- 
looking impostors*
3.4 2.0 0.4 58
Part o f  your body doesn't belong to you* 3.0 2.0 1.1 61
Some w ell-know n celebrity is secretly in love with you 4.9 1.0 1.0 69
You are infested by parasites 5.7 3.9 2.8 124
The world is about to end 7.6 3.6 1.7 129
The reflection in the mirror is sometimes not you* 7.1 8.7 2.6 184
People you know disguise themselves as others to manipulate 
or influence you*
10.6 9.9 4.4 249
Some people are duplicated, i.e. are in two places at the same 
time*
12.4 9.7 4.1 262
There is another person who looks and acts like you* 13.0 14.3 5.4 327
Your thoughts are not fully under your control* 12.3 15.1 6.2 336
Certain people are out to harm or discredit you 14.8 12.5 6.5 338
People say or do things that contain special m essages for you 14.4 17.1 7.0 385
Certain places are duplicated, i.e. are in two different locations 
at the same time*
14.3 17.6 6.8 387
You are an exceptionally gifted person that others do not 
recognise
17.0 19.7 3.8 405
You are not in control o f some o f your actions* 15.4 18.1 10.8 443
Your body or part o f  your body is misshapen or ugly 14.0 21.6 10.8 464
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Despite high levels of endorsement for DLBs overall, the number of bizarre beliefs 
endorsed was relatively low compared to that of non-bizarre beliefs, as predicted.
5.3.2 Discussion
In this study a substantial proportion of participants (38%) strongly endorsed 
at least one delusion-like belief (with 91% endorsement at any strength), indicating 
that endorsing such belief types in the general public may be more common than 
previously estimated. The level of endorsement (given that these were currently held 
beliefs) is higher than previous lifetime prevalence studies of delusional-type beliefs 
(around 15%: Rutten et al., 2008). This, however, was predicted as previous estimates 
employed stricter definitions of delusion (e.g., only taking those beliefs that cause 
distress to the holder, or investigating the plausibility, etc.), employed clinical 
terminology and required recollection. In contrast, the CBQ was less clinically 
explicit than previous measures, which may account (in part) for the increased 
prevalence of DLB.
Moreover, these prevalence levels for currently held beliefs were not that 
dissimilar to levels of lifetime delusional ideation found using the PDI measure 
(Peters et al., 2004), where around 95% of the non-clinical sample endorsed at least 
one PDI item to some degree. However, the PDI does not address the problem of 
response bias resulting from potential psychiatric stigmatisation to the same extent as 
the CBQ. Furthermore, the CBQ allows an investigation of a much wider range of 
beliefs, including a more varied selection of DLB due to the inclusion of several 
bizarre themes.
Some 26% of participants strongly endorsed at least one bizarre delusion-like 
belief (rising to 78% at any strength), suggesting that the endorsement of such a belief
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may not by itself be sufficient to qualify as a clinical delusion. Only a few bizarre 
beliefs have been investigated in general population studies before. In contrast to the 
DSM assumption that these are so significantly different as to warrant a special set of 
criteria for the diagnosis of schizophrenia, it seems that some of these types of belief 
may be relatively common in non-clinical populations, all of which provides further 
support and extension of the continuum hypothesis to include bizarre delusion-like 
beliefs in non-clinical samples.
5.4 DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
5.4.1 Background
If the psychosis phenotype is considered as lying on a dimensional continuum, 
as suggested by previous results, the relationships observed between clinical disorder 
and demographic characteristics might be expected to extend to sub-clinical beliefs 
(van Os et al., 2009). Incorporated into the large CBQ study were questions 
addressing demographic characteristics previously found to be related to psychosis, 
including those of age, gender, socioeconomic group, education ethnicity, religion and 
living alone (Cantor-Graee & Selten, 2005; Johns et al., 2004; Neeleman & Lewis, 
1994; Scott et al., 2005; Sundquist et al., 2004; Tien, 1991; van Os et al., 2000). A 
final demographic worth consideration was participants’ handedness. Previous reports 
have suggested a link to higher levels of magical ideation for those with mixed- 
handedness (Barnett & Corballis, 2002) and magical ideation has been associated in 
turn with delusions (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). Finally, part of the initial pre­
assessment screening for the CBQ required all participants to indicate whether or not
152
they currently suffered from a physical and/or mental condition. The prevalence of 
each of these demographics within the sample is given in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3. The sample characteristics
Demographic group %
G ender F em a le 52.1
M a le 4 7 .9
A g e 1 8 -2 9 19.4
3 0 -4 4 2 9 .2
4 5 -5 9 24 .5
6 0 + 2 6 .9
S o c io e c o n o m ic A B 3 4 .6
group C l 2 1 .2
C 2 9.3
D E 20 .3
N o t  c la ss if ie d 14.6
H igh est S eco n d a ry  /  h igh  sch o o l /  N V Q  1-3 55.1
ed u cational U n iv ers ity  d egree or eq u ivalent 2 7 .4
q u a lifica tion p ro fess io n a l q ualification
H ig h er  u n iversity  d egree /  D octorate /  
M B A  /  N V Q  5 or eq u ivalent
6 .8
E thnicity A sia n  /  A sian  British 1.1
B la c k  /  B la ck  British 0 .3
M ix e d  background 0 .3
W h ite 9 7 .5
O ther eth n ic group 0 .2
R e lig io n C hristian ity 6 6 .5
H in d u ism 0 .4
Islam 0.5
Judaism 0.5
S ik h ism 0.1
O ther 2 .2
N o n e 29 .5
L iv in g L iv e  a lon e 9 .8
arrangem ents L iv e  w ith  o ther(s) 90 .2
W ith  partner 64 .5
W ith  ch ild (ren) 38 .8
W ith  parent(s) 17.5
W ith  other re la tive(s) 2 .2
W ith ffien d (s) /  h o u sem a te(s) 0 .6
H an d ed n ess L eft 14.9
A m b id extrou s 1.7
R igh t 83.1
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5.4.2 Results
Non-parametric tests (Kruskal-Wallis or Mann-Whitney) were used to assess the 
effects of each of the demographic variables ((i) Gender; (ii) Age; (iii) Socioeconomic 
group; (iv) Education; (v) Ethnicity [white/other]; (vi) Religion 
[Christian/other/none]; (vii) Presence of a current physical or mental condition 
[present/absent]; (viii) Household [live with others/live alone]; (ix) Handedness) on 
the overall delusion-like belief score. Threshold levels of significance for inferential 
statistics were adjusted for multiple comparisons using Bonferroni's correction
(p<0.0001).
Two factors were found to be related to DLB score: age (% (3)=39.88) and 
socioeconomic group (% (3)=32.08). Education showed a trend towards significance 
(JC2(2)= 15.79, p=0.0004). Follow-up Mann-Whitney tests were carried out to compare 
between levels for each significant demographic variable. Odds ratios were calculated 
for significant comparisons by dividing participants into above and below average 
DLB scores.
Age
Participants in the youngest age band (18-29 years) showed significantly higher DLB 
scores than participants aged 30-44 (U(194,292)=21701.0; OR: 2.131, 95%CI: 1.473- 
3.084 [reference group: 18-29]), aged 45-59 (U( 194,245)= 18131.0; OR: 2.066, 
95%CI: 1.409-3.030 [reference group: 18-29]) or aged 60 and over
(U( 194,269)= 17122.5; OR: 2.787, 95%CI: 1.903-4.082 [reference group: 18-29]). No 
other age group comparisons were significant.
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Socioeconomic group
Individuals from socioeconomic groups D and E (semi/unskilled manual workers) 
showed significantly higher DLB scores (U(346,203)=25179.0; OR: 2.521, 95%CI: 
1.765-3.600 [reference group: D&E]) than those in groups A and B (e.g., managers, 
administrators and professionals).
Concurrent physical/mental condition
In the general public it is not unusual for some to report having physical or mental 
disorders. All participants were asked to report if they currently suffered from a 
mental or physical condition and, if so, the effect of this on their lives and whether 
they were currently taking medication. Forty-nine individuals (4.9% of the total 
sample) reported longstanding physical/mental conditions, that had a substantial effect 
on day-to-day activities, and for which they took medication. The results are 
described in detail in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4. The presence of a longstanding physical/mental condition
Response options Number Percentage of 
total sample
Percentage of those 
reporting a condition
(a) Yes (physical or mental) 108 10.8% 100%
(4 refused)
(b) Substantial adverse effect 59 5.9% 55%
on day-to-day activities (1 refused)
(c) Currently taking medication 87 8.8% 82%
(2 refused)
To ensure that results represented participants without or with only mild mental or 
physical health conditions, the presence or absence of a reported medical/psychiatric 
condition was explored. Such self-reports were not significantly related to DLB score 
(U(888,108)=43083.0, p=0.08), suggesting that the results reflect the findings from a 
non-clinical sample.
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5.4.3 Discussion
Individuals aged 18-29 and/or who belonged to the lowest socioeconomic 
groups tended to report higher DLB scores (i.e., endorsed a greater number of DLB 
and/or endorsed DLB with greater strength). Younger age has previously been found 
to correlate with delusional ideation (Verdoux et al., 1998). In addition, both factors 
identified here have been associated with clinical delusional beliefs (Johns et al., 
2004; Scott et al., 2005; Tien, 1991; van Os et al., 2000). Although no associations 
were found for ethnicity, religion and household status (thought to be potentially 
related to isolation, which has been linked to psychosis: Boydell et al., 2004), the 
minority groups were relatively small, suggesting a lack of sufficient power to fully 
investigate these. Gender also did not appear to contribute significantly to DLB scores 
in this study, despite previous association with sub-clinical psychosis in a large meta­
analysis by van Os et al. (2009). This may be due to the wider range of delusion-like 
items included in the CBQ, for example, body dysmorphia, is more commonly 
reported among females (Phillips et al., 2006). Interestingly, a large Australian sample 
(N=2441) reported by Scott et al. (2008) found that women were significantly more 
likely to endorse items related to hallucinations but not delusions on the PDI.
5.5 PARANORMAL AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
A second strand of research in this study investigated the prevalence of more 
‘ordinary’ beliefs and their relationship to DLB. The 3 religious beliefs (beliefs in a 
god or gods, soul or spirit surviving death and/or intelligent design) were (not 
surprisingly) all highly endorsed, with 47.9% of participants endorsing at least one
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strongly and 84.7% endorsing one or more at any strength. Each individual belief was 
endorsed by over half of the sample (see Figure 5.2).
Intelligent d es ign  
The soul or spirit survives d ea th  
G od o r go d s
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75
Percentage positively rating RB
Figure 5.2. The percentage o f participants reporting holding religious beliefs weakly, moderately or 
strongly (Note: the question on intelligent design included an elaboration o f this as the belief ‘that the 
complexity o f the world suggests that it was purposefully designed by an intelligent creator
The seven paranormal beliefs were, as predicted, also highly endorsed with 29.3% of 
participants reporting at least one strong belief and 78.9% of the sample claiming to 
hold one or more o f these beliefs at any strength (see Figure 5.3).
Some people communicate with the dead 
Astrology 
Reincarnation
Some people are possessed by eMI spirits 
Demons or evil spirits 
Black magic or witchcraft 
Some people transform into werewolxes
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
Percentage positively rating PB
Figure 5.3. The percentage o f participants reporting holding paranormal beliefs weakly, moderately or 
strongly (Note: the question on astrology included an elaboration o f this belief as ‘the position of the 
stars and planets affects or determines your life' and the question on reincarnation described this as 
‘when you die your soul is reborn in another body 3
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The levels of endorsement reported for one or more paranormal-type beliefs at 
any strength (79%) are similar to those of Gallup studies (Moore, 2005; Newport & 
Strausberg, 2001) using large US samples (n=1002 and n=1012 respectively), which 
found such beliefs to be endorsed by 73% and 76%. These levels also do not differ 
greatly from results found in previous large scale British surveys (see Table 5.5), and 
variations can probably be explained by differences in question phrasing. For 
example, in the present study participants were offered three ‘believe’ options 
(strongly/moderately/weakly) rather than a simple categorical yes/no choice presented 
in several other studies. The general consistency in belief prevalence between 
published large public polls suggests that the findings of the current study are reliable.
Table 5.5. The prevalence (%) o f  selected religious and paranormal beliefs in recent British surveys
Date
conducted:
Jan-98 Feb-
98
Aug-03 Oct-04 Apr-05 Jan-06 Jan-08
Conducted
by:
ICM MORI MORI YouGov Populus Ipsos-
MORI
M RUK
Conducted Daily The BBC: ITV: The The Sun Cardiff
for: Mail Sun Heaven and 
Earth Show
This
Morning
Sun University
N
Belief in
1000 721 1001 2116 1009 1001 1000
God 64 64 60 - 70 60 73
A soul - 67 68 - 71 - 64
Astrology - 38 31 - - 28 45
Reincarnation 25 24 23 29 - 23 40
Chapter 4 described how paranormal and religious beliefs combined to form 
one factor using a PCA, and also formed a reliable scale (see section 4.3), 
emphasising the overlap/ similarities between these two types of belief. Figure 5.4 
shows the number of combined paranormal and religious beliefs endorsed by 
participants, showing a pattern resembling an approximately normal distribution.
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Figure 5.4. The distribution of the number of paranormal and religious beliefs 
(P&RB) endorsed
5.6 SOCIETAL/CULTURAL BELIEFS
Most studies have focused on levels of delusional belief in the general 
population but little research has been carried out on more generic non-clinical beliefs 
such as moral, political or cultural beliefs. The main sources of data regarding the 
prevalence of these types of belief typically come from customised opinion polls (see 
Table 5.6). In the CBQ study, it was found that these beliefs were by far the most 
commonly endorsed of all three belief types (delusion-like, paranormal and religious 
and societal/cultural) with 1 0 0 % of participants endorsing one or more at any strength 
and 98.0% endorsing at least one strongly.
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Table 5.6. The prevalence of moral belief endorsement in several recent British polls
Date
conducted: Sep-99 Apr-05 Dec-05 May-06 May-06 Jul-06 Jan-08
Conducted
by: M O R I P op u lu s ICM Y o u G o v Y o u G o v ICM
M R U K
Conducted
for:
M ed ica l
R esearch
C o u n cil
T h e
Sun
R esearch
D e fe n c e
S o c ie ty
D a ily
T elegraph
D ign ity  
in D y in g
B B C :
N ew sn ig h t
C ard iff
U niversity
N 1014 1009 1003 2 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 1001 1000
Belief in
A nim al 64% 55% 57% 70% 69%
testin g  for 
m ed ica l
research
D eath 61% 61% 72%
p en alty
E uthanasia 66%
(S h o u ld
b e
le g a l)
87%  
(P e o p le  
h ave  
right to  
c h o o se )
76%
(L aw
sh ould
be
changed)
74%
As Figure 5.5 shows, the most common of these items included a range of 
political (e.g., ‘democracy is the best system of government’) and what could be 
described as scientific beliefs (e.g., ‘theory of evolution’). Others could be considered 
as relatively close to paranormal and religious beliefs (‘positive thoughts and feelings 
improve your physical wellbeing’) -  although such a belief does not necessarily 
involve the type of ontological confusion described by Lindeman and Aamio (2007), 
while a more extreme version, ‘positive thoughts and feelings cure physical ailments’ 
might. Some of the questions (e.g., on ‘evolution’ and ‘sharing a common ancestor 
with apes’) were deliberately similar to assess the consistency of answers on the 
questionnaire. This and four similar question pairs will be considered in more detail in 
Chapter 7.
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Figure 5.5. The percentage o f participants reporting holding the most common societal/cultural beliefs 
weakly, moderately or strongly
Figure 5.6 shows that most moral beliefs were endorsed slightly less than most 
other general societal/cultural beliefs, with between 60-80% of participants agreeing 
to each of these statements. This is not unexpected, given that such moral beliefs were 
chosen given the range of opinions they evoke and being discussed frequently in the 
media. As can be seen the CBQ figures are also similar to previous findings. 
Reviewing the online archives available from large market research companies (Ipsos-
MORI, ICM, Populus and YouGov), it is clear that despite changes in question
wording and response options, the percentages holding with these positions remain 
relatively consistent over the past ten years (see Table 5.6).
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Figure 5.6. The percentage o f participants reporting holding moral societal/cultural beliefs weakly, 
moderately or strongly
Finally, as expected, the societal/cultural beliefs with the least number of 
people endorsing them were those relating to judgements regarding beliefs or those 
with less objective evidence to support them (see Figure 5.7). Beliefs regarding 
extraterrestrial life could be classified as paranormal beliefs and indeed have been by 
several researchers (e.g., Jones et al., 1977; Rice, 2003; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). 
However, ‘paranormal’ has become a “catch-it-all” term for any seemingly irrational 
or unprovable belief, preventing meaningful comparisons by including too many 
disparate beliefs. Using the definition adopted by Lindeman and Aamio (2007), 
beliefs in extraterrestrial life would not be classed as paranormal as they do not 
involve any confusion between ontological categories. Notwithstanding the question 
of where such beliefs might best be categorised, belief in extraterrestrial life per se 
remains relatively common, with 54% endorsing this to any degree, similar to the 
49% found by an ICM/Daily Mail poll in 1998. The more extreme version of this 
belief, that extraterrestrial life has visited earth, was endorsed by 34% at any strength.
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Figure 5.7. The percentage o f participants reporting holding less common societal/cultural beliefs 
weakly, moderately or strongly
Societal/cultural were, as predicted, the most commonly endorsed beliefs, with 
the majority being endorsed (at any strength) by over 80% of the sample (see Figure 
5.8 for the distribution of these items). Furthermore, it is clear that the content of 
some beliefs in this category also link with paranormal and religious beliefs, which 
can be considered to form a subcategory of societal/cultural beliefs. More importantly, 
this is the first study to provide a quantitative benchmark from which levels of 
clinically relevant beliefs (delusions) can be compared with more ordinary beliefs in 
the same individuals.
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Figure 5.8. The distribution o f the number o f societal/cultural beliefs (SCB) endorsed
163
5.7 COMPARING BELIEF TYPES
5.7.1 Relative distribution of belief types
When the distributions of the three belief types were compared (Figure 5.9), 
endorsements for paranormal and religious beliefs showed a more similar distribution 
to delusion-like beliefs than to general societal/cultural beliefs. The subdivisions on 
the figure show the proportion of beliefs held weakly, moderately or strongly (for 
those participants who endorsed that number of beliefs).
5.7.2 Shared underlying factors
To discover if the three belief clusters shared common underlying factors, a principal 
components analysis was carried out on all belief items. Oblimin rotation was used, as 
it was felt that any components would be likely to correlate. To ensure a reliable 
component structure, the sample was randomly split in half, with each half analysed 
separately. Several belief items were subsequently dropped from the analyses, due to 
low communalities (below 0.3). This left a total of 20 beliefs: 4 societal/cultural 
beliefs, 7 delusion-like beliefs and 9 paranormal and religious beliefs (see Table 5.7 
for belief items).
Sample 1
The Kaiser criterion of eigenvalue>l produced a six-factor solution but inspection of 
the scree plot (see Figure 5.10) suggested a 3 factor solution. Following Stevens 
(1992), the scree plot criterion was used to establish the number of factors. Individual 
items had Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measures of sampling adequacy varying 
between 0.584-0.915. The overall KMO was 0.836 and the Bartlett test for sphericity 
was highly significant, confirming that the data were suitable for PCA. Overall, the 
three-component solution explained some 45.4% of the total variance.
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Figure 5.10. Scree plot for group 1 
Sample 2
The Kaiser criterion of eigenvalue>l suggested a five-factor solution but again the 
scree plot (see Figure 5.11) supported the results of sample 1, suggesting a three 
component solution. Individual items had KMO measures of sampling adequacy 
varying between 0.583-0.935. The overall KMO was 0.852 and the Bartlett test for 
sphericity was highly significant. Overall, the solution explained 47.6% of the total 
variance.
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Figure 5.11. Scree plot for group 2
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Table 5.7 shows the factor loadings of the different belief items onto the three factors. 
Factor 1 consisted of mainly paranormal and religious ideas but also included the 
delusion-like beliefs corresponding to reduplicative paramnesia, which perhaps links 
to a belief in other parallel worlds. The second factor is harder to interpret as it 
comprises beliefs in both evolution and extra-terrestrial life. These may tie in with 
science and science fiction types of belief. The final component is made up of the 
more bizarre delusions, alongside the most unusual paranormal and religious belief 
(werewolves) and the most unusual non-bizarre DLB (erotomania).
Although low communalities meant that it was not possible to analyse all CBQ belief 
items, the exploratory factor analysis suggests some overlap between belief 
categories, with delusion-like and paranormal and religious beliefs combining across 
factors. Indeed, Table 5.8 clearly shows the religious and paranormal component is 
positively correlated with the predominantly bizarre component (as the bizarre 
grouping has negative factor loadings). This relationship will be discussed in further 
detail in the next section.
Table 5.8. Correlations between components
Group
Paranormal/
religious
Science/ science 
fiction
Bizarre
Paranormal/ religious 1 1 . 0 0
2 1 . 0 0
Science/ science fiction 1 0 . 1 1 1 . 0 0
2 0.03 1 . 0 0
Bizarre 1 -0.34 -0.17 1 . 0 0
2 -0.33 -0 . 1 2 1 . 0 0
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Table 5.7. Factor loadings (>0.3) for belief items
B e lie f  /a c lo r
type Group number
PR That the soul or spirit survives death
PR That som e people communicate with the dead
D L(N B) That people say or do things that contain special m essages for you  
PR In black magic or witchcraft
PR That some people are possessed by evil spirits
PR In demons or evil spirits
PR In reincarnation (i.e. that when you die your soul is reborn in another body)
PR In "intelligent design" (i.e. that the com plexity o f  the world suggests that it was
purposefully designed by an intelligent creator)
PR In a god or gods
DL(B) That certain places are duplicated, i.e. are in two different locations at the same 
time
D L(B) That some people are duplicated, i.e. are in two places at the same time
SC That earth has been visited by aliens from other solar systems
SC In extra-terrestrial life
SC In the theory o f  evolution
SC That humans share a common ancestor with apes
DL(B) That you are dead and/or do not exist
DL(B) That part o f  your body doesn’t belong to you
DL(B) That relatives or close friends are som etimes replaced by identical-looking
impostors
PR Som e people transform into werewolves 
DL(NB) That some well-known celebrity is secretly in love with you
Paranorm al/ religious
i i
Science/ science fiction
0.78 0.78
0.67 0.67
0.43 0.59
0.45 0.44
0.64 0.50
0.59 0.64
0.65 0.62 0.31
0.58 0.49 -0.39
0.73 0.58 -0.32 -0.41
0.37 0.53 0.34 0.31
0.31 0.45
0.46 0.56 0.50
0.45 0.62 0.56
0.69 0.66
0.67 0.68
-0.71
-0.70
-0.81
-0.73
-0.52
1. l i i  w w r i u i u n i l  W 1VV11VJ w   J     , 1 / 1  1
DL(B): Delusion-like (bizarre); DL(NB): Delusion-like (non-bizarre); PR: Paranormal and religious; SC: Societal/cultural
-0.81
-0.81
-0.69
-0.76
-0.62
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5.7.3 Calculating belief scores
To investigate the relationships between the different types of belief, scores for each 
belief type were calculated based on the number of and conviction for relevant beliefs. 
These scores were based on those beliefs that comprised a reliable scale (as described 
in Chapter 4), and were calculated for 14 DLB, 8  P&RB and 13 SCB items. 
Responses of ‘weakly believe’ were scored 1, ‘moderately believe’ scored 2 and 
‘strongly believe’ scored 3. These were then summed to give the total score for each 
category. Figures 5.12-5.14 display the distributions of the scores for each group, 
which follow the same pattern as for the number of beliefs endorsed for each 
category.
I I I I II  I . .
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Figure 5.12. The distribution of DLB scores
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Figure 5.14. The distribution of SCB scores
5.8 RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN BELIEF TYPES
5.8.1 Background
Paranormal beliefs, such as beliefs in astrology or ghosts, are often viewed as 
anomalous, pre-scientific and unusual (e.g., Iping-Petterson & Roll, 1994; Lawrence 
& Peters, 2004; Rattet & Bursik, 2001). However, while they may lack scientific 
credibility, few studies support the contention that such beliefs are uncommon. Gallup
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studies (Moore, 2005; Newport & Strausberg, 2001) using large US samples (n=1002 
and n=1012 respectively) found such beliefs to be endorsed by 73% and 76% -  a 
finding confirmed in the current study. Paranormal beliefs or experiences per se are 
not symptomatic of mental illness, but have been shown to have an indirect link. 
People who report paranormal experiences tend to have higher than usual levels of 
psychiatric symptoms (McCreery & Claridge, 1995). Moreover, the converse 
relationship is also true: Many of those with mental illness report having unusually 
strong convictions regarding supernatural forces (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983; 
Thalboume, 1994a,b). Similarly, those who report intense religious experiences are 
likely to score higher on measures of positive symptomatology (Jackson, 1997).
Furthermore, there is some evidence for similarities in the types of reasoning 
biases. Blackmore (1997) proposed three potential underlying causes for paranormal 
beliefs: personal experience, selective bias and probability misjudgement. In an earlier 
study Blackmore and Troscianko (1985) found that believers in the paranormal were 
more susceptible to illusions of control, with believers in ESP reporting more control 
over two tasks (one with an element of skill involved and one where participants had 
no control) than non-believers, despite no score differences on the task itself. This 
may relate to a failure to appreciate randomness (Brugger & Mohr, 2008; French, 
1992). Mohr et al. (2003) found that participants with higher magical ideation scores 
showed hyperdopaminergia (a persistent increase of dopaminergic transmission) in 
the right hemisphere. As discussed in Chapter 2, dysfunction in the transmission of 
dopamine may cause sensitivity to coincidences, and has also been associated with 
schizophrenia (Bowers, 1968; Kapur, 2003; MacDonald, 1960). The links between 
delusional and paranormal beliefs suggest that holding one such belief may make an 
individual more likely to also hold or develop others, despite these belief types being
171
differentially classed as non-clinical or as potentially symptomatic of psychosis. 
Therefore, a positive correlation between delusion-like and paranormal and religious 
belief types was predicted for the CBQ study.
5.8.2 Results
Spearman’s correlations were carried between belief scores but given the large 
sample size, the data were split randomly into 4 groups. These showed significant 
correlations between delusion-like and paranormal and religious beliefs (p ranging 
from 0.32-0.46, all p<0.0001) but no association between societal/cultural beliefs and 
either paranormal and religious or delusion-like belief types, confirming the 
distinctive nature of this relationship.
5.8.3 Discussion
The strong relationship between paranormal and religious and delusion-like 
beliefs suggests that the clinical boundary between such beliefs may be relatively 
porous, particularly given the strong and reliable association between delusional and 
paranormal beliefs shown in other studies (Houran et al., 2001; Irwin & Green, 1998; 
McCreery & Claridge, 2002; Thalboume, 1994a,b). This finding also ties in with 
evidence suggesting that members of new religious movements report higher levels of 
delusional ideation than other non-clinical populations but significantly not the levels 
of distress or preoccupation found in clinical patients (Day & Peters, 1999; Peters, 
Day et al., 1999; Smith et al., 2009). But what is the basis for this reliable 
relationship? One potential explanation is that holding one type of belief impacts upon 
an individual’s wider belief system such that the endorsement of similar beliefs
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becomes more likely. This is in keeping with the web of belief hypothesis proposed 
by Quine and Ullian (1970), which suggests that belief coheres with other similar 
beliefs held by an individual. In addition, it is possible that other cognitive factors, 
such as the reasoning biases associated with delusions (e.g., Garety & Hemsley, 1994; 
Linney et al., 1998), also play a role in the development of these beliefs. Finally, 
shared or common anomalous experiences, suggested by Maher (1988) to lead to the 
development of delusional beliefs, could provide for more wide-ranging beliefs.
5.9 DLB EN DO RSEM EN T AND RATING S OF KEY BELIEF  
FEATURES
It is worth noting that the current data were derived from the same sample as 
those reported in Chapter 3. Since the information regarding belief characteristics was 
obtained first, it is reasonable to assume that participants were better prepared to 
consider what a belief was before being asked about specific content-based items. If 
reports of delusion-like or other beliefs were independent of the endorsements given 
to the nature of belief, it is reasonable to assume that even when examining 
participants who endorsed a number of (e.g.) delusion-like beliefs, the majority of 
these individuals do hold with the characteristics of belief described in Chapter 3 (i.e., 
consider belief to be a stable conviction capable of influencing behaviour).
Participants’ overall mean endorsements for the characteristics of belief were 
subsequently correlated with different belief types across the four subsamples 
described earlier. Higher mean levels of endorsement were significantly associated (at 
p<0 .0 0 0 1 ) with higher paranormal and religious scores for two of the four groups, 
with a third indicating a trend towards this (rhos of 0.29 and 0.42, p<0.0001, and 
rho=0.23, p=0.0002; for the final group, rho=0.16, p=0.012). This was probably due
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to the presence of religious beliefs in this category, tying in with the finding from 
Chapter 3 that people who belonged to an organised religion tended to give more or 
stronger endorsements to the characteristics of belief. Correlations for delusion-like 
and societal/cultural beliefs were not significant for any of the four subsamples. As 
such, we can deduce that a majority of these participants endorsing DLB considered a 
belief to be a strongly held conviction, which impacts on their behaviour, thoughts 
and emotions.
5.10 META-BELIEFS
5.10.1 Background
Although many delusion-like beliefs and experiences in the general population 
overlap with those found in clinical studies, these are still generally considered rare 
phenomena. As such, participants’ awareness/insight into their propensity to hold (in 
some cases) unusual beliefs remains unknown. In addition, it would be interesting to 
know whether participants remain internally consistent with regard to beliefs endorsed 
(i.e., those endorsing many religious beliefs would be expected to report being 
religious). The aim for the following section was to ascertain participants’ meta­
beliefs (i.e., their self-appraisals regarding the types of beliefs they hold), using 
simple probe questions. In addition to discovering participants’ evaluation of the types 
of beliefs they held, a secondary aim was to explore responses in terms of potential 
utility for predicting delusion-like beliefs and other types of belief. To probe this issue 
further, 4 simple questions addressing meta-beliefs were included in the CBQ. These 
followed the main CBQ questions relating to beliefs and experiences, all of which 
primed participants to reflect on the way they had responded to the 46 belief items.
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Meta-beliefs focus on participants’ subjective evaluation of their own set of 
beliefs and, although different, are related to metacognitive beliefs (“beliefs that are 
linked to the interpretation, selection and execution of particular thought processes”: 
Laroi & van der Linden, 2005, p. 1426). The latter has received attention in studies of 
psychosis and in particular when considering the putative processes that determine the 
manner in which individuals assess their anomalous experiences. Recent 
psychological models of psychotic symptoms suggest that metacognitive beliefs can 
impact on subjects’ appraisal of anomalous experiences to the extent that these 
appraisals can influence the onset of distress or elevated levels of general 
psychopathology (Brett et al., 2009). Maladaptive metacognitive beliefs, such as those 
assessed on the Metacognitions Questionnaire (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997), 
have been shown to be associated with psychotic symptoms in both clinical (Morrison 
& Wells, 2003) and non-clinical samples (Laroi & van der Linden, 2005). While 
metacognitive beliefs “determine the kinds of appraisals [participants] will make of 
their anomalous experiences” (Brett et al., 2009, p.l), meta-beliefs provide a more 
direct measure of individuals’ self-appraisals of their beliefs.
As part of the main CBQ study all participants were asked to rate themselves 
(choosing ‘not at all’, ‘quite’ or ‘very’) on four key simple meta-beliefs:
(i) whether they considered themselves religious;
(ii) whether they considered themselves superstitious;
(iii) whether they considered themselves likely to believe things others do
not; and
(iv) whether they considered themselves tolerant o f others ’ beliefs.
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Following a brief description of the basic results for each of the above, the findings 
will consider how each of the 4 meta-beliefs was predictive of the three different 
types of belief covered in the main CBQ (delusion-like, paranormal and religious and 
societal/cultural).
5.10.2 Religion
Earlier in this chapter it was established that there was a significant 
relationship between religious and paranormal and delusion-like beliefs but not with 
societal/cultural beliefs. Estimates of religiousness not surprisingly vary depending on 
the type and number of questions asked. An ICM poll in 1998 found that 7% of the 
1 0 0 0  participants described themselves as ‘very religious’, 31% ‘quite religious’, 
while 35% described themselves as ‘not very religious’ and 24% ‘not at all religious’. 
This is similar to the type of question adopted in the CBQ study but with an additional 
‘not very’ category. By comparison, in a MORI poll in 2003 (N=1001) 18% described 
themselves as a ‘practising member of an organised religion’, 25% ‘a non-practising 
member of an organised religion’ and 24% were ‘spiritually inclined but don't really 
"belong" to an organised religion’.
Interrogating the CBQ data (see Table 5.9) showed that 55.8% of participants 
considered themselves religious (when combined over both ‘Quite’ and ‘Very’ 
responses). The percentage that considered themselves ‘very religious’ (8 .6 %) 
compares well with the 7% from the 1998 ICM poll and the ‘not very’ religious group 
from the same poll splits between the ‘quite’ and ‘not at all’ groups in the CBQ study.
Table 5.9. The responses to the religiousness meta-belief (%)
Question______________________________ Not at all Quite______ Very
To what extent do you consider yourself a AA ~ An ~
.. . 0 4 4 .Z 4 / .Z  o.Oreligious person?________________________________________________________
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Examining the data further for the effects of basic demographics (age, gender, 
education and socioeconomic group) on these ratings (using Mann-Whitney and 
Kruskal-Wallis tests), results (see Figures 5.15 and 5.16) showed that younger 
participants were less likely to consider themselves religious than older people (x2(3, 
N=987)=36.440, p<0.0001). Females were more likely to rate themselves as religious 
(%2(1, N=987)=29.117, p<0.0001). This mirrors the findings o f the 2001 British 
census, which found that females and older individuals were more likely to describe 
themselves as belonging to a religion. Similarly, a Harris poll o f adults in the US 
found women were more likely to hold Christian beliefs, and people aged 25-29 
reported low levels o f these beliefs (Taylor, 2003).
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Figure 5.15. Ratings o f  religiousness by age group Figure 5.16. Ratings o f  religiousness by gender
Overall 56% o f people rated themselves as religious to some extent (‘Quite’ or 
‘Very’), and this compared to 70% who initially reported belonging to an organised 
religion and 72% reporting belief in god(s) to some degree on the CBQ. Some 
participants may have been members o f religions which do not require belief in a god 
or god(s) (2.2% of participants reported being a member of an organised religion, 
which was not offered as a response option), so this factor may account for some of 
the difference between the two latter responses. It would appear that believing oneself 
to be ‘religious’ is seen to comprise both holding beliefs with a religious content and
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being a member of an organised religion, whereas some people may only fulfil one of 
these criteria, leading to the difference in prevalence described above.
As can be seen from Table 5.10, identification with a religious group appears 
highly dependent on the question asked. On top of the main group of 41.5% (who 
believe in God, consider themselves religious, are a member of an organised religion 
and attend religious services), asking about belief in God recruits an additional 31.9%, 
while asking about belonging to an organised religion adds 29%. In contrast, a 
question on attendance at religious services only adds 15.6%, and self-reported 
religiousness just 14.4% more. Indeed, only 12.9% of participants would not be 
included in any one of these options. Such questions are also open to social 
desirability biases; a US study that objectively quantified church attendance found 
that people over-report their attendance by a factor of two (Hadaway et al., 1993).
Table 5.10. Percentage of CBQ sample who identified themselves by religious
characteristics on the CBQ
CBQ question Believe in God Do not believe in God
Consider Do not Consider Do not
themselves consider themselves consider
religious themselves
religious
religious themselves
religious
Attend
Belong to an
organised
religion
religious
services
41.5% 5.2% 1 .1 % 2 .0 %
Do not attend
religious
services
8 .0 % 5.7% 0 .6 % 6.4%
Attend
Do not belong 
to an organised 
religion
religious
services
1 .8 % 2 .2 % 0.3% 3.0%
Do not attend
religious
services
2.3% 6.7% 0.3% 12.9%
Percentages do not account for strength or frequency: Attend religious services includes responses of 
‘rarely ‘sometimes ’ and ‘often Consider themselves religious includes responses of ‘quite ’ and 
‘very Believe in God includes responses of ‘weakly ‘moderately ’ and ‘strongly ’
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5.10.3 Superstition
Superstition has been defined as the propensity to believe in causal 
relationships between two unrelated events (Brugger, Dowdy & Graves, 1994), 
People may learn such beliefs from others (e.g., observing that other people may 
avoid walking under ladders). Indeed, Campbell (1996) suggests that many people 
perform superstitious acts even though they deny holding superstitious beliefs, 
describing those manifesting these contradictory behaviours as holding ‘half-beliefs’, 
whereby they turn to superstitious beliefs when feeling particularly stressed or 
helpless.
Superstition appears relatively common (Griffiths & Bingham, 2005). A 1996 
Gallup poll revealed that 25% of Americans reported being ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ 
superstitious ( 1 % very superstitious), with a further 28% choosing ‘not very’ 
superstitious. In Britain, a recent Ipsos-MORI poll (2007) found that 22% of people 
considered themselves superstitious. However, many more people could be described 
as having “half-beliefs”, since the Ipsos-MORI poll found that 51% of people touched 
wood for luck, 39% crossed their fingers, 16% had lucky charms and 15% considered 
the number 13 unlucky. Such a mismatch between reported behaviours and overall 
meta-belief shows how subjects may choose to interpret the question.
As can be seen from Table 5.11, 43.5% considered themselves superstitious 
(combining over ‘Quite’ and ‘Very’), more than in the recent Ipsos-MORI poll. This 
may be due to the inclusion of the ‘Quite’ category here (the Ipsos-MORI poll 
included only a yes/no response), whereby some of those individuals holding ‘half- 
beliefs’ might have been willing to acknowledge a lesser degree of superstitiousness.
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Table 5.11. The responses to the superstitiousness meta-belief (%)
Question Not at all Quite Very
To what extent do you consider yourself
superstitious (i.e. likely to believe certain events 56.5 38.1 5.4
occur through mysterious or magical means)?
In terms o f basic demographics, ratings of superstitiousness decreased with 
level o f education (x2(2, N=888)=20.429, p<0.0001) (see Figure 5.17). In addition, 
Figure 5.18 showed that males were less likely to rate themselves as superstitious 
(x2( l ,  N=992)=26.849, p<0.0001). Griffiths and Bingham (2005) also found 
significant associations between being female and holding superstitious beliefs. The 
CBQ results also confirm findings from previous polls, namely the 2007 Ipsos-MORI 
poll that similarly found women were more superstitious.
■  Not superstitious ■ Superstitious I Not superstitious ■ Superstitious ;
80 
a  70 | 60 
■B 50
I 40|  30 | 20 
a. 10 
0
Secondary school Uni\«rsity Higher
H ighest e d u c a tio n a l  qualification
Figure 5.17. Ratings o f  superstitiousness by highest 
educational qualification
F em ale
G ender
Figure 5.18. Ratings o f superstitiousness by 
gender
5.10.4 Propensity to believe
The third meta-belief investigated participants’ self ratings of their propensity 
to believe in things that others do not. McKay, Langdon and Coltheart (2005) suggest 
that credulity is one possible dimension along which belief evaluation could vary, 
when considering the impaired ‘second factor’ in their account of delusions. Again the
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issue here relates to participants’ insight regarding their own beliefs. Individuals who 
see themselves as likely to endorse beliefs might be more likely to entertain 
delusional, paranormal or religious ideas.
Table 5.12 shows that approximately half of the sample (50.4%, combining 
over ‘Quite’ and ‘Very’) considered themselves as being likely to believe things 
others do not. As this question was asked following the questions on the wider range 
of beliefs and experiences included on the CBQ, it may be that participants have been 
primed to think about their beliefs, and therefore were aware of any perceived-to-be 
unusual beliefs or experiences (although the high levels of DLB and P&RB found 
here indicate that such perceptions may not be accurate). These ratings were not 
associated with any of the basic demographics.
Table 5.12. The responses to the propensity to believe meta-belief (%)
Question__________________________________Not at all Quite____ Very
To what extent do you consider yourself likely ^ 5  ^  j 3 3
to believe in things that others do not?______________ ’__________’_________ '
5.10.5 Tolerance of others’ beliefs
The final meta-belief concerned participants’ judgements/beliefs regarding 
their tolerance of others’ beliefs. Table 5.13 shows that an overwhelming majority of 
people (94.7%) considered that they were tolerant of beliefs that were different to 
their own. This is not unexpected, given that people tend to see themselves as above 
average on good characteristics (e.g., fair-mindedness) (Gilovich, 1991). Indeed, it is 
perhaps more interesting to look at the 5.3% of people who declared that they were 
not at all tolerant of other people’s beliefs, as this may reflect a small group of 
individuals who may be less open to beliefs generally. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given
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the high levels of tolerance ratings, these were not associated with any basic 
demographics. Relationships between meta-beliefs and belief scores were further 
explored, as described below.
Table 5.13. The responses to the tolerance meta-belief (%)
Question Not at all Quite Very
To what extent do you consider yourself tolerant 
of people with different beliefs? 5.3 43.2 51.5
5.10.6 Relationships between meta-beliefs
Table 5.14 shows that there were significant associations (using chi-square 
tests) between three of the four meta-beliefs, but ratings of tolerance did not relate to 
any of the other three. It is not surprising that it is harder to distinguish within this 
group, given that the ratings for tolerance were so high (94%).
Table 5.14. The associations between the four meta-beliefs (bold type indicates
significance at p<0 .0 0 0 1 )
Superstitiousness Propensity to 
believe
Tolerance
Religiousness X2(4, N=981) = 27.643,
p<0.00002*
X2(4, N=963) = 23.415,
p=0.0001
X5(4, N=979) = 
2.054, p=0.726*
Superstitiousness X2(4, N=968) = 83.469, 
p<0.05E-15*
X2(4,N =985) = 
7.379, p=0.117*
Propensity to 
believe
X2(4, N=967) =
11.001, p=0.027*
* These contingency tables each had one expected count less than 5(11.1%) but none o f the expected 
counts were below 1 so these were considered sound (Field, 2000).
Religiousness and superstitiousness were significantly associated (Cramer’s 
V= 0.119), as might be expected, given that superstitiousness is typically associated 
with holding paranormal beliefs, and religious beliefs can be considered to be a
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special variant of these types of belief (Gray, 1991). The strongest relationship, 
however, was between superstitiousness and likeliness to believe things others do not 
(Cramer’s V= 0.208). This correlation may arise from the fact that superstitious-type 
beliefs (particularly those associated with the paranormal) may be types of beliefs that 
people are less likely to admit to holding and so those participants who currently 
endorse these types of beliefs were more likely to rate themselves as having a high 
propensity to believe in things. The relationship between ratings of religiousness and 
likeliness to believe things others do not (Cramer’s V= 0.110) may also reflect the 
same kind of reasoning, particularly as religious beliefs are not felt to be as popular as 
they once were.
5.10.7 Relationships with the three belief types
If the meta-beliefs provide an accurate overview of an individual’s evaluation 
or appraisal of their portfolio of current beliefs then it might be expected that meta­
beliefs would relate, albeit differentially, to at least two of the three main belief types. 
Participants were grouped according to their self-ratings for each meta-belief (e.g., 
those responding ‘Not at all’ formed a ‘not religious’ group and those responding 
‘Quite’ or ‘Very’ comprised the ‘religious’ group). Mann-Whitney tests were 
subsequently conducted to see if the belief scores for each of the three belief types 
differed between the ‘Not at all’ and ‘Quite’/’Very’ groups (see Table 5.15).
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Table 5.15. M an n -W h itn ey  tests com p arin g p articipants’ m eta -b e lie f  ratings w ith  b e lie f  
scores, sco res in  b o ld  s ig n ifica n t at pO.O OOl
M eta-belief Group N* DLB P&RB SCB
Nl N2 U U U
Religiousness 4 3 6 551 1 1 9 3 2 8 .0
(p = 0 .8 6 )
56060.0 
(p=3.3 E-47)
97699.5 
(p=4.5 E-7)
Superstitiousness 5 6 0 4 3 2 85946.0 
(p=3.9 E-15)
85310.0 
(p=1.4 E-15)
1 0 6 3 2 4 .0
(p = 0 .0 0 1 )
Propensity to believe in 4 8 2 491 89062.5 79341.0 1121 3 3 .0
things that others do not (p=2.0 E - l l) (p=5.0 E-19) (p = 0 .1 6 )
Tolerance o f others’ 52 93 8 2 3 7 1 1 .5 1 9 7 8 0 .0 16095.5
beliefs (p = 0 .2 4 ) (p = 0 .0 4 4 ) (p=3.5 E-5)
* N l :  ‘N o t  at a ll’ group; N 2 : ‘Q u ite ’/ 4V ery ’ group
The meta-belief and CBQ belief ratings provide for some interesting results, including 
several suggesting that self-rated simple meta-beliefs provide some early indication of 
proneness to endorse certain belief types.
Moving through the findings, it was clear that those who judged themselves 
as superstitious were significantly more likely to endorse higher paranormal and 
religious belief and delusion-like belief scores than those who judged themselves ‘not 
at all’ superstitious (see Figure 5.19). These results support previous findings whereby 
the abnormal linking of events or over-evaluation of coincidences remains a key 
feature pertaining to delusion formation (Hemsley, 1993). Maher (1988) noted the 
case of a patient who believed he was responsible for World War I after noticing the 
house he was in front of on Armistice Day (11/11) was numbered 11. Moreover, these 
cross links are supported by several findings linking assessments of superstition and 
general psychopathology or schizotypy (e.g., Brugger, Dowdy & Graves, 1994; Dag, 
1999; Hergovich et al., 2008).
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■  Not superstitious ■  Superstitious
5  DLB P&RB SCB
Figure 5.19. Mean belief scores compared to ratings o f superstitiousness
Lindeman and Aamio (2007) went so far as to suggest that “notions o f  
superstition, magical thinking, and paranormal beliefs share the same ontological 
confusion and can thus be regarded synonymous ”  (p. 734). Thus in a similar manner 
to delusional coincidences, paranormal beliefs can form as a result of placing too 
much weight on everyday coincidences. For example, most people will at some point 
be telephoned by someone just as they were thinking about that person, but not 
everyone will go on to develop a belief in ESP on the basis of this evidence.
Self-rating judgements of religiousness were also significantly associated with 
higher paranormal and religious belief scores. This association is expected, given that 
both are intended to tap into a generic religious construct. However, unlike 
superstitiousness, religiousness was not associated with delusion-like beliefs (see 
Figure 5.20). This might arise because religious beliefs result from a different method 
of formation to that o f DLB, as many religious beliefs are actively encouraged and 
taught from early childhood. In addition, those who rated themselves as religious 
tended to provide fewer or weaker endorsements of SCB items. This could be due to 
the presence of some items (such as belief in evolution), which may conflict with 
more traditional religious beliefs.
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□  Not religious ■  Religious
I  70
5  DLB P&RB SCB
Figure 5.20. Mean belief scores compared to ratings of religiousness
Those who endorsed having a propensity to believe things that others do not 
were significantly more likely to have higher paranormal and religious belief and 
delusion-like belief scores than those who rated themselves ‘not at all’ likely (see 
Figure 5.21). This may reflect a similar trend to that discussed above regarding the 
relationship between this meta-belief and superstitiousness (also associated with both 
o f these scores), in that participants were aware that some people may consider 
paranormal or delusion-like beliefs unusual or irrational, and (having just 
acknowledged holding these types of beliefs) are therefore more likely to report that 
they are likely to hold beliefs others do not.
H Not likely to belie\« a  Likely to belies
S  DLB P&RB SCB
Figure 5.21. Mean belief scores compared to ratings o f likeliness to believe things others do not
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Finally, self-ratings of tolerance were only significantly related to 
societal/cultural beliefs with those who rated themselves as tolerant reporting more 
beliefs or giving stronger endorsement for the beliefs (see Figure 5.22). One potential 
explanation for this is the presence of a large number of the moral beliefs in this belief 
group, all o f which may be taken as an indirect measure of tolerance.
D Not tolerant ■ Tolerant
|  70
s  DLB P&RB SCB
Figure 5.22. Mean belief scores compared to ratings o f tolerance
5.11 PATIENTS
5.11.1 Introduction
In addition to the general population study described above, it was interesting 
to explore the results for psychiatric patients currently holding delusions and how 
these compared to those o f healthy participants. Six outpatients currently being treated 
for psychosis at Cardiff and Vale NHS Trust clinics, and in particular reporting 
delusions, agreed to complete the CBQ. The aim of including a small number of 
patients was to explore the range and extent o f beliefs held by patients with clinical
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delusions (assessed using the CBQ) and to compare these with relevant age/sex 
matched controls given the continuum account. Specific aims included exploring:
( 1 ) whether such patients endorsed more delusion-like beliefs;
(2) patients’ performance on the P&RB and SCB items and
(3) whether their beliefs were more strongly held.
A brief summary of each patient’s relevant psychiatric history is provided below.
AD
AD was a 39-year-old single white male, diagnosed with paranoid illness and 
hospitalised twice. Over the past few years he had felt that his life was being 
broadcast all over the world, and that he had been watched and followed by others, 
primarily the police. AD also believed that someone was going to murder him. At the 
point when he completed the CBQ he was responding to risperidone, and had been 
discharged about 7 weeks. Nevertheless, at this time, he was still anxious about 
people watching him and also reported that he was murdered as a child. He believed 
that he and his sister had been chased by a man with a knife, who had eventually 
caught and stabbed him. AD reported dying while his parents watched from a 
window. He spoke of having nightmares of dying again, and was very anxious about 
this.
BN
BN was a 30-year-old single white male with schizophrenia. Admitted to 
hospital at 14, due to auditory and visual hallucinations (seeing ghosts), paranoid 
ideas, ideas of reference and passivity, in 2 0 0 1 , he was diagnosed as having paranoid
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delusions, and was prescribed clozapine. When he completed the CBQ, he talked of 
blocking thoughts about people watching him. In addition, he had difficulty making 
eye contact and socialising, and was consulting a specialist on Asperger Syndrome at 
this point.
CH
CH was a single white 42-year-old male with a history of erratic employment, 
drug and alcohol abuse, and attempted suicide. He was diagnosed in 1990 with 
schizophrenia and depression (including Messianic delusions), although he reports 
having delusions for five years prior to that. In particular, he believed his home phone 
had been tapped by police and also believed his neighbours were plotting against him. 
When he completed the CBQ, CH was anxious about people and avoided situations 
where he would have to socialise. He also seemed preoccupied with the significance 
of coincidences.
DV
DV was a single white 42-year-old male with a history of taking drugs, 
including cannabis, cocaine and ecstasy. About three years ago he was diagnosed with 
anxiety disorder and depression, following some deaths in his family. At the session 
when he completed the CBQ, he reported avoiding crowded places and feeling very 
anxious about people watching him (describing sweating and heart palpitations ‘all 
the time’). He was also generally depressed, which he attributed to the anxiety.
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EM
EM is a 40-year-old divorced white female, who was diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia 14 years ago, and had been hospitalised twice (for 6  months in 1994 
and a further 6  months in 2005 [following an acrimonious divorce]). She had made 
several suicide attempts but was almost entirely symptom-free between episodes. 
Most of her delusions had quasi-religious themes (e.g., she tried to kill her ex- 
husband, believing he was the Anti-Christ and that she was told this by the presenters 
of a TV breakfast show). When she completed the CBQ, she reported that her only 
current symptom was hearing muffled music (describing this as not distracting but 
like a CD in the background) for a significant part of every day.
FR
FR was a 67-year-old divorced white female, who took clozapine for her 
schizophrenia. Amongst several bizarre beliefs she believed that she was receiving 
instructions from a priest, sometimes through the radio, and that her spirit (a 
protective angel) was moving in and out of her body at will. She also reported 
experiencing visual hallucinations and was concerned about thought withdrawal and 
broadcasting. When she completed the CBQ, FR reported that she was no longer 
seeing/ hearing things, although she continued to hold beliefs regarding both the priest 
and the spirit.
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5.11.2 Results
5,11.2.1 Number o f beliefs
All patients were compared to their age and gender matched cohort from participants 
in the large CBQ study (see Table 5.16). This meant patients AD, BN, CH and DV 
were compared to males aged 30-44, EM to females aged 30-44 and FR to females 
aged 60+.
Table 5.16. Descriptive statistics for the number of reported beliefs at any strength by
belief type and selected demographic groups for the control group and patient data
Group Matched
Group’s
Range
Matched 
Group’s 
Mean (s.d.)
Patients’
Range/
Score
Patients’ 
Mean (s.d.)
Males, 30-44 
(n=133)
DLB 0-17 4.09
(3.52)
1 - 1 0 4.8
(4.11)
SCB 1-19 14.11
(2 .6 8 )
7-11 9.3
(2.06)
P&RB 0 - 1 0 3.62
(2.94)
0-5 3.3
(2.36)
Females, 30-44 
(n=159)
DLB 0-17 4.56
(3.59)
0
SCB 2-19 14.58
(2.77)
15
P&RB 0 - 1 0 5.29
(2.35)
1
Females, 60+ 
(n=142)
DLB 0-15 3.07
(2.48)
3
SCB 4-18 12.97 13 -
(2.59)
P&RB 0 - 1 0 4.04
(2.08)
9
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Delusion-like beliefs
The number of DLB endorsed by the 4 male patients aged 30-44 were 10, 6 , 2 
and 1 (AD, BN, CH and DV respectively), the latter three all being close to the mean 
for their group (see Table 5.16). The first, while higher than average for the age 
group, is within 2 s.d. of the mean. EM did not endorse any DLB, which was slightly 
below the mean for her group. FR endorsed 3 DLB, which was about average for the 
age and gender.
Paranormal and religious beliefs
The numbers of P&RB endorsed by AD, BN, CH and DV were 5 , 5 , 0  and 3 
respectively, which again were all close to the mean for their group, with the lowest 
score of 0 being the most unusual. EM endorsed one P&RB, which was slightly below 
the mean for her group. FR endorsed 9 P&RB, which was over 2 standard deviations 
higher than the mean for her comparison group.
Societal/cultural beliefs
The male participants endorsed 8 , 11, 11 and 7 SCB (respectively). 
Interestingly, these were all fairly low scores, with both AD and DV’s scores falling 
below 2 s.d. of the mean. In contrast, EM and FR endorsed similar numbers to the 
means for their comparison groups (15 and 13 respectively).
5.11.2.2 Strength o f beliefs
Although the questions completed by patients and poll respondents were 
identical in content, the version of the CBQ completed by patients had similar scales 
to previous versions (using a scale from ‘-2’ [‘Do not believe’] to ‘2’ [‘Believe’]).
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Patients’ strength of belief endorsement was therefore determined from their choice of 
either ‘1’ or ‘2 ’ on this scale. These scores were transformed to make them 
comparable to those of the poll respondents. The average strength of endorsement 
given to each belief type was calculated by giving the highest category (e.g., 
‘strongly’) a strength of 1 and the other ratings a strength relative to this (i.e., for the 
patients, the rating ‘weakly’ was given a weight of 0.5, for the poll respondents, 
‘weakly’ had a rating of 0.33 and ‘moderately’ 0.66). These ratings were summed for 
all questions for which the belief had been endorsed at any strength and divided by 
this number of questions.
The mean strength ratings provided by the four male patients were 1, 0.57, 
0 . 8 8  and 0 . 8 6  respectively, the latter three all being reasonably close to the mean for 
their group (see Table 5.17). AD’s mean strength rating, while higher than average, 
was just within 2 s.d. of the mean. EM’s mean strength rating of 1 was more than 2 
s.d. higher than the mean for her comparison group and FR again gave fairly high 
ratings, with a mean strength of 0.96, slightly above average for her age and gender.
Table 5.17. Descriptive statistics for the mean strength rating given to reported beliefs 
by belief type and selected demographic groups for controls and patient
Group Range Mean Patient Mean
(s.d.) Range (s.d.)
Males, 30-44 
(n=133)
0.50-1.00
0.76
(0 .1 2 )
0.57-1.00
0.82
(0.18)
Females, 30-44 
(n=159)
0.46-1.00
0.71
(0 . 1 1 )
1 -
Females, 60+ 
(n=142)
0.48-1.00
0.78
(0 .1 1 )
0.96 -
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While collectively these findings only involve a small number of patients and 
therefore can only provide preliminary results, it seems clear that there is a 
considerable overlap between these patients’ and healthy respondents’ number, and to 
a lesser extent strength, of beliefs. This supports the point made in Chapter 2 
regarding the issues of defining of delusions -  namely that belief content and level of 
conviction are unlikely to distinguish clinical implications.
5.12 SUMMARY
This main focus of this chapter has been on reporting and analysing the key findings 
of the large CBQ study. The results confirm that it was not statistically unusual for 
members of the general population to hold DLBs; 39% reported holding one or more 
DLB strongly (with approximately 90% at any strength). Moreover, the nature of 
these delusion-like beliefs were often bizarre (25% endorsing one or more of these 
items strongly), including those that had not been researched in previous clinical and 
non-clinical measures. Thus the findings largely confirm and extend the results of 
previous relevant studies (Bell, Halligan & Ellis, 2006c; Johns & van Os, 2001; Peters 
et al., 2004; van Os et al., 2009), demonstrating that declarative belief endorsement, 
while necessary, is not sufficient to distinguish clinically presenting beliefs. Clinical 
diagnosis of delusions largely depends on the functional consequences (e.g., distress, 
preoccupation) that such beliefs and associated factors conspire to impact on an 
individual’s quality of life. Moreover, the results support the continuum account of 
psychotic-like symptomology and previous reports showing delusion-like beliefs are 
not uncommon in non-clinical populations (Eaton et al., 1991; Freeman et al., 2005; 
Kendler et al., 1996; Olfson et al., 2002; Poulton et al., 2000; Scott et al., 2005; van
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Os et al., 2000). The high levels of DLB within the normal population, and 
association between DLB and paranormal and/or religious beliefs, also raise important 
questions regarding the assumption that delusions per se are distinguishable from 
other beliefs depending on the proportion of people assumed to hold them, as 
proposed in the DSM definition (APA, 2000).
Having considered beliefs in detail in this chapter, the next chapter will focus 
on experiences and in particular the relationships between belief and experience, both 
in the context of the anomalous (psychotic-like and paranormal and religious) items 
and the general societal/cultural items.
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CHAPTER 6
ANOMALOUS EXPERIENCE: PREVALENCE AND 
RELATIONSHIP TO BELIEFS
6.1 INTRO DUCTIO N
The last chapter largely focused on elucidating the prevalence of different 
types of beliefs, and in particular, the numbers of delusion-like beliefs held in the 
general population. However, as indicated earlier in Chapter 1, beliefs (as 
psychosocial constructs) are unlikely to exist in isolation. They are influenced by 
emotions, other beliefs (as seen in Chapter 5) and, critically in terms of delusional 
belief formation and proximal cause, are thought to be possibly triggered by salient 
phenomenological experiences.
The idea that delusions can arise from a disturbance of perceptual experience 
was originally put forward by philosopher John Locke (Locke, 1689/2004; Porter, 
1987). In keeping with this approach, Maher’s (1999) influential account considered 
delusions to be the product of attempts to explain anomalous perceptual experiences 
using normal reasoning. This theoretical account forms the basis for a number of 
neuropsychological theories of delusion formation (Davies et al., 2001; Ellis et al., 
1997; Langdon and Coltheart, 2000) and is also recognised as an important factor for 
a number of equally influential cognitive theories (Bentall et al., 2001; Freeman & 
Garety, 2004; Garety & Hemsley, 1994). Although causally implicated in many 
accounts of delusions, such experiences receive less attention than their proposed 
output belief. This chapter will consider such experiences, and in particular their 
relationship with delusions and other beliefs.
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6.2 THE RELEVANCE OF EXPERIENCES FOR DELUSION 
FORMATION
The association between hallucinations (considered as one form of anomalous 
experience) and delusions in psychotic patients is clinically well accepted (Bilder et 
al., 1985; Lewinsohn, 1970; Liddle, 1987; Lincoln, 2007; Mortimer et al., 1996; 
Peralta et al., 1992). Indeed, this is reflected in the characterisation of both symptoms 
as comprising a positive psychotic dimension (DSM-IV-TR: APA, 2000), perhaps 
suggesting a similar psychopathological process. The clinical co-existence of these 
symptoms has also fuelled several influential theoretical accounts that argue that 
delusions are causally linked to anomalous perceptual experiences (e.g., Maher, 
1974). Some neuropsychological theories (Coltheart et al., 2007; Davies et al., 2001; 
Ellis & Young, 1990) propose that anomalous perceptual experiences (attributable to 
discemable and quantifiable neuropsychological impairments) provide the necessary 
causal trigger (and content specificity) for monothematic delusions. However, many 
of the original theoretical accounts now suggest the need for a second factor (e.g., a 
dysfunction of belief evaluation), given the resilience and content-specific nature of 
many clinical delusional beliefs. Furthermore, prior beliefs and experiences are likely 
to affect the interpretation of any anomalous experience (AE) or any subsequent 
belief, suggesting the presence of AE may be a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for delusion formation (see Bell, Halligan & Ellis, 2006c).
Such accounts do not argue that the anomalous perception involved has to be a 
hallucination (i.e., a perception in the absence of a stimulus). Indeed, there are a wide 
range of anomalous experiences that have been linked to delusions (Bell, Halligan & 
Ellis, 2006c, 2008). Furthermore, it is not just delusional beliefs that have been linked 
to AE, McNally and Clancy (2005) found that those who reported being abducted by
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aliens experienced higher rates of sleep paralysis, suggesting that the belief in alien 
abduction was formed following AE experienced during sleep paralysis.
Despite compelling evidence for their clinical co-occurrence, the precise 
nature of the association between delusions (considered as anomalous beliefs) and 
anomalous experiences remains unclear. Some researchers, while recognising the 
strong link between anomalous perceptual experiences and delusions, have questioned 
the causal dependency in all cases (e.g., Bell et al., 2008; Brugger & Mohr, 2008). 
Given that studies generally focus on chronic patients suffering from a general 
diagnosis of psychosis, and the cross-sectional nature and timings of most patient 
evaluations, the neuropsychological deficits (even where present and relevant) 
underpinning anomalous experiences could be a consequence rather than a cause, 
following a deficit involving more central belief generation and/or evaluation systems.
Assuming a continuum account of psychotic symptoms (Claridge, 1994; Crow 
et al., 1995; Johns & van Os, 2001), whereby “core symptoms...are much more 
prevalent in the general population that their clinical counterparts” (Rutten et al., 
2008, p.53), a relevant research question involves the relationships between 
anomalous beliefs (AB) and anomalous experiences (AE) in a general population 
sample.
Reports of delusion-like beliefs and/or hallucination-like experiences are not 
uncommon in many non-clinical populations (Barrett & Etheridge, 1992; Eaton et al., 
1991; Freeman et al., 2005; Johns et al., 2002; Johns et al., 2004; Kendler et al., 1996; 
Laroi & van der Linden, 2005; Ohayon, 2000; Olfson et al., 2002; Posey & Losch, 
1983; Poulton et al., 2000; Scott et al., 2005; Tien, 1991; van Os et al., 2000) and “do 
not differ qualitatively” from those of clinical patients “on a number of levels, 
including their distribution and aetiology” (Laroi & van der Linden, 2005, p. 1438).
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Indeed, evidence suggests that hallucinatory experiences in non-clinical and clinical 
samples are similar (albeit with non-patients more likely to perceive the voices as 
predominantly positive [see Honig et al., 1998]), and that both share similar socio­
demographic risk factors and neurocognitive mechanisms (Johns, 2005). Furthermore, 
several studies indicate a general relationship between hallucinatory experiences and 
delusional ideation (Johns et al., 2002; Lincoln, 2007; Verdoux et al., 1998), although 
Laroi and van der Linden (2005) found that one of five hallucinatory factors (relating 
to daydreaming) did not correlate to delusion-proneness and one of seven delusion 
factors (relating to religious ideation) did not correlate with hallucination-proneness.
With these considerations in mind, the studies described in this chapter set out to:
(i) Investigate the prevalence and distribution of self-reported anomalous 
experiences (AE) in a large stratified sample.
(ii) Assuming a continuum account, examine known demographic 
characteristics and other correlates of clinical hallucinations to ascertain if 
these also extend to non-clinical experiences (van Os et al., 2009). In 
particular:
a. Evaluate the co-occurrence and content association between AE and 
beliefs, at both the group and individual levels. Few studies have 
empirically evaluated the nature of this relationship.
b. More specifically, establish the association or dissociation between 
overall anomalous experience and belief groups and also determine 
whether specific AEs predicted specific ABs.
c. Establish whether participants’ self-ratings of meta-beliefs (e.g., 
religiousness) might predict AE proneness.
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(iii) Finally, examine the experience scores of a small group of patients to 
ascertain the degree to which these are similar or distinct from those of age 
and gender matched controls.
6.3 PREVALENCE OF HALLUCINATION-LIKE EXPERIENCES
Several studies of hallucinations report lifetime prevalence estimates of around 
6-15% (Slade & Bentall, 1988; Tien, 1991; van Os et al., 2000: see Table 6.1). 
However, a few give higher estimates: both Barrett and Etheridge (1992) and Ohayon 
(2000) found 30-40% of participants reported some hallucinatory experiences, and 
Posey and Losch (1983) found that 71% of their student sample reported brief 
hallucinated voices.
The use of student samples by Barrett and Etheridge and Posey and Losch, and 
the inclusion of a wide range of experiences (gustatory, olfactory and haptic items) in 
Ohayon’s case, lead to these increased prevalence rates. However, a study on current 
hallucinatory experiences of general practice attendees by Olfson et al. (2002) 
confirms the high prevalence rate, as 1 0 % of their sample reported having visual 
hallucinatory experiences, and 13% reported auditory. Given that this study still used 
a clinical measure (MINI), it is expected that these prevalence levels might rise 
further if a potentially more stigma-reducing questionnaire was used, such as the CBQ 
(described in Chapter 4).
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Table 6.1. Selected studies investigating hallucinations in non-clinical populations. (See Table 4.1 [Chapter 4] for abbreviated instrument
references. Instrument names listed in full here are described in the reference given in this table).
Focus Author(s) N Instrument Sample Prevalence
Currently
Present Auditory and visual experiences
Olfson et al. (2002) 1005 MINI US adults (attending an 
urban general medical 
practice)
12.7% (Auditory), 
10.3% (Visual)
Lifetime
Prevalence
Tien (1991) 18572 DIS US adults 1 0 % men, 15% women
Auditory, visual, 
haptic, olfactory and 
gustatory experiences
Ohayon (2000) 13507 Sleep-EVAL European adults 38.7%
Auditory experiences
van Os et al. (2000) 7076 CIDI Dutch adults 8.2% (1.7% ‘true’ 
clinically rated 
hallucination)
Posey & Losch 
(1983)
375 Questionnaire: 
‘Hearing Voices’
US college students 71 % (Brief hallucinated 
voices)
Barrett & Etheridge 
(1992)
586 Verbal
Hallucination
Questionnaire
US college students 30-40% (Hearing 
voices)
Annual
Prevalence
Auditory and visual 
experiences
Johns et al. (2002) 8063 PSQ, PSE British adults 4.0% (White sample 
only)
Johns et al. (2004) 8580 PSQ British adults 4.2%
Poulton et al. 
(2 0 0 0 )
761 DIS 26-yr-old New Zealanders 
(Longitudinal study)
13.2%
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6.4 M ETHOD S
6.4.1 CBQ Experience items
Chapter 4 described 8  anomalous experience items which comprised a part of 
the Cardiff Beliefs Questionnaire (CBQ). These experience items include six items 
addressing a range of paranormal experiences and two items addressing visual and 
auditory hallucination-like experiences. Questions concerned both current and lifetime 
experiences (e.g., ‘Have you seen...’), with participants responding using a 4-point 
Likert scale, with the options 0 (‘Never’), 1 (‘Rarely’), 2 (‘Sometimes’) and 3 
(‘Often’).
Given validity concerns discussed in earlier chapters (see Chapter 4) when 
using clinical measures to reveal sub-clinical symptoms from non-clinical samples 
(Henderson, 1996) and the understandable unwillingness of subjects to provide 
responses that present subjects in a socially unacceptable manner (Byrne, 2000; 
Corrigan, 2000) these questions avoided clinical vocabulary and were embedded 
within a broader context of the 3 different beliefs groups described in Chapters 4 and 
5. These three belief groups (delusion-like, paranormal and religious and 
societal/cultural) were employed in this study to compare the relationships between 
beliefs and experiences, as were the four meta-belief questions (earlier described in 
Chapter 4) to examine whether these related to anomalous experiences.
6.4.2 Participants
The general population sample (1000 British adults) described in detail earlier 
in Chapter 5 was used with quotas set on age, gender and employment status. Data 
were collected using computer-assisted telephone interviewing, carried out by an
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experienced market research company. For further details on the sampling 
methodology and participant characteristics see Chapter 5 (section 5.2).
6.5 ANOM ALOUS EX PERIEN CES
6.5.1 Overall Prevalence
One or more o f  the 8 anomalous experiences were reported at any frequency 
(i.e., ratings o f 1-3) by 74.5% o f subjects, with 44.0% of subjects reported having one 
or more AE occurring ‘sometimes’, and 13.1% reporting these occurring ‘often’. As 
Figure 6.1 shows, A E are not uncommon (complementing previous reports of 
paranormal experiences and the continuum account), with one or more ‘sometimes’ or 
‘often’ occurring AE being reported by nearly half of the sample.
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Figure 6.1. The frequency o f participants reporting different numbers o f ‘sometimes’ 
or ‘often' occurring AE
1 7
0  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
No of 'sometimes' or 'often' occurring AE
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The prevalence of these items are now considered with regard to their categories 
(hallucination-like and paranormal), and the case for combining all items together to 
form one AE scale is discussed.
6.5.2 Prevalence of HLE
6.5.2.1 Results
One or both o f the hallucination-like experiences were reported by 24.1% of 
participants, with 9.7% o f participants reporting having at least one HLE occurring 
‘sometimes’, and 2.5% reporting these occurring ‘often’. Hearing voices was reported 
by 15.3%, while seeing things that other people cannot was reported by 13.8% (see 
Figure 6.2). Five percent (n=50) o f the sample endorsed both of the items.
□ Rarely □ Sometimes ■ Often
Heard voices 
w hen no-one's 
around
Seen things others 
cannot
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
P ercen tage reporting HLE
Figure 6.2. The strength o f  endorsement o f individual HLE items
6.5.2.2 Discussion
Despite only including two items directly comparable to clinical hallucination­
like experiences, and avoiding psychiatric associations, a substantial proportion of
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participants endorsed these items (24%) compared to previous estimates of around 
10% when using clinical measures (Tien, 1991; van Os et al., 2000).
However, a higher prevalence estimate (38.7%) was reported by Ohayon 
(2000) who used large telephone based samples from the UK, Germany and Italy 
(n=l3,057). The higher level in this study could, however, be explained by the much 
wider range of items used (e.g., including gustatory, olfactory and haptic experiences) 
to assess hallucinatory experiences. This was also true for the study by Posey and 
Losch (1983), who found that 71% of college students reported brief auditory 
hallucinations, using a wide range of items (e.g., hypnopompic/hypnagogic 
experiences and hearing the phone or doorbell ring when it didn’t), all of which makes 
it difficult to compare with the current study’s findings and results of studies 
employing clinical measures.
One issue when attempting to assess hallucination-like experiences, in both 
non-clinical and clinical samples and even when neutrally defined, is the extent to 
which subjects are capable of recognising such experiences as a departure from the 
norm. As with delusion-like beliefs, where it is not possible to reliably distinguish 
between those beliefs that have an objective basis in reality and those which do not, 
the data for HLE are based on participants’ reports and without any objective 
evidence. Moreover, unlike with the DLB, the methods used to assess HLE on the 
CBQ rely on participants themselves distinguishing between objective and subjective 
realities, e.g., there being another person present or not in the case of hearing voices.
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6.5.3 Paranorm al Experiences
The results for the 6 paranormal items (see Figure 6.3) confirm results from
several similar large market research polls. In a MORI (1998) poll, belief in ghosts 
was reported by 40% of a UK sample o f 721 people, of whom 37% reported 
experiences o f ghosts (15% o f the total sample, although only those reporting belief 
were questioned regarding their experiences). Similarly, another MORI poll in 2003 
(using 1001 respondents from the UK) found that 49% of the 38% who reported 
beliefs in ghosts had also reported some experiences (19% of the total sample, 
compared to 22% at any frequency in this study). In the same two polls described 
above, 7% (21% o f believers, who made up 31% of the sample) and 8% (26% of 
believers, who were 32% o f the sample) respectively reported out-of-body 
experiences compared to 10% in the current study, suggesting the current results are 
not dissimilar. Interestingly, the methodology used in both polls assumed that beliefs 
followed from relevant experiences.
Sensed  when a  friend or family member was in trouble 
Felt that familiar people all seem  colder or more distant than before 
Had premonitions of events that have yet to take place 
Seen or sensed a ghost
Felt that familiar objects appeared different even though you knew they hadn't changed
Had an out-of-body experience
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
P ercen tage  reporting paranorm al experiences
Figure 6.3. The prevalence o f the 6 paranormal experiences {Note: the question on out-of- 
body experiences included an elaboration of this as having felt as though you were looking down on 
your own body from above ’)
□ Rarely ■ Sometimes ■ Often
\\\v
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6.5.4 Hallucination-like and paranormal experiences
6.5.4.1 Correlational analysis
Spearman’s correlations were also used to assess the associations between these two 
different subtypes of anomalous experiences. Given the large sample size, the data 
were split randomly into 4 groups, and correlations were carried out on each. As 
expected the two hallucination-like experiences were strongly associated with 6  
paranormal experiences (rho between 0.38-0.46 for the four subsamples, all 
p<0 .0 0 0 1 ), suggesting that the subtypes might be better placed within a continuum of 
anomalous experiences, despite the different clinical, historical and social 
interpretations attributed to both.
To test this further, the results from both experiences were combined and subjected to 
principal components analysis (PCA) to assess underlying communalities between 
both. As with the other factor analyses, the sample was randomly split into two groups 
and the solutions compared.
6.5.4.2 Factor analysis
Sample 1 (n=487)
Individual items had KMO measures of sampling adequacy varying between 0.770- 
0.849. The overall KMO was 0.801 and the Bartlett test for sphericity was highly 
significant, confirming that the data were suitable for PCA. The Kaiser criterion of 
eigenvalue>l suggested a two component solution, whereas the scree plot indicated a 
one component solution (see Figure 6.4). Following Stevens (1992), the solution 
indicated by the scree plot was taken given that there was a large sample with 
relatively low communalities.
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Figure 6.4. Sample 1 scree plot for experience items
Overall, a single component solution explained 36.1% of the total variance. Table 6.2 
shows the factor loadings for this component.
Sample 2 (n=489)
The Kaiser criterion of eigenvalue>l again indicated a two component solution, 
whereas the scree plot suggested a one component solution (see Figure 6.5).
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Figure 6.5. Sample 2 scree plot for experience items
Individual items had KMO measures of sampling adequacy varying between 0.812- 
0.863. The overall KMO was 0.840 and the Bartlett test for sphericity was highly
208
significant, confirming that the data were suitable for PCA. Overall, a single 
component solution explained 38.1% of the total variance. Table 6.2 shows the factor 
loadings for this component.
Table 6.2. Factor loadings for experience items
Factor loading
How often have you ... Sample 1 Sample 2
Seen or sensed a ghost? 0 . 6 6 8 0.696
Seen things which other people cannot? 0.680 0.674
Felt that familiar objects appeared different even though 
you knew they hadn't changed? 0.661 0.615
Sensed when a friend or family member was in trouble? 0.592 0.637
Had premonitions of events that have yet to take place? 0.554 0.665
Heard voices when no one is around? 0.558 0.613
Had an out of body experience (e.g. felt as though you 
were looking down on your own body from above)? 0.574 0.484
Felt that familiar people all seem colder or more distant 
than before? 0.493 0.528
Importantly neither PCA suggested the separation of hallucination-like and 
paranormal experiences. Nor did either PCA distinguish unexplained perceptual 
experiences from the specific paranormal-type experiences: those that may have 
resulted from perceptual experiences but have already been interpreted in a particular 
way.
6.5.4.3 Internal consistency
Internal consistency tests were conducted on the 8  anomalous experience items to 
establish whether these would form a reliable scale. Collectively the anomalous 
experience (AE) items demonstrated an acceptable level of internal consistency, with 
a Cronbach alpha coefficient of 0.74 and item-whole correlations ranging between 
0.37-0.51. A corrected split-half reliability analysis indicated a reasonable correlation 
of 0.79.
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Given that both the PCA and the internal consistency results suggest that all 8
experience items could be combined to form an adequate scale, an overall anomalous
experiences score was calculated for each participant. This was calculated by
summing the number of reported experiences weighted by frequency (i.e., a response
o f ‘never’ scored nothing, ‘rarely’ was scored as ‘1 ’, ‘sometimes’ as ‘2 ’ and ‘often’ as
‘3’). The distribution of these scores is shown in Figure 6 .6 .
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Figure 6 .6 . The distribution of anomalous experience (AE) scores
6.5.5 Demographics
6.5.5.1 Results
Non-parametric tests (Kruskal-Wallis or Mann-Whitney) were used to explore
relationships between established clinical demographic variables (Age; Gender;
Socioeconomic group; Education; Ethnicity; Religion; Household [live with others /
live alone]; Handedness) and the anomalous experience score. Given the number of
comparisons, only effects significant at p<0.0001 were considered (Bonferroni’s
correction).
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9 1011 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3
AE Score
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Two variables were found to be significantly associated with AE score. Odds 
ratios were calculated for significant comparisons by dividing participants into above 
and below average experience scores. With regard to gender, females showed 
significantly higher experience scores (M=3.56, s.d.=3.50) than males (M=2.94, 
s.d.=3.47) (U(468,508)=102266.5, p=0.0001; OR: 1.418, 95%CI: 1.091-1.843
[reference group: Female]). This finding is consistent with several previous studies 
that also found that females were more likely than males to report hallucinations (Preti 
et al., 2007; Scott et al., 2008; Shevlin et al., 2007).
In terms of religion, participants who identified themselves as belonging to 
non-Christian religions (M=6.46, s.d.=5.73) showed significantly higher anomalous 
experience scores than those who identified themselves as Christians (M=3.06, 
s.d.=3.23) (U(37,650)=7423.0, p<0.0001; OR: 4.348, 95%CI: 2.121-8.911 [reference 
group: non-Christian]).
6.5.5.2 Discussion
The gender difference in favour of females has been partially explained by the 
effects of sex hormones on brain development and social factors (Scott et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, these findings tie in with those suggesting that women also tend to be 
more superstitious (Griffiths & Bingham, 2005; Ipsos-MORI, 2007). Interestingly, 
when only the two clinically relevant items (i.e., hallucination-like experiences) were 
considered, no significant gender difference was apparent.
The only other significant finding that related to the combined score was those 
being identified as a Christian. These participants (N=650) tended to report 
significantly fewer and/or less frequent anomalous experiences than those who 
identified themselves as belonging to non-Christian religions (N=37). The explanation
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for this difference is not immediately obvious. The non-Christian group constituted 
individuals from several mainstream religions (predominantly Islam, Judaism and 
Hinduism), in addition to those who identified themselves as part of smaller religious 
groups. It is possible, however, that a general association with religious beliefs exists 
but with the increasing secularisation of Christianity in the UK, the interpretation of 
unusual experiences by individuals in this group had greater competition from other 
less religious accounts. Another possible explanation is that there is a greater feeling 
of isolation in minority religious groups, a factor that has been linked with the 
development of psychotic illness (Boydell et al., 2004). It is important to note that the 
interpretation of visual hallucinations is influenced by a patient's social and cultural 
milieu (Knight et al., 2008). As such, certain experiences that have been given a 
religious explanation may not always be considered hallucinatory. Nevertheless, in 
China, religious beliefs and superstitions have been shown to have important 
influence on delusions and hallucinations (Yip, 2003).
6.6 BELIEFS AND EXPERIENCES
6.6.1 Results
6.6.1.1 Comparisons o f overall scores
The influential Maherian account of delusions predicts that anomalous 
experiences provide for delusions and hence from a continuum account such 
experiences are likely to be associated with both delusion-like and paranormal and 
religious beliefs but not with societal/cultural beliefs. In the following study, 
Spearman’s correlations (for the four subgroups of 250 individuals) were used to
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assess the associations between experiences and delusion-like, paranormal and 
religious and societal/cultural beliefs.
Anomalous experiences (AE) correlated strongly with anomalous beliefs 
(AB: comprising both delusion-like and paranormal and religious) (with p between 
0.36-0.47, all p<1.0E-06) but not with societal/cultural beliefs (p between 0.05-0.19). 
In terms of individual belief groups anomalous experiences correlated with 
paranormal and religious (with p between 0.32-0.38) and delusion-like beliefs (p 
between 0.27-0.45) (both p<2.0E-09 for all four groups).
Percentage differences
To get an overall picture of the relationship between AB and AE the 
percentage difference was calculated between participants’ anomalous belief (AB) 
score and their anomalous experience (AE) score (see Figure 6.7). To determine these 
differences each person’s (n=848) AE and AB scores were transformed into 
percentages of the total possible AE or AB score, following which the transformed 
AE score was subtracted from the transformed AB score. Although the results show a 
reasonably good fit to a normal distribution, the number of subjects contained in the 
tails (+/- 25) are informative, suggesting two-way dissociations between high and low 
performance on AE and AB respectively.
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Figure 6.7. The percentage difference between individual participants’ anomalous 
experience and belief scores
6.6.1.2 Exploring individual participants’ endorsements
Overall AE and AB scores
To explore the extent o f association and dissociation between AE and AB, the 
performance o f smaller subgroups of participants with particularly high or low scores 
were subsequently examined. To ensure balanced high and low groups, the high AE 
group included participants who reported at least 2 or more AE occurring 
‘Sometimes’ or ‘Often’, with the low AE group comprising those who endorsed no 
AE at any level. For AB, the high group included participants who reported believing 
in 14 or more delusion-like, paranormal or religious items ‘Strongly’ or ‘Moderately’, 
whereas the low group was those who reported no AB items ‘Strongly’ or 
‘Moderately’.
The results (see Table 6.3) confirm that for the most part those that endorsed 
high levels o f AB also endorsed high levels o f AE. Reciprocally, most who did not 
endorse AB did not report AE. Indeed, o f the 76 participants falling into these 4
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groups, 88.2% showed this pattern of results. This association, however, was not true 
for all cases and Table 6.3 also shows clear evidence of double dissociation involving 
nine participants (in bold); five of whom endorsed 14 or more AB relatively strongly 
but did not endorse AE and four participants who showed the opposite dissociation - 
high levels of AE without any consequential AB. Furthermore, of the 253 participants 
who did not endorse any anomalous experiences, 89% (n=225) still endorsed one or 
more AB strongly or moderately (56% ‘strongly’ believing at least one AB). By 
comparison, the 63 participants who reported no strong or moderate AB, 56% (n=35) 
still reported one or more AE occurring at any frequency (24% reporting at least one 
occurring ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’).
Table 6.3. The frequency of combinations of anomalous beliefs (AB) and anomalous
experiences (AE) scores
AB
(N=63)
+
(N=59)
AE
(N=253) 28 5
+
(N=258) 4 39
+ AE: Participants reporting 2 or more (out o f  8) ‘Som etim es’ or ‘Often’ occurring AE  
+ AB: Participants reporting 14 or more (out o f  27) ‘Strong’ or ‘M oderate’ AB
- AE: Participants reporting no AE
- AB: Participants reporting no ‘Strong’ or ‘M oderate’ AB
Relationship with specific beliefs
In attempting to explain monothematic delusions, it has been suggested that an 
anomalous experience provides for the delusion content, either with the delusion 
developing as a rational explanation for the AE or with the AE providing the first 
factor in a two-stage process (Coltheart et al., 2007; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000; 
Maher, 1988). Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2, these theories propose that a
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specific anomalous perceptual experience leads to particular delusional beliefs (e.g., 
Capgras delusion is thought to result from a deficit in covert face recognition: Ellis & 
Lewis, 2001; Ellis & Young, 1990). To examine whether particular belief contents 
related to reported experience type, correlations between individual AE and AB items 
were conducted, again using the four sub-samples (n=250) described above (see Table 
6.4). Only associations which showed an average correlation of 0.20 or greater were 
considered. Those where all four correlations were significant at p<0.0001 
(Bonferroni’s correction) are indicated in bold.
Table 6.4. Average correlations taken over the four subsamples for specific AE and AB_______
AB
________ Type o f  AB
Black
magic/
Soul/ witch- RP: Astro
Ref spirit Reinc CD craft DES Place CA CT -logy PES
D L -  D L -  D L -  D L -
AE NB P&R P&R P&R P&R P&R B B B P&R P&R
Seen a 
ghost 0.23 0 . 2 0 0.27 0.33 0.23 0.23 0.20
Seen
things 0.24 0.25 0.23 0 . 2 1 0 . 2 2
Sensed
trouble 0.26 0.25 0.24
Felt
familiar
objects
changed
0.23 0 . 2 0 0 . 2 0 0 . 2 2
Had
premo­ 0.25 0.25 0.25
nitions
Felt
familiar
people
changed
0.23 0.24 0.22
Heard
voices 0 . 2 1
Ref: Ideas o f  reference; Reinc: Reincarnation; CD: Communication with the dead; DES: Demons or
evil spirits; RP: Reduplicative paramnesia; CA: Controlled actions; CT: Controlled thoughts; PES: 
Possession by evil spirits; DL-B: D elusion-like (bizarre); DL-NB: D elusion-like (non-bizarre); P&R: 
Paranormal and religious
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Table 6.4 shows that seeing a ghost was significantly associated with beliefs in 
reincarnation and communication with the dead. In addition, sensing when a friend or 
family member was in trouble correlated with ideas of reference (i.e., believing that 
certain things people say or do contain special messages for you).
Table 6.5 looks in detail at the relationship between seeing ghosts and belief in 
communication with the dead, the strongest between a belief and experience. As 
predicted, while there are many reports of endorsements for both items or for neither; 
this was not true for all cases.
Table 6.5. The co-occurrence of belief in “communication with the dead” and the 
experience of “seeing a ghost”
Experience of seeing a ghost
Absent
(n=769)
Present
(n=213)
Belief in Absent 398 36
communication (n=434) (Expected = 340) (Expected = 94)
with the dead Present
(n=548)
371
(Expected = 429)
111
(Expected =119)
Another AE of particular interest was the feeling that familiar people had 
changed (e.g., become colder or more distant), because of the hypothesised 
relationship between this type of experience and Capgras-like beliefs. This 
relationship did not prove significant in this sample, however, (mean p=0.06 for the 
four subsamples), although the majority of those endorsing Capgras-like beliefs (‘Do 
you believe that relatives or close friends are sometimes replaced by identical-looking 
impostors?’) did also endorse this experience (see Table 6 .6 ).
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Table 6.6. The co-occurrence of Capgras-type beliefs and experiences of familiar 
people being more distant
Felt familiar people changed
Absent
(n=573)
Present
(n=416)
Capgras- Absent 546 385
like (n=931) (Expected = 539) (Expected = 392)
belief Present 27 31
(n=58) (Expected = 34) (Expected = 24)
6.6.2 Discussion
Significant relationships were identified between ‘anomalous’ belief types 
(combining delusion-like and paranormal and religious) and ‘anomalous’ experiences. 
In keeping with the prediction that delusions are the product of a subject’s 
interpretation of their anomalous perceptual experiences (Davies et al., 2001; Ellis et 
al., 1997; Langdon & Coltheart, 2000; Maher, 1988), anomalous experiences 
correlated significantly with both paranormal and religious beliefs (rho ranging 
between 0.32-0.38) and delusion-like beliefs (rho ranging from 0.27-0.45) but not 
with general societal or cultural beliefs. Furthermore, the association between 
paranormal beliefs and AE suggest a common mechanism for explaining anomalous 
beliefs. Indeed, given that delusion-like and paranormal beliefs are strongly linked 
(Houran, Irwin & Lange, 2001; Irwin & Green, 1998; McCreery & Claridge, 2002; 
Thalboume, 1994a,b), it seems plausible to assume that the relationship between these 
anomalous beliefs and experiences would be similar.
As expected, this relationship held for the majority of participants, with 8 8 % 
of those falling into the extreme high and low AE and AB groups either endorsing 
high levels of AB and AE or endorsing neither AB nor AE. While these results 
confirm previous clinical accounts reporting the co-occurrence of delusions and
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hallucinations in both clinical (Bilder et al., 1985; Liddle, 1987; Mortimer et al., 1996; 
Peralta et al., 1992), and non-clinical samples (Johns et al., 2002; Laroi & van der 
Linden, 2005; Lincoln, 2007; Verdoux et al. 1998), all of these studies (including the 
findings reported in this thesis) are limited by the cross-sectional methodology used. 
As such none can imply an explicit directional causal mechanism. Moreover, this type 
of methodology does not take into account other relevant factors that may influence 
belief formation, for instance, attentional or attributional biases (Fear et al., 1996; 
Freeman & Garety, 2004; Kaney & Bentall, 1989). Furthermore, Young (2008) 
advocates an interactionist model, which allows for both bottom-up and top-down 
processes in delusion formation, thus providing the potential for AE and AB to feed 
into each other. For example, Young (2008) suggests that Capgras beliefs may form 
following an AE, but it is the delusion itself that leads to the maintenance of the 
experience being perceived in a manner consistent with the belief.
Moreover, Bell et al. (2008) have provided evidence that anomalous 
perceptual experiences, as measured by the Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale, are 
not always necessary to account for the presence of all delusions. Indeed, while most 
participants reported DLB alongside anomalous experiences, this pattern was not 
found in every case, as is demonstrated by the substantial tails in the distribution on 
Figure 6.7. Furthermore, as would be expected (given that AE is not thought to be a 
sufficient condition for AB formation), four participants endorsed high levels of AE 
without any consequential AB. In addition, five participants endorsed 14 or more AB 
relatively strongly but did not endorse any AE, suggesting AE is not a necessary 
condition for AB formation. Furthermore, of the 253 participants who did not endorse 
any anomalous experiences, 29% still endorsed at least one DLB strongly. As pointed 
out by Bell et al. (2008), however, there is no comprehensive list of anomalous
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experiences, so it may be that these participants have experienced anomalous 
experiences in a different form to those addressed here.
One way of addressing this difficulty, however, is to investigate the 
relationships between specific beliefs and experiences that would be predicted to co­
occur. In particular, the loss of the expected feeling of familiarity one should get when 
perceiving a known face has previously been suggested to be associated with Capgras 
delusion (Ellis & Young, 1990), with people developing the belief that those close to 
them are impostors as a result of this kind of experience, alongside a second deficit in 
belief evaluation (Coltheart et al., 2007). From this dual account, it could be predicted 
that the experience would not be limited to those with Capgras as only a subset of 
people with the second evaluative deficit would go on to develop the delusion.
In the current study, the experience of feeling that familiar people seem colder 
or more distant (reported occurring ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ by over 2 0 % of the sample) 
was used as a potential way of investigating these types of feelings in an attenuated 
form. However, despite the frequency with which this experience was reported in this 
study, the association between this particular AE and Capgras-type beliefs was not 
significant, suggesting that the versions of this anomalous experience captured by the 
CBQ question were not necessary for the formation of this belief. Lincoln (2007) 
found that hallucinations were particularly strongly related to delusions that would 
plausibly follow from hallucinatory experiences (e.g., beliefs about thought insertion, 
broadcasting, being influenced and loss of control) in a patient sample, whereas in the 
general population sample the association was independent of content. A similar 
pattern of results might be found if this association was investigated in a clinical 
sample. Nonetheless, the context-specific nature of such a pattern, if found, would 
still question the dependency of the delusional belief on the AE.
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However, it is possible that the critical anomalous experience that provided for 
the current belief may no longer be remembered (given that the study asked for 
lifetime experiences). Furthermore, the actual experience that people have as a result 
of this loss of familiarity is unknown; it may be that people feel that others have 
changed but cannot pinpoint the specific deficit (as seems the case from reports of the 
delusion itself), or it may be that, as the delusion provides an explanation for this lack 
of emotion, the belief in a different person rather than the emotional response 
becomes more salient in the reports. Indeed, one might argue (following the 
arguments of Young [2008]) that holding the belief would in fact prohibit participants 
from responding to the experience question, given that the individual perceives these 
people as impostors, they are no longer ‘familiar people’ as described in the 
experience question. On the other hand, Capgras syndrome does not usually affect all 
persons known by an individual, but rather those closest to him or her, and one would 
predict that this feeling should still be experienced for those acquaintances whose 
identity is not questioned.
In terms o f other beliefs and experiences, the relationships found included 
those that might be predicted, namely belief in communication with the dead 
correlated with the experience of seeing a ghost. This association is more readily 
explained, as seeing a ghost may well raise the possibility of communication with the 
dead. In addition, beliefs in reincarnation also correlated with seeing ghosts, and 
sensing when a friend or family member was in trouble correlated with ideas of 
reference (i.e., believing that certain things people say or do contain special messages 
for you). These may be explained as part of a belief system that is catholic with regard 
to justification, including beliefs beyond those capable of explanation by rational 
logic alone. In addition, the last pairing may also both be influenced by the over­
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evaluation of coincidences, linked to both delusions (Hemsley, 1993) and paranormal 
beliefs (Brugger & Mohr, 2008). Thus, several relationships suggest a general 
tendency towards reporting paranormal beliefs and experiences, perhaps reflecting a 
reasoning bias present in individuals with DLB, which makes paranormal experiences 
more prominent, or leads to the interpretation of experiences in a particular way.
6.7 RELATIONSHIP TO META-BELIEFS
As the beliefs and experiences on the CBQ were highly associated, the 
opportunity to investigate whether self-appraisals of participants’ own beliefs (i.e., 
meta-beliefs) could predict (i.e., were associated with) reported experiences was 
examined. To explore the contribution of meta-beliefs, participants were grouped by 
their ratings (e.g., those responding ‘Not at all’ formed a ‘not religious’ group and 
those responding ‘Quite’ or ‘Very’ comprised the ‘religious’ group). Mann-Whitney 
tests showed significant relationships between collective experience scores and self- 
ratings of superstitiousness (U(560,432)=87997.5, p=0.25E-ll) and propensity to 
believe in things others do not (U(482,491)=85176.0, p=0.58E-15). In both cases, 
where participants rated themselves as possessing the meta-belief, they were 
significantly more likely to have higher experience scores, i.e., to have endorsed more 
experiences and/or rated these as occurring more frequently.
Self-reports of superstitiousness were significantly associated with higher 
scores for experience. This link between superstition and predominantly paranormal 
experiences (previously covered in Chapter 5) is not unexpected, given strong 
associations between superstition and paranormal thinking (Lindeman & Aamio, 
2007). Similarly, the relationship between propensity to believe things others do not
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and paranormal experiences may be due to an awareness of attitudes towards 
paranormal beliefs.
6.8 PATIENTS
The six patients described in Chapter 5 (section 5.11) were all asked to 
complete the 8  questions relating to anomalous experiences. Given that beliefs and 
experiences tend to co-occur as described above, the aim here was to see whether 
those holding delusion-like beliefs on the CBQ were more likely to report a greater 
number or more frequently occurring anomalous experiences than the general 
population.
6.8.1 Results
Number o f experiences
The four male patients (AD, BN, CH and DV) (all aged between 30-44) 
endorsed a total of 8 , 7, 6  and 3 experiences respectively (out of a possible 8 ) 
compared to a mean of 1.62 (s.d.=1.70, range = 0-7) for the 133 age and gender 
matched respondents. As such, all but DV reported a number of anomalous 
experiences greater than 2  standard deviations above the mean for their gender and 
age group. Indeed, AD reported more AE than any participant in this group from the 
total poll sample.
Of the two female patients, EM, the younger female (aged 40), reported 6  
experiences, which for the matched group of 159 poll respondents was higher than the 
average of 2.30 (s.d.=2.04, range = 0-8) but not outside 2 standard deviations of the 
norm. The older female (aged 67), FR, also reported 6  experiences, which was more
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than 2 standard deviations above the mean (M=2.09, s.d.=1.69, range = 0-7) for the 
142 age and gender matched poll respondents. Therefore, it was clear that as a group, 
anomalous experiences were generally much more common for the patients than for 
their relative age-/sex-matched group controls.
Frequency o f experiences
As described in Chapter 5, while the question content was identical for patient 
and poll respondent groups, the scales were slightly different. Patients responded on a 
scale from ‘O’ (‘Never’) to ‘4’ (‘Many times’), rather than the 4-point Likert scale 
used by poll respondents. As such, the frequency ratings were transformed so as to 
make responses comparable, in a similar manner to that of beliefs described in 
Chapter 5: for patients, ratings of ‘1’ were weighted at 0.25, ‘2 ’ at 0.5 and ‘3’ at 0.75 
and ‘4’ at 1; for poll respondents, ratings of ‘seldom’ were weighted at 0.33, 
‘sometimes’ at 0 . 6 6  and ‘often’ at 1 .
Of the 83 male age matched poll respondents with complete data the mean 
frequency rating was 0.51 (s.d.=0.19, range = 0.33-1.00) out o f a maximum of 1. The 
four male patients by comparison had mean frequency ratings of 0.59, 0.43, 0.50 and 
0.83 (AD, BN, CH and DV respectively). As such, most were close to the mean, 
although DV’s score was higher than average (but within 2 s.d.). EM had a mean 
frequency rating of 0.75, which was higher than average compared to the 122 female 
age matched poll respondents with complete data (M=0.50, s.d.=0.16, range = 0.33- 
0.96), although it does not fall outside 2 standard deviations of the norm. FR had a 
mean frequency rating of 0.38, which was close to the mean (M=0.52, s.d.=0.16,
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range = 0.33-0.89) of the comparison age and gender matched group of 112 poll 
respondents with complete data.
In conclusion, the patients collectively report higher numbers of experiences: 
four of the six patients’ numbers of experiences were considerably above the means 
for their groups. The remaining two patients had high (although not as different from 
average) ratings of frequency. This links in with previous research indicating overlap 
between beliefs and experiences.
Relationship between AE and AB for patients
To further examine the relationship between AB and AE for the small patient 
group, the percentage difference was calculated between their anomalous belief score 
(again combining delusion-like and paranormal and religious) and their anomalous 
experience score (as with respondents from the general population sample, described 
in section 6 .6 ). That is, each person’s AE and AB scores were transformed into 
percentages of the total possible AE or AB score, following which the transformed 
AE score was subtracted from the transformed AB score.
The results, shown in Table 6.7, reveal that all but one patient (FR) had higher 
experience than belief scores, with two patients (BN and DV) having moderately 
different scores but a further two patients (CH and EM) falling into the extreme tails 
of the distribution (see Figure 6.7). As AD was the most ill when completing the 
CBQ, and FR had a long history of holding stable delusions, it is perhaps not 
surprising that these two had more balanced AE and AB scores. It is possible that this 
suggests a higher propensity to experience AE in the patient group, which may have 
contributed to the development and/or maintenance of their delusional beliefs.
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Another possibility is that this may be the result of interventions that preferentially 
target the beliefs held by individuals rather than their experiences.
Table 6.7. The percentage differences between AE and AB scores for the patient 
group
Patient Percentage difference (AB-AE)
AD -3.82
BN -17.13
CH -31.94
DV -20.14
EM -52.55
FR 12.62
6.9 SUMMARY
Most participants in the large sample of the general public endorsed 
anomalous experiences (75%), and 24% endorsed items relating to hallucination-like 
experiences, providing further support for a continuum account of psychotic 
symptoms. Moreover, a substantial proportion of this group reported their experiences 
occurring ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ (48% for all AE, 12% for HLE). Furthermore, these 
psychotic-like and paranormal items formed a reliable scale together and could not be 
distinguished in a factor analysis, indicating that the boundaries between these types 
of experiences are flexible, albeit one type being more associated with clinical 
symptoms than the other.
As expected, a strong relationship was found between AB and AE, and this 
held for the majority of participants, with 8 8 % of those falling into the extreme high 
and low AE and AB groups either endorsing high levels of AB and AE or endorsing 
neither AB nor AE. Despite the strength of the group relationship, several participants 
endorsed high AB in the absence of AE or vice versa. This confirms the findings of
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Bell, Halligan and Ellis (2006c), and suggests (using a cross sectional methodology) 
that AE are not a necessary condition for delusion formation.
Interestingly, those who rated themselves as superstitious or as having a high 
propensity to believe had significantly higher numbers of and/or more frequent 
anomalous experiences. This suggests that self-rated judgements of overall 
dispositions towards self-rated beliefs could provide some indication of participants’ 
propensity to report anomalous experiences.
This chapter has explored the relationship between beliefs and experiences in 
some detail, including the effect of holding certain content-specific beliefs or 
experiences. The following chapter will also explore the relationships between 
specific beliefs by looking directly as the often neglected issues of belief consistency 
and coherence.
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CHAPTER 7
BELIEF CONSISTENCY AND COHERENCE: EXPLORING THE 
WEB OF BELIEFS
7.1 B A C K G R O U N D
The last chapter explored the relationships between individual beliefs and 
experiences, and the findings confirmed a relationship between beliefs endorsed and 
experiences reported. Furthermore, MORI market research polls (1998, 2003) of 
paranormal experiences also assumed that respondents’ relevant experiences (e.g., 
seeing a ghost) provided for beliefs (e.g., in ghosts). Looking instead at relationships 
between beliefs, philosophers have proposed that beliefs are not encapsulated (i.e., do 
not exist in isolation from other beliefs) but rather, in the interests of ensuring 
consistency, naturally cohere together (Quine & Ullian, 1970). Indeed, several of the 
key defining characteristics of belief (conviction, influence on behaviour, etc.) 
endorsed by most participants (Chapter 3) require this and it would be difficult to 
knowingly hold two contradictory beliefs. That said, this depends on subjects having 
explicit awareness of their beliefs and insight to know that incoming beliefs could 
provide for potential inconstancy. In the clinical literature there are examples from 
cases of somatoparaphrenia (e.g., Halligan et al., 1993), where questions probing the 
experiential condition (in this case, a supernumerary phantom limb) revealed a form 
of uncomfortable awareness of contradictory claims. According to cognitive 
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), humans are strongly predisposed to seek 
consistency among their cognitions (including beliefs) and avoid inconsistency, 
particularly where the holding of such cognitions (beliefs) would compromise self­
esteem (Cooper & Duncan, 2006).
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The idea of coherence between beliefs impacts on the earlier discussion 
involving delusions in Chapter 2. The cognitive neuropsychiatric perspective suggests 
that unusual beliefs such as delusions are best explained by an understanding of the 
normal processes by which beliefs are formed and subsequently perturbed. Delusions 
may occur for several reasons, including misattribution, breakdown in an evaluative 
component regarding the plausibility of beliefs or a component responsible for 
updating beliefs (Langdon & Coltheart, 2000; Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998). 
However, the exact nature of the deficit (or more likely, multiple deficits) that might 
give rise to delusional beliefs is not known, nor is the framework or context in which 
beliefs develop. One factor that might help refine existing deficit models could be the 
inclusion of a criterion that assesses whether an individual’s beliefs exist within a web 
of similar beliefs - defined in terms of consistency (i.e., their reliability over time and 
conviction), coherence (non-contradictory between-belief relationships) and perceived 
truth. In the case of clinical patients, such coherence might be compromised to a 
greater extent or not at all. The clinically relevant delusion (e.g., Capgras) could for 
example “infect” existing beliefs, or indeed provide for new content-dependent 
delusions (e.g., paranoia), or have no such effects. Indeed, whilst it seems plausible 
that beliefs should cohere with others held by the same individual for self- 
consistency, much cognitive research on delusions has tended to focus on stand-alone 
monothematic delusions and does not explicitly screen for other delusions and/or 
other co-existing normal beliefs.
Although not the same as coherence, the notion that beliefs are comparatively 
stable is clearly important when arguing for coherence since if beliefs fluctuated 
significantly and/or often, then it would be difficult to maintain coherence. Indeed, the 
(intuitively plausible) assumption of a relatively stable set of core beliefs seems a
229
necessary condition for coherence. Furthermore, one could argue that the more 
coherent a belief is (i.e., the more closely associated it is to other beliefs), the more 
stable it should be, and vice versa. However, notions of stability and coherence have 
not received much attention within psychiatry, and many discussions of delusions 
often assume that such beliefs exist in relative isolation.
This chapter considers both the stability (or reliability) of beliefs and the inter­
relationship between beliefs (coherence). The first section covers the stability of 
different types of belief. Following this, studies of coherence will investigate (i) belief 
dissonance (i.e., holding of contradictory beliefs), and (ii) some preliminary evidence 
for coherence (i.e., whether holding one belief of a particular type significantly 
increases the likelihood of holding another belief of that type).
7.2 STABILITY
7.2.1 Background
The conviction with which a belief is held provides some indication of its 
importance to the belief holder. As such, it seems plausible that conviction would 
impact upon both belief consistency over time and consistency between beliefs. Kant 
(1781) regarded belief as the judgement of the truth of a statement using “objectively 
insufficient but subjectively sufficient” justification. He used this definition to 
distinguish belief from opinion, the evidence base of which is neither objectively nor 
subjectively sufficient, and knowledge, for which justification involves both objective 
and subjective evidence. Indeed, it is commonly accepted that it is the degree of 
conviction with which a belief is held that typically leads us to term our judgements
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differently; ‘belief, ‘knowledge’ or ‘opinion’ (e.g., Nilsson, 2006). Intuitively, it 
seems that those judgements one would describe as ‘knowledge’ might be more 
consistent than those termed ‘belief.
Given that the conviction attributed to a belief may vary, it follows that 
stability (i.e., being consistent over time and across situations) similarly holds to 
differing extents between beliefs. Nevertheless, stability is often considered relevant 
to the definition (e.g., by almost 80% of participants in the characteristics of belief 
study reported in Chapter 3). Indeed, to ‘believe’ is defined in the Merriam-Webster 
dictionary as:
1 a: having a firm religious faith 
b: accepting as true, genuine, or real 
2: having a firm conviction as to the goodness, efficacy, or ability o f something 
3: holding an opinion
With the exception of feature 3 (opinion), all imply an attribute of consistency (a firm 
conviction or faith, or accepting something as true).
Indeed, as with the definition above, beliefs presumably play a significant role 
in self-identity and personality. Yet even key beliefs can undergo significant changes 
throughout an individual’s life. Scobie (1973) found 20% of trainee Protestant 
ministers reported having suddenly converted to their religion, although the majority 
(50%) had undergone a slow process of identification (the remainder being brought up 
religious). The comparative likelihood of a gradual change seems to fit better with the 
idea of a “web of beliefs”; where all beliefs held by an individual must be consistent 
with each other, so if one changes, others may need to be altered to fit with this.
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Delusional beliefs in particular are known to be long-lasting, and often held 
with great tenacity, despite individuals being presented with evidence contradicting 
their belief. Delusions tend to form around certain themes (e.g., persecutory or 
grandiose ideas) perhaps indicating that these areas are more likely to be emotionally 
intense and difficult to change. However, delusions can be relinquished (e.g., 
Chapman, 2002), albeit often following pharmaceutical interventions.
In contrast, subclinical symptoms seem more transient. Whilst holding 
subclinical psychotic symptoms increases the risk of developing a psychotic disorder 
(Hanssen et al., 2005), many subclinical symptoms do not make the transition (e.g., 
are only held briefly while under a period of stress). Hanssen et al. (2005) found that 
8 % of their sample still reported subclinical symptoms 2  years after their initial 
endorsement of these, but in a large majority (84%) these experiences disappeared 
over the same period. In a shorter time period (18 months), Wiles et al. (2006) found 
that 31% of the subclinical symptoms reported at T1 persisted. On the other hand, of 
the 1965 individuals in their study who did not report any psychotic symptoms at T l, 
134 (7%) had developed these at T2.
In terms of delusional ideation or paranormal beliefs, estimates of stability 
focus on test-retest reliability measures for various instruments. These indicate that 
participants’ scores are highly correlated between sessions. Chapman, Chapman and 
Miller (1982) tested students on the Magical Ideation Scale (MIS: Eckblad & 
Chapman, 1983) at two sessions, approximately 6  weeks apart, reporting high test- 
retest correlations of r = 0.8 for male and r = 0.82 for female participants. Peters et al. 
(2004) report similar test-retest results for the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI: 
Peters, Joseph & Garety, 1999), finding a high reliability between non-clinical 
samples’ scores, even 6-12 months after initial assessment (r = 0.78).
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The high correlations for measures including more paranormal-type ideas 
suggest that delusion-like beliefs may have lower levels of consistency than other 
types of belief held by healthy individuals. This would be expected if (given non- 
clinical participants’ assumed good mental health) beliefs in religion, morals and 
other societal/cultural beliefs were given more credence (and had greater influence) 
than those relating to delusion-like themes. Therefore, rather than simply focusing on 
general associations, the following study aimed to investigate the stability of 3 
different types of belief; paranormal and religious, societal/cultural and delusion-like 
in detail.
It was predicted that beliefs would in general prove to be stable, given their 
implications for identity, behaviour and decision-making. Indeed, philosophical 
theories and previous research have generally assumed this to be true. However, the 
degree of stability may vary according on the type of belief discussed; in particular, 
delusion-like ideas in non-clinical participants may be less stable than other types of 
belief.
7.2.2 Method
7.2.2.1 Sample
In total, 76 participants (described in Chapter 4, section 4.3.1) completed an 
earlier version of the Cardiff Beliefs Questionnaire (CBQ) on two occasions (see 
Chapter 4: Table 4.3), with an interval of 3-6 weeks (M=31 days) between 
assessments. Participants’ age ranged from 18-48, with 90% within the 18-25 age 
band (M=21.4, s.d. = 4.91). The majority were female (n=60, 79%). Participants were 
all recruited using the volunteer panel in the School of Psychology at Cardiff
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University. These 76 were a subset of 119 who completed the CBQ at T1 (there were 
no age (t(59)=-0.667, p=0.507) or gender (%2(1)=0.035, p=0.852) differences between 
completers and non-completers of the second stage).
7.2.2.2 Measure
Participants completed version 2 of the CBQ (described in Chapter 4 [Table 
4.3]). In this version belief questions (10 SCB, 14 DLB and 8  P&RB) were responded 
to on a scale from ‘-2’ to ‘2’ (with the endpoints labelled ‘Do not believe’ and 
‘Strongly believe’, and the midpoint (‘0’) labelled ‘Don’t know’).
In addition to the standard CBQ questions, participants were asked four basic 
knowledge questions: ‘What is the capital of Australia?’, ‘Which chemical element 
has the symbol H?’, ‘When was the Great Fire of London?’ and ‘Who wrote The Lord 
o f the RingsT. Participants were asked to guess if they did not know the answers. 
They were also asked how confident they were about their answer, responding on a 
scale from 0 (‘Not at all sure’) to 2 (‘Certain’). This was to allow a comparison 
between the stability of beliefs and knowledge (which, having greater conviction in 
general, should be more stable).
7.2.3 Results
7.2.3.1 Stability o f belief
Out of the 2417 beliefs rated by participants at the first (Tl) and second (T2) 
sessions (76 participants x 32 belief questions; 15 beliefs had missing data at Tl or 
T2), 1742 (72.1%) produced the same rating on both occasions. Furthermore, 83.7% 
of beliefs did not meaningfully change (i.e., did not change from a positive rating to
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an answer of ‘Don’t know’ or to a negative rating, and vice versa). Negative (‘Do not 
believe’) answers were more likely to remain consistent between Tl and T2 than 
positive (‘Believe’) answers (see Table 7.1).
Of the beliefs reported with the same conviction at both Tl and T2, 6 8 .8 % 
were endorsed strongly (i.e., received a rating of either ‘2’ or ‘-2’). This trend was 
reflected in the percentages reported in Table 7.1, where those beliefs given stronger 
positive or negative ratings are more consistent between sessions.
Table 7.1. The change in distribution of all beliefs at Tl and T2
No of beliefs Percentage of stable beliefs
Rating Tl T2 T1&T2 Exact rating General2
Believe
2 375 323 261 69.6
81 S
1 447 415 270 60.4
Don ’t know 0 304 308 153 50.3
Don’t believe
-1 259 256 1 2 1 46.7
Q3 0
- 2 1032 1115 937 90.8
1 Formula: No o f  constant beliefs 
No o f  beliefs at Tl
2 General: beliefs are consistently answered ‘Believe’, ‘Don’t believe’ or ‘Don’t 
know’ between Tl and T2
7.2.3.2 Differences in subsets o f belief
For the delusion-like beliefs, the total percentage of beliefs holding stable was 
as high as societal/cultural beliefs (Table 7.2). However, it is clear from Table 7.2 that 
for DLB this relationship was due to very stable ‘Don’t believe’ responses rather than 
‘Believe’ responses, and vice versa for SCB. Paranormal and religious beliefs fall 
between these two extremes, although somewhat closer to the pattern for DLB, with 
more stable ‘Don’t believe’ than ‘Believe’ responses.
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Table 7.2. The percentage for each belief type remaining consistent
Response Delusion-like Paranormal/
Religious
Societal/
Cultural
Believe 55.8 77.1 1 0 0
Don’t know 22.5 63.1 64.2
Don’t believe 1 0 0 97.6 6 8 . 0
Total 8 8 . 2 83.2 88.7
7.2.3.3 Trends in belief change
The mean number of beliefs answered ‘Believe’ fell significantly between Tl 
(M=10.8, s.d.=2.60) and T2 (M=9.7, s.d.=2.95) (Wilcoxon signed-ranks, Z=-4.667, 
p<0.001), whilst the number answered ‘Don’t believe’ rose from a mean of 17.0 at Tl 
(s.d. = 3.64) to 18.1 at T2 (s.d. = 3.38) (Wilcoxon signed-ranks, Z=-3.974, p<0.001). 
Indeed, 45 participants endorsed fewer beliefs at T2 than at T l, 20 endorsed the same 
number of beliefs, and only 11 endorsed more at T2. Table 7.3 shows these data by 
belief type, indicating that (although individuals were picking up and dropping beliefs 
of each type), in general participants were responding ‘Don’t believe’ to more DLB 
and P&RB questions at T2, but ‘Don’t know’ to more SCB questions at T2. Average 
strength of belief did not change between Tl and T2 (with a mean strength of 1.45 out 
of 2 for ‘Believe’ answers at both sessions, and 1.8 out of 2 at both times for ‘Don’t 
believe’ answers).
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Table 7.3. Trend in belief change by belief type (calculated using the formula:
number of beliefs in category at Tl -  number of beliefs in category at T2)
Minimum Maximum Mean Std.
Deviation
DLB Believe - 2 3 0.41 1.05
Don’t know - 2 4 0.37 1 . 1 2
Don’t believe -4 2 -0.80 1.47
P&RB Believe - 1 4 0.25 0.79
Don’t know -3 4 0 . 1 1 1.29
Don’t believe -5 3 -0.37 1.36
SCB Believe - 2 4 0.46 1.16
Don’t know -3 3 -0.57 1.15
Don’t believe -3 2 0 . 1 1 0.89
7.2.3.4. Knowledge
Responses to the 4 factual questions were also analysed, by taking those responses 
that had been rated as ‘certain’ by participants, and comparing their stability over this 
period. As might be expected, these were very stable with 96.4% being rated as 
‘certain’ again at T2. This rises slightly to 97.6% if one only considers the same 
answer being given on both occasions (it is worth noting that the correctness of the 
answer was not considered, only the degree of certainty with which it was held).
7.2.3.5. Coherence and stability
To evaluate the effects of coherence on stability, a group of individuals with 
high numbers of reported DLB and another group with high numbers o f P&RB were 
identified, as DLB and P&RB formed reliable scales with other beliefs from their 
category. It was expected that if an individual endorsed high numbers of these beliefs, 
they would be more likely to still hold these beliefs at T2, as it would be harder to 
drop these beliefs if they were linked to similar beliefs.
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Table 7.4 shows the results for the high DLB group (n=13), defined as those 
with three or more DLB at any strength (mean for total sample: 1.34, s.d.=1.29). 
Compared to those in the overall sample (Table 7.2), DLB seem more stable for the 
high DLB group (92% overall compared to 8 8 %), while the stability for the other 
groups remain unchanged. Indeed, it is the stability of the positive DLB that changed 
in particular, increasing from 56% overall to 93% for this group.
Table 7.4. Percentage of belief type remaining consistent for the high DLB group
Response Delusion-like Paranorm al/
Religious
Societal/
Cultural
Believe 92.6 77.4 1 0 0
Don’t know 33.3 72.7 64.7
Don’t believe 1 0 0 97.8 6 8 . 8
Total 92.1 85.7 90.6
Table 7.5 shows the results for the high P&RB group (n=18), defined as those with 
four or more P&RB at any strength (mean for total sample: 2.05, s.d.=1.80). In a 
similar manner to the DLB, it seems that the stability of the P&RB increased for this 
group, raising the percentage of stable ‘believe’ P&RB responses from 77% to 99%.
Table 7.5. Percentage of belief type remaining consistent for the high P&RB group
Response Delusion-like Paranorm al/
Religious
Societal/
Cultural
Believe 59.3 98.7 1 0 0
Don’t know 30.0 50.0 60.9
Don’t believe 1 0 0 93.8 75.0
Total 8 8 . 2 89.1 89.9
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7.2.4 Discussion
7.2.4.1 Overall stability
The results suggest that in general beliefs are reasonably stable (when 
investigated over a month-long period). Over eighty percent of the beliefs endorsed at 
T1 did not change in terms of content over this period, and over 70% of all beliefs 
were reported with the same degree of conviction at both sessions. This fits with 
previous assumptions of belief as a relatively stable and consistent judgement on 
which to base behaviour. Moreover, as some beliefs addressed here may be ideas that 
have never occurred to participants before (e.g., some delusion-like beliefs) or ideas 
that do not usually come up in everyday life (e.g., conspiracies regarding the moon 
landings), higher levels might be predicted to be found if personally significant beliefs 
had been targeted.
7.2.4.2 Effect o f belief strength
The results also show that the stronger beliefs at T1 were more likely to be 
still held at T2. Indeed, nearly 75% of all of beliefs held to the same level of 
conviction at both sessions were beliefs that were rated strongly (‘-2’ or ‘2’). This 
makes intuitive sense as more personally significant beliefs are likely to be held with 
a greater conviction. In contrast, beliefs held with a weak conviction should require 
less evidence to induce a change, and thus be more susceptible to fluctuations.
7.2.4.3 Stability o f knowledge
As expected, responses to the knowledge questions were more stable in 
general than beliefs, with 96.4% being rated as ‘certain’ on both occasions, compared
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to 72.1% of beliefs being given the same rating (similarly, knowledge has a 
consistency of 97.6% compared to 83.7% if one allows general consistency between 
ratings). It might be expected that knowledge should be 100% consistent (in 
particular, given that this was the case for some belief types at certain ratings). 
However, knowledge here is defined in terms of a level of conviction self-reported by 
participants rather than an objective measure. Given that this result was based on only 
a small number of items (n=4), the answers to which were not universally known, this 
estimate is likely to rise further with items that are held with greater conviction.
7.2.4.4 Effect o f belief type
Interestingly there were definite differences in the stability of beliefs in terms 
of the 3 types of belief. Table 7.2 showed delusion-like and societal/cultural beliefs to 
have slightly higher overall stability than paranormal and religious beliefs. However, 
this was due to very high stability in most given answers (i.e., ‘Don’t believe’ for 
DLB and ‘Believe’ for SCB).
The lower correlation for positive answers to delusion-like belief questions fits 
with the idea that although very common (91% endorsing one or more at any strength 
in the study reported in Chapter 5), they were not held with the strength typical of a 
delusion. This supports the previous suggestion by Peters, Joseph & Garety (1999) 
that holding of a belief is not sufficient, but rather the way in which a belief is held 
(e.g., the effect that it has on the individual) is the key factor in establishing whether a 
belief should be classed as a delusion.
In fact, the majority of the changes in reported beliefs consisted of the 
dropping of positive beliefs reported at T1 by T2. A general decrease in the number of 
positive beliefs reported could be due to people challenging the beliefs after their
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attention was explicitly drawn to these at T l. However, this seems unlikely as a full 
explanation due to the scale of the change (58% of participants endorsing fewer 
beliefs at T2, compared to just 8 % endorsing more). Alternatively, due to attempts to 
neutralise the questions, participants may have initially felt comfortable when 
endorsing questions at T l, but retained an overall impression of the unusual nature of 
the questions. This impression could lead them to approach the second session with 
increased wariness. Indeed, the proportion of changed beliefs fits predictions from a 
social desirability bias, with less DLB being endorsed in general, and slightly less 
P&RB, whilst slightly more SCB are endorsed. Thus it is difficult to extract the levels 
of comparative stability, as this type of bias could lead to differential effects on the 
stabilities of belief types. However, as the levels of stability would be decreased if this 
bias is exerting an effect, this should only make our overall (reasonably high) estimate 
more conservative.
7.2.4.5 Coherence and stability
As predicted, when individuals endorsed high numbers of P&RB or DLB 
beliefs, a greater number of these kinds of belief continued to be reported at T2, than 
when the individuals had only endorsed a small number of these beliefs at Tl. This 
provides support for the idea that coherence between beliefs is an important factor in 
belief maintenance.
A further consideration is that inconsistency decreases the stability of a belief. 
Previous research has shown that ambivalence decreases the stability of attitudes 
(Bargh, Chaiken, Govender & Pratto, 1992). However, as this was carried out using 
an earlier version of the CBQ (before the explicit development of the belief pairs to
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assess dissonance), there were not sufficient examples of inconsistent beliefs to 
evaluate this in the present study.
One finding of this study was that those beliefs that showed greater coherence 
were more stable, presumably as it would require greater change to the web of belief 
if one of these were to be dropped. Indeed, examples of those beliefs that should have 
very strong coherence are those tied up in the notion of self. Self-concept (the nature 
and organisation of beliefs about one's self) is generally considered relatively stable 
and multi-dimensional (e.g., including physical, emotional, and social aspects). The 
following section reports further analysis of belief coherence, carried out using the 
large CBQ sample (n=1000).
7.3 BELIEF COHERENCE
7.3.1 Background
Chapter 1 introduced Quine & Ullian’s idea of a web of beliefs (1970). This 
suggested that individuals should not be able to maintain two contradictory beliefs if 
aware of holding both. These ideas were further developed by Thagard (2000), who 
considered a belief to be justified “not because it is indubitable or is derived from 
some other indubitable beliefs, but because it coheres with other beliefs that jointly 
support each other” (p. 5). He accounts for coherence in terms of constraint 
satisfaction, extending discussion of coherence to a much wider range of cognitions, 
including perception and decision-making (Thagard, 2000). In this manner, each 
element (i.e., a representation, such as a belief) can either cohere (have a positive 
constraint) or not cohere (have a negative constraint) with each of the others. 
Elements are either accepted or rejected, with positive constraints between two
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elements being satisfied if both are accepted or rejected and negative constraints 
satisfied if one is accepted and the other rejected. Coherence is maximised by 
accepting or rejecting elements so as to satisfy the most constraints (both positive and 
negative). In this manner, Thagard considers there to be some incoherence between 
beliefs (unlike in the philosophical argument of Quine and Ullian). However, this 
work remains largely theoretical.
Another influential approach worth mentioning is that of Festinger (1957), 
who proposed that people are motivated to avoid cognitive dissonance (i.e., holding 
contradictory beliefs, thoughts, attitudes, etc.). As such, belief content should be 
consistent within an individual to avoid negative psychological tension. As with the 
ideas of Quine and Ullian (1970), according to this theory the individual must be 
aware of inconsistencies for these to become problematic in terms of psychological 
discomfort.
Despite general agreement that healthy individuals’ beliefs are likely to show 
content coherence with their other beliefs and the absence of explicit contradictory 
beliefs (e.g., Davidson, 1984; Festinger, 1957; Quine & Ullian, 1970), there has been 
little or no empirical investigation, in particular with regard to delusional or delusion­
like beliefs. Indeed, “the nature of coherence is usually left vague, with no method 
provided for determining whether a belief should be accepted or rejected on the basis 
of its coherence or incoherence with other beliefs” (Thagard, 2000, p. 41).
Notwithstanding few published accounts about possible inter-belief 
interactions, it seems sensible to consider the range of potential options and 
consequences for belief inter-relationships. Figures 7.1-7.3 highlight different options 
for describing between-belief relationships. In Figure 7.1 beliefs were configured as 
distinct and essentially stand-alone as personalised knowledge units (i.e., they have
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little or no apparent between-belief coherence). Such an arrangement could well 
provide for regular forms of incoherence between an individual’s beliefs, which in 
turn might present an individual as inconsistent, uncomfortable, variable and liable to 
persuasion (due to the resulting cognitive dissonance: Festinger, 1957).
O o o 
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Figure 7.1: All beliefs are islands.
There are no links- each belief is formed without regard to existing beliefs. Ideas 
regarding belief coherence may instead result from the similarities o f one’s 
experiences leading to similar types o f beliefs.
Figure 7.2: Few beliefs are islands (i.e., most but not all show coherence)
Most beliefs are characterised by links to other beliefs and the basis for such links are 
largely derived by principles o f precedence, chronicity, relative salience and 
parsimonious attempts at coherence for consistency and recall. Salient beliefs (e.g., 
core beliefs), perhaps gaining influence through repetitive activation and/or 
experience, are more likely to influence the formation and consideration o f new 
beliefs. However, the formation o f isolated beliefs is possible.
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Figure 7.3: Web of beliefs (no beliefs are islands)
Follows the principles outlined in Figure 7.2, but each belief has a number o f indirect 
/direct links with other beliefs to maximise coherence and minimise inconsistency.
Previous attempts to investigate belief inter-relationships
Mathematical
One research avenue that has explored coherence is by developing 
mathematical models of predicted belief formation. Fifty years ago McGuire (1960) 
proposed a “probabilogical” model of logical consistency between beliefs, using 
belief syllogisms. A similar model was later developed by Wyer (1970). This 
approach defined belief in terms of subjective probability judgements, and used 
mathematics to examine how beliefs ought to (rather than do) relate to each other.
Wyer (1970) provides one example of a person believing that a particular 
candidate would be good as their country’s leader (conclusion: C). He suggests this 
belief/ judgement is likely to follow from other beliefs held by the subject related to 
the general evaluation of the candidate’s standing (e.g., holding belief A, that ‘The 
candidate supports a left-wing agenda’, and the premise (C/A) that ‘If a candidate 
supports a left-wing agenda, such a candidate will be good as the country’s leader’).
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Wyer described the relationship between these as:
p ( C )  = p ( A )  p ( C \ A )  + / ? ( A ' ) p ( C | A ' )
Indeed, there is some evidence showing that the predicted and observed values using 
such models produce a moderately high degree of correspondence (Wyer & Goldberg, 
1970). Importantly, it is clear from the equation above, that if the outcome belief (C) 
was to change (and thus the probability of reaching this conclusion: the left side of the 
equation), one could assume some changes in the related beliefs (which provide the 
input for the right side of the equation) and vice versa. While some promising results 
exist in this area, much of the research is not capable of addressing the extent or 
degree to which belief coherence occurs. Furthermore, the focus on abstract scenarios 
may only give a simplified account, given the complexity and number of factors that 
influence beliefs (see models of delusional beliefs [Chapter 2]: e.g., experiences, 
emotions, etc.).
Social psychological
Another form of coherence has been suggested from attitudinal studies 
operating within social psychology by evaluating inconsistent (or ‘ambivalent’) 
beliefs. Eagly and Chaiken (1993, p. 123) defined such beliefs as when an individual 
claims to hold “beliefs that express positive evaluation and other beliefs that express 
negative evaluation”. Evidence of incoherent evaluative beliefs comes from studies by 
Katz and Hass (e.g., 1988), who looked at white participants’ views of black members 
of the population. Katz and Hass found that whilst participants tended to endorse 
some positive statements towards this group (e.g., ‘this country would be better off if 
it were more willing to assimilate the good things in black culture’), they also often 
endorsed some negative beliefs (e.g., ‘many black teenagers don’t respect themselves
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or anyone else’). Katz and Hass found that the positive statements tended to be 
associated with the overarching value of communalism, whereas the negative 
statements tended to be associated with individualism. As such, these beliefs may not 
appear to be incoherent; indeed, the contents of the beliefs may not seem directly 
contradictory. Furthermore, there are clearly social desirability concerns with any 
study that attempts to investigate these kinds of attitudes. A test of coherence using 
less loaded stimuli would provide stronger evidence for the existence of incoherent 
beliefs.
Attempting to get a picture o f belief coherence
One of the important findings from Chapter 4 was that categories of belief 
used on the CBQ showed sufficient commonalities to form scales. Furthermore, 
correlational analyses described in Chapter 5 indicated that the hypothesised-to-be- 
similar belief types (DLB and P&RB) were indeed significantly correlated, whereas 
those that did not seem to have any overlap (SCB with DLB or P&RB) were 
unrelated. This provides some preliminary support for coherence between
participants’ beliefs belonging to the same category. To further explore this area the 
following studies were carried out:
(i) The five CBQ belief pairings (described in Chapter 4) were examined in
terms of the percentages that showed consistent/inconsistent 
associations;
(ii) The contribution of demographic variables in predicting any
inconsistency was established;
(iii) Finally, the levels of co-endorsement between each belief pair included 
in the total sample of CBQ beliefs (n=46) was investigated
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7.3.2 Method
The current study examined the extent of co-endorsements for the 46 CBQ 
belief items (17 delusion-like beliefs, 10 paranormal and religious beliefs and 19 
societal/cultural beliefs). In addition, five pairs of related beliefs were explicitly 
included on the CBQ to directly explore coherence (i.e., positive endorsement of one 
belief in a pair, should result in a similar response to the other). These pairs are 
described in Table 7.6.
Table 7.6. The five belief pairs designed to investigate coherence
Belief
pair
A positive response of ‘believe’ to 
the item below ...
Should predict a similar 
response to the corresponding 
item below
1 Reincarnation (i.e. that when you die 
your soul is reborn in another body)
The soul or spirit survives death
2 Some people communicate with the 
dead
The soul or spirit survives death
3 Earth has been visited by aliens from 
other solar systems
Extra-terrestrial life
4 Some people are possessed by evil 
spirits
Demons or evil spirits
5 The theory of evolution Humans share a common ancestor 
with apes
Humans share a common ancestor 
with apes
The theory of evolution
For belief pairs 1-4 outlined above, there is a clear ‘If...’, ‘then...’ 
relationship predicted between participants’ responses (e.g., if an individual reports a 
belief in possession by evil spirits, then (s)he would be expected to also report a 
belief in evil spirits). For the fifth pair this relationship is true whichever belief is
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placed first. In every case the ‘Then...’ belief (e.g., ‘demons or evil spirits’) was 
asked prior to the ‘If ...’ belief, so the simpler version of the beliefs was the first 
encountered by participants (in general, the questionnaire attempted to keep more 
unusual beliefs towards the end, so as not to discourage participants from endorsing 
beliefs due to any perceived stigma). (The ‘common ancestor’ version of belief pair 5 
was asked first).
7.3.3 Participants
Participants comprised the general population sample of 1000 British adults 
described in detail earlier in Chapter 5. For further details on the sampling 
methodology and participant characteristics see Chapter 5 (section 5.2).
7.3.4 Results
Overall, 64.9% of the sample produced consistent belief pairings. However, 
35.1% of the sample produced inconsistent belief pairs: 25.8% of these holding one 
inconsistent belief pair, 7.7% holding two, 1.4% three and 0.2% four. Furthermore, 
13.1% held strongly inconsistent belief pairs: 1 1 .1 % held one inconsistent belief pair, 
1.9% held two, and 0.1% three. Table 7.7 shows the results for the individual belief 
pairings, where the pairing ‘possession by evil spirits’ and ‘demons or evil spirits’ 
appeared to be the most inconsistent (42% of those endorsing possession not 
endorsing evil spirits, with 38% still doing so when endorsing possession strongly).
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Table 7.7. The percentage of inconsistent belief pairs reported
If. . . Then ... Number 
reporting 
IB at any 
strength
Percentage of 
IB reporters 
not reporting 
TB
Number 
reporting 
IB strongly
Percentage of 
strong IB 
reporters not 
reporting TB
Possession Evil 382 41.6% 94 38.3%
spirits (n=159) (n=36)
Communicate Soul/spirit 403 2 2 .6 % 158 21.5%
with dead (n=91) (n=34)
Aliens visited ET life 347 12.4% 60 8.3%
Earth (n=43) (n=5)
Reincarnation Soul/spirit 403 9.4% 96 4.2%
(n=38) (n=4)
Common Evolution 833 8 % 462 5.6%
ancestor (n=67) (n=26)
Evolution Common 830 7.7% 508 4.3%
ancestor (n=64) (n=2 2 )
IB: ‘If...’ belief; TB: ‘Then...’ belief
The consistency between one belief-experience pair was also examined. If 
participants reported some experience of seeing ghosts, then they were expected to 
endorse the belief: ‘To what extent do you believe that the soul or spirit survives 
death?’ Of the 215 participants who reported any experience of seeing ghosts, 15.8% 
(n=34) reported not believing in a soul or spirit that survives death, not dissimilar to 
the levels reported in Table 7.7.
7.3.4.1 Demographics
Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U tests were used to explore the 
contribution of demographic variables (Age; Gender; Socioeconomic group; 
Education; Ethnicity; Religion) to the findings described above for the 5 pairs of 
beliefs. Significant associations (at p<0.0001) with the number of inconsistent beliefs 
were found with older age (x2(3)=28.59) and lower education (x2(2)=20.14).
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Age
Older participants (aged 60+) endorsed significantly more inconsistent belief pairs 
than those who were younger (aged 18-29 (U(194,269)=20855.5) or aged 30-44 
(U(292,269)=31723.0)), and there was also a trend towards the 60+ age group having 
more inconsistent belief pairs than those aged 45-59 (U(245,269)=27779.0, 
p=0.0004). No other age group comparisons were significant.
Education
Participants whose highest educational qualification was secondary level showed 
more inconsistent belief endorsements than those with university qualifications 
(U(551,274)=64551.0). However, the comparison between those with a secondary 
level qualification and those with a higher qualification failed to reach significance; 
U(551,68)=15674.0, p=0.010).
7.3.5 Discussion
Contrary to prior expectations, a substantial proportion of individuals reported 
inconsistent belief pairings (although this fell to only 13% when looking at reports of 
strong beliefs). This suggests that option three (Figure 7.3), where all beliefs cohere 
with each other is unlikely, and that individuals can hold inconsistent beliefs. 
Interestingly, the paranormal belief pairs tended to be more inconsistent than the 
societal/cultural pair (evolution/sharing a common ancestor with apes). This may be 
due to these pairs being less likely to be discussed, and therefore people are less likely 
to become aware of or address this discrepancy. Indeed, belief coherence should be 
stronger for those belief pairs that are more likely to be core or salient beliefs, and
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need only hold for those belief pairs that the holder is aware of (which are likely to be 
those that are frequently considered). However, as both of the beliefs in a pair were 
answered within a short period of time in this study, it seems the requirement that the 
holder should be conscious of both beliefs would be fulfilled here (although, given the 
gap between the questions being asked, it is possible that they are not simultaneously 
aware of holding both).
Some of the inconsistent beliefs may of course arise due to participants’ 
interpretation of the question asked, e.g., believing in a certain kind of spirit capable 
of possession, but thinking of this as distinct from demons, so being wary of 
endorsing the demons/evil spirits question. Indeed, it is not possible to determine how 
participants were interpreting each question, and this may account for some of the 
apparent discrepancies found in the present study. Furthermore, it could be suggested 
that these inconsistencies were due to participants not responding accurately, but this 
charge could be levelled at any study that requires participants to indicate cognitions, 
and there is no evidence to suggest this was a particular concern in this study.
Given the levels of inconsistent beliefs, it seems likely that not all of these can 
be accounted for by inaccurate responding, suggesting that people do hold some 
inconsistent beliefs. Indeed, the demographic results support this in that they reflect a 
pattern that seems intuitively credible. It seems plausible that people may have 
varying degrees of tolerance for inconsistent beliefs, in particular given that this is 
expected to depend on awareness of one’s beliefs. Those with higher levels of 
education may be more inclined to question their beliefs, while the difficulties with 
memory or other cognitive decline that can occur particularly amongst elderly people 
(e.g., Katzman & Terry, 1992) may have an impact on the belief system.
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7.4 THE NATURE OF A BELIEF WEB
Despite discovering that some participants endorse beliefs that appear to have
inconsistencies with each other, the first study still showed most beliefs to be
reasonably consistent. Indeed, previous research assumed (and indeed it makes
intuitive sense) that beliefs show some degree of coherence with each other. Another
way to examine the degree of coherence was to examine the levels of co-endorsement
between belief pairs.
7.4.1 Individual webs of belief
Although the number of strong/moderate beliefs endorsed by individuals
(mean=17.6) varied considerably (see Figure 7.4) there was no shortage of examples
of extensive belief co-endorsements. Males (M=17.2) generally endorsed less than
females (M=18.0), and younger people more than older (18-29 (M=18.3); 30-44
(M=18.0); 45-59 (M=18.0); 60+ (M=16.3).
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Figure 7.4. The number of strong /moderate beliefs reported by the large stratified
sample
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By taking a selection of individuals from different points on this distribution, 
it is possible to compare the kinds of belief co-endorsements occurring in given 
individuals. In Figure 7.5 the different types of beliefs endorsed by 4 age-matched 
individuals demonstrate extreme cases from the range of belief co-endorsements ( 1  
vs. 39 beliefs), and also show two participants closer to the mean in terms of overall 
number of endorsements. Three of these response maps come from non-clinical 
participants. However, the top left example (showing 24 beliefs) is taken from 
answers provided by one of the male patients (AD) (see Chapter 5 for further 
description). Collectively these individuals’ co-endorsements of beliefs suggest that 
while many beliefs may co-occur in content groups, others appear to be the only 
representative of a specific content group that the person acknowledges (albeit limited 
to those addressed on the CBQ). Furthermore, it seems that patients with delusions 
endorse a similar range of beliefs and, in this case, do not stand apart from healthy 
participants in terms of the patterns of belief they show. While it is interesting to note 
the considerable variety of belief endorsements made by healthy individuals, it is also 
useful to look at beliefs from a group level.
7.4.2 Group webs of belief
To determine which levels of co-endorsement might occur more (or less) often 
than would be expected by chance, the number of times each belief pair within the set 
of CBQ belief questions was co-endorsed was analysed using chi-square tests (with 
Yates’s and Bonferroni’s corrections). The phi statistic was also used as a measure of 
degree of association.
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M, 30-44 
24 beliefs
M, 30-44 
1 belief F, 30-44  39 beliefs
Figure 7.5. Individual webs o f belief (displaying strong/moderate beliefs). DLB are 
shown in blue, P&RB in purple and SCB in green.
7.4.2,1 Results
The first three figures (Figures 7.6-7.8) presented below show all observed links 
between beliefs for each o f  the three groups (delusion-like, paranormal and religious 
and societal/cultural). The thickness o f the line joining any two beliefs confirms the 
strength o f the association, with thicker lines representing stronger association.
Figures 7.9-7.11 show only the significant belief pair associations (all phi>0.1, 
pO.OOOl) for the three belief categories. The findings clearly show that delusion-like 
and paranormal and religious beliefs have much higher co-endorsements than would 
be expected by chance alone, and in particular, by comparison to societal/cultural 
beliefs. Figure 7.12 shows the strongest o f these associations (phi>0.2) for all groups.
F, 30-44 
12 beliefs
DLB 
P&RB 
H  SCB
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Erotomania
Body
Dysmorphia Controlled
Actions
RP: Place
Cotard
Capgras
Parasitosis Subjective
Doubles
PersecutionMirrored-Self
Misidentification
RP: Person
Figure 7.6. The delusion-like belief co­
endorsement pairings
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God(s)
Soul / spirit
Werewolves
Astrology
Demons / 
evil spirits
;elligent
iesign
Possession 
by evil spirits
Communication 
with the dead
Figure 7.7. The paranormal and religious belief co-endorsement pairings
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Erotomania
Body
dysmorphia
Cotard
Capgras
Subjective
doubles
Mirrored-self
misidentification
Persecution
Figure 7.9. The delusion-like belief pairs with associations of phi (cp) >0.1. (RP: Reduplicative paramnesia)
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Magic/
witchcraft
Demons / evil 
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Werewolves
Reincarnation
God(s)
Possession by 
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Figure 7.10. The paranormal and religious belief pairs with associations of phi (cp) > 0.1
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Sam e sex  
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Extraterrestrial
life
Children 
(under 6) hold 
beliefs
Earth has 
been visited  
by aliens
Humans share 
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with apes
Figure 7.11. The societal/cultural belief pairs with associations o f phi ((p) > 0.1
In general, endorsement o f beliefs from DLB or P&RB categories (see Figures 
7.9 and 7.10) provides for a small/moderate increase in the chances of an individual 
endorsing another belief from that category. However, this was less true for SCB (see 
Figure 7.11), where often there were no relationships between endorsements within 
this heterogeneous belief type, and only one belief pair showed an association o f phi 
(<p) > 0.2 or more (and this was one o f the engineered belief dissonance pairs: see 
Figure 7.11). However, Figure 7.12 shows that strong associations also crossed 
between belief categories, especially for paranormal and religious and delusion-like 
beliefs. In particular, beliefs in reincarnation, aliens visiting Earth, reduplicative 
paramnesia o f both person and place, and ideas o f reference were strongly associated 
with other beliefs including those from other categories.
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Dotted lines indicate the strongest association between 
members o f separated belief groups. These were: 
Somatoparaphrenia - Mirrored-self misidentification, 
phi=0.18; Controlled thoughts - Persecution, phi=0.19
Figure 7.12. The belief pairs with associations o f phi (q>) > 0.2
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7.4.3 Discussion
The web of belief diagrams are crude first attempts to capture the extent of 
coherence (or incoherence) between beliefs. The findings support the previous results 
(reported in Chapter 5), indicating that the belief groups with delusion-like, 
paranormal and religious content comprised items that were linked, whereas SCB 
items predictably showed less association, both with other SCB items and with the 
other belief types. Therefore, while belief co-endorsement is not strong as might be 
expected, there is evidence to suggest that it is more than a random occurrence of 
individual beliefs. For example, endorsing one paranormal or religious belief made it 
more likely that the same person would endorse another from the group. As such, this 
ties in with previous ideas promoting belief coherence, such as those relating to both 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and the idea of a web of belief (Quine & 
Ullian, 1970).
Furthermore, this approach allows one to identify the belief pairs with the 
strongest associations (with phi>0.3: reduplicative paramnesia of person and of place; 
possessions by evil spirits with demons/evil spirits; possessions by evil spirits with 
magic; extraterrestrial life and aliens having visited Earth), revealing links between 
those beliefs that would be expected to co-occur (including 2 of the 5 dissonance pairs 
from the first study -  the other 3 were also significantly associated, with phi>0.1).
It is important to note, however, that co-occurrence of belief endorsement 
could be due to other factors in belief development over and above coherence. The 
factors outlined in Chapter 2 contributing to belief formation illustrate that people are 
likely to have biases (including the influence of other beliefs or meta-beliefs) 
affecting the way they perceive and evaluate information (e.g., reasoning biases) that 
are likely to impact on the types of beliefs they are likely to hold. For example, the
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presence of anomalous experiences (e.g., seeing things), could lead to a number of 
similar beliefs (e.g., in ghosts, spirits, magic, etc.).
7.5 SUMMARY
Contrary to previous expectations, a substantial proportion of individuals 
reported a larger than expected number of inconsistent belief pairs. However, the web 
of belief analysis for the larger set of beliefs suggested evidence of coherence between 
(some) beliefs, in that DLB and P&RB items tended to co-occur with others in their 
category. This suggests that there is more than a random occurrence of beliefs, as 
endorsing one paranormal or religious belief generally makes it more likely that the 
same person will endorse another from the group. This is further supported by the 
stability analysis, which indicated that the more co-endorsements from DLB or P&RB 
categories, the more likely these beliefs were to be reported again at T2. Thus, 
although in general there appears to be coherence between beliefs and particularly 
within a designated category, this does not seem to always be the case.
Results also indicated that there is variety in the stability of different types of 
belief. In particular, delusion-like beliefs seem to be held with less tenacity than other 
types of belief. This may be part of the reason why beliefs with this type of content, 
which can have a significant impact on the lives of some individuals (in the form of 
delusions), can also be held by others in non-clinical populations without any serious 
consequences.
In the following final chapter (Chapter 8 ) these and previous findings from 
earlier chapters will be summarised and integrated in a review of the overall findings 
and possible areas for further research will be suggested.
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CHAPTER 8: 
CONCLUSIONS
In this final chapter, key findings from the thesis are integrated and implications for 
future research explored. This is also an opportunity to consider some of the 
limitations of the different research studies described.
8.1 Defining issues: belief and delusion
The starting point for most of the research studies described in this thesis 
concerned attempts to come up with an operational definition of the constructs in 
question; namely belief and delusion. As with other philosophical/psychological 
constructs it was clearly problematic to agree overarching definitions for these 
multidimensional constructs, and indeed little progress had been made in identifying 
or agreeing the key characteristics considered most pertinent to describing ‘belief. 
Defining delusion, while potentially equally difficult given the wide-ranging content 
and characteristics attributed to the term, had a more pragmatic solution in the shape 
of the established psychiatric glossaries. Here it was clear that whatever else delusions 
were, they were considered a form of belief (APA, 2000). Indeed, as can be seen from 
the thesis plan (presented at the start of Chapter 1 and reproduced overleaf), this 
definition provided one of the main pathways from which subsequent studies were 
developed to investigate the nature of a belief and delusion.
The other major account of delusions that was particularly influential was the 
continuum account, where beliefs (including delusions) are considered to comprise a 
continuum where functional characteristics (rather than content) are more relevant
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Delusions form a continuum with 
other beliefs
What features are important in 
identifying a belief?
I
1. Key characteristics o f belief 
as judged by general public
J
What differentiates ‘belief from 
other similar terms?
□2. Use of assumed-to-be interchangeable terms (believe/think/feel)
To what extent do these properties 
hold for ordinary beliefs?
Figure 1.1 [Reproduced]. Main research questions
I THE NATURE OF DELUSION AND  DELUSIO N -IJK E BELIEF
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with a similar content to 
delusions present in the 
general population ?
T
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and ‘ordinary’ beliefs
6. Relationships between anomalous 
beliefs and anomalous experiences
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(e.g., delusion-like)
I
8. Coherence of different types of belief
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when distinguishing persons without psychotic disorders. Given the explicit 
identification of delusion as a form of belief, it follows that investigations of non- 
delusional beliefs can offer insights into the nature of delusion. While this approach 
has several advantages over clinical studies (e.g., by not necessitating considerations 
of the impact of medication), little investigation to date had focused on the 
characteristics of the ‘ordinary’ beliefs to which delusions were being compared.
Consequently the first empirical study of the thesis (reported in Chapter 3) 
addressed the key issue of the nature of belief. This study of the general public 
provided evidence of a reasonably consistent endorsement of several key properties of 
‘belief including this being a stable personal conviction, with an explanatory 
purpose, and the capacity to influence one’s behaviour. Overall, the findings 
confirmed that while there is general consistency and ease of use for participants 
when employing the term, there are also individual differences in the number or types 
of features endorsed, thus making it worthwhile to establish or perhaps remind 
potential participants of the key characteristics when measuring content-specific 
beliefs. Although the brief scale introduced here is not intended as a gold standard, it 
serves to illustrate the types of variation, and degree of similarity in terms of the 
characteristics of belief that are endorsed in the general population. Furthermore, this 
study provides a platform for other studies by identifying key characteristics of 
healthy beliefs that would be valuable to explore in greater detail. This issue will be 
returned to later in this chapter when discussing comparisons between delusion-like 
and other beliefs.
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8.2 Methodology
One additional benefit from the first study was highlighting the potential 
differences resulting from using different terms when assessing delusional or 
delusion-like items. Many of the existing measures tended to employ a mixture of 
terms interchangeably, although the degree to which participants consider these terms 
synonymous had not been established. The follow-up study reported in the thesis (see 
Chapter 3) was designed to address this, by comparing how participants use and view 
each of three commonly employed terms (‘believe’, ‘think’ and ‘feel’). The results 
were somewhat mixed, however, with most participants considering the term ‘believe’ 
to be a significantly stronger personal endorsement than either ‘think’ or ‘feel’ but 
often using these terms equivalently (when assessed using a yes/no measure). Overall, 
the results suggest caution when interpreting responses to questions that use different 
probe terms in clinical and health questionnaires of beliefs, as there appeared to be 
some differences (albeit a minority) in participants’ usage of these. There are also 
some preliminary suggestions that these may be context-dependent, although further 
investigation will be necessary to establish the degree to which this occurs for 
different types of item.
These considerations played a role in the next research aim, namely the 
development of the Cardiff Beliefs Questionnaire (reported in Chapter 4), which 
demonstrated good psychometric properties in general. A key feature of the CBQ was 
the inclusion of a range of non-clinical beliefs, which, as well as providing a relative 
baseline from which to compare the prevalence of delusion-like beliefs, reduced the 
psychiatric focus of the measure (and presumably stigma associated with endorsing 
such items). One area where further study would be beneficial, however, would be 
quantifying the extent to which stigma influences participants’ responses on these
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types of questionnaires, and whether this does differ between groups (as has been 
suggested in other areas: Ray & Lovejoy, 2003; Thomsen et al., 2005), which may 
play some role in the various demographics reported to be associated with delusions 
and DLB (see van Os et al., 2009).
8.3 Prevalence of anomalous beliefs and experiences
By developing a new measure of delusion-like beliefs, designed to reduce 
stigma, employ a single consistent term (‘believe’), and embed questions addressing 
DLB within a wider range of beliefs, it was predicted that reported levels of DLB 
would increase over previous estimates. Indeed, the results suggest that it is not 
unusual for members of a non-clinical sample to hold DLBs. Chapter 5 showed that 
38% of a large British sample reported holding one or more DLB strongly and 
approximately 90% reported one or more at any strength. Moreover, by including a 
range of bizarre DLB, it is clear that these kinds of beliefs are also often endorsed in 
the general population (26% endorsing one or more of these items strongly). This is 
especially significant, given that the DSM has fewer requirements for diagnosis of 
schizophrenia if a bizarre delusion is present.
Overall, these findings support the growing consensus that endorsing or 
holding certain content-specific beliefs is by no means sufficient to characterise a 
delusion (Bell, Halligan & Ellis, 2006b; Johns & van Os, 2001; Peters et al., 2004; 
van Os et al., 2009). Furthermore, the higher prevalence found in the studies questions 
assumptions regarding the unusualness of DLBs in the general population. These 
findings provide further support for the continuum hypothesis (alongside those of 
Chapter 6, which indicated that almost a quarter of participants in the same large 
sample of the general public endorsed items relating to hallucination-like
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experiences). As these psychotic-like phenomena are commonly found in the general 
population, the implication is that there is nothing inherently unusual about content- 
specific delusions (or hallucinations). As such, the results suggest that it may be 
possible, and perhaps more interesting, to elaborate on what causes delusions to be 
distressing or preoccupying for some individuals but not for others (i.e., compare 
groups of people with strongly held DLB (but without distress or preoccupation) to 
those with distressing and preoccupying delusions of a similar content).
In addition, the CBQ has the potential to be employed as a screening 
instrument for psychosis (although this is likely to need further development). 
Although other measures of schizotypy or psychotic symptoms (e.g., O-LIFE, PSQ) 
have been developed for this purpose, given the CBQ’s unique focus on reducing 
stigma, and inclusion of a range of other beliefs, it may be able to provide a better 
indication of individual’s beliefs and experiences. As such, it may be beneficial to 
investigate the beliefs reported on the CBQ using a longitudinal design, to see if there 
is an increased risk of developing psychotic disorders for high DLB or AE groups. 
Moreover, given that holding very low numbers of SCB was as unusual as holding 
high numbers of DLB, it would be interesting to see how individuals falling into this 
category progress over time. Indeed, it might be interesting to further investigate a 
low SCB group, to establish whether these individuals have particular cognitive biases 
or other factors that contribute to their lack of belief.
Although the high levels described in the current study suggest that DLB are 
reported in the general population, there are clearly some limitations inherent in 
conducting self-report studies into phenomena of this nature. The main difficulties are 
summarised in turn below.
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Potential fo r  misinterpretation
Although the CBQ is a reliable and useful instrument, it shares some limitations with 
all research studies using self-report assessments. One such limitation is that 
researchers may not fully determine how individuals understand/interpret the 
questions being asked. This issue can be mitigated to some extent by extensive 
piloting and taking account o f participant feedback. Moreover, by requiring that all 
participants completed the characteristics of belief section prior to answering the CBQ 
questions proper, it is reasonable to assume that participants had a better 
understanding o f what constituted a belief before commencing the CBQ. Although 
the final version of the CBQ had gone through 3 iterative developments and included 
respondent feedback, it is not possible to say for certain that all individuals addressed 
items fully and appropriately given the potential for differential interpretation of the 
questions.
Plausibility o f  delusion-like items
As briefly highlighted in Chapter 4, another issue with this type of research is that the 
basic themes for many of the non-bizarre delusion-like beliefs (persecution, grandeur, 
somatic, erotomania, reference, nihilism) are by definition all potentially or partially 
plausible (i.e., they could be objectively true). Given that participants’ responses rely 
on self-report and there were only a limited number of generic questions covering a 
belief content theme, it was not possible to determine the veracity of all endorsed 
beliefs. This is not to imply that participants were being economical with the truth, but 
rather that the relative subjective salience of events and evidence that might lead to 
such an endorsement (e.g., o f a persecutory belief that someone is out to harm one) 
may be different for different subjects. Responses to questions will always mirror the
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reality of events being interpreted. This limitation clearly affects all such 
questionnaires in the field, and extends to all interview-based studies, including 
formal clinical psychiatric interviews.
Cultural explanation
As well as being unsure as to the veracity of certain DLB responses, there may be 
some cultural or personal justification informing a participant’s responses that is not 
identified in this study. For example, many participants in this study endorsed the 
belief relating to ideas of reference (‘Do you believe that people say or do things that 
contain special messages for you?’). This was highly correlated with participants’ 
self-ratings of religiosity, however, and, as religious beliefs are not considered 
delusional by clinical definition, this belief could be viewed differently in a religious 
context.
Other aspects o f  psychotic symptoms
A further limitation remains the relative focus of the CBQ questions on content and 
conviction. There is good evidence that other dimensions, such as distress and 
preoccupation, may differentiate clinical from non-clinical beliefs (Myin-Germeys et 
al., 2001; Strauss, 1969). Indeed, such features have been implicated as playing a vital 
role in the assessment of delusions and anomalous experiences (Bell et al., 2008; 
Peters et al., 2004). An improved version of the CBQ might include such dimensions; 
however, such questions would have to be worded carefully so as not to 
unintentionally highlight negative consequences (e.g., distress) for specific beliefs that 
had been previously considered positively by participants. Indeed, it would be
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interesting to establish whether any of these beliefs in fact had a positive impact on 
participants’ lives, given that emotionally positive psychotic symptoms do occur (e.g., 
the protective angel of patient FR) and hallucinations in the general population tend to 
be more positive (Honig et al., 1998).
These limitations provide an impetus for further research in this area. As 
already highlighted, the extent to which a belief is based on evidence that would be 
objectively credible is not known. Overvalued ideas, such as those found in anorexia, 
are another way of investigating beliefs in patient versus healthy samples. These types 
of belief are extremely common in young people (e.g., Johns & Swift, 2009; Paxton et 
al., 1991). Moreover, some beliefs in eating disorders have been considered as having 
delusional intensity (Munro, 1999). Such beliefs could provide an objective way of 
looking at the degree to which the belief is appropriate, by considering an 
anthropometric measure, such as body mass index. By comparing the same types of 
belief (e.g., ‘I need to lose weight’) across individuals (e.g., overweight, healthy and 
underweight), and also gaining an idea of the actions they take following this belief 
and their attitudes towards the causes of weight gain/loss, it may be possible to build 
upon belief models by using data from this area. In particular, it may also provide an 
assessment of the degree to which ‘false’ beliefs occur in the general population, 
albeit with the extent of ‘falsity’ varying throughout the sample.
A further area of interest would be to examine the beliefs reported on the CBQ 
in greater detail. By interviewing individuals with high DLB scores, it would be 
possible to establish with greater accuracy the nature of the reported beliefs, and 
perhaps estimate the likely effects of misinterpretation, plausibility or cultural 
explanation.
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8.4 Relationships with theoretical correlates
Following on from the findings relating to delusion-like beliefs, the 
relationships between beliefs and experiences are particularly interesting, given the 
longstanding view of beliefs offering explanations for experiences (dating back to the 
philosopher Locke). This relationship was prominent in studies of delusions and 
hallucinations, and was similarly expected to carry over and be evidenced in 
psychotic-like symptoms. Indeed, this was generally supported, with findings 
suggesting a strong relationship between AB and AE, which held for the majority of 
participants. However, several participants did endorse high AB in the absence of AE 
or vice versa. This questions previous accounts that postulate a one-to-one 
correspondence between an AE and an AB. Instead, these results tie in better with 
studies suggesting that AE are not a necessary condition for delusion formation (e.g., 
Bell, Halligan & Ellis, 2006c). However, such conclusions are still limited by the 
difficulties with ruling out other or forgotten experiences. In particular, the cross- 
sectional nature of the majority of studies to date makes it difficult to tease apart the 
correlation between AE and AB. A longitudinal study using the CBQ or similar 
measures would help to address some of these limitations.
8.5 Meta-beliefs
One additional characteristic of the CBQ, which distinguishes it from other current 
measures, was the inclusion of a range of brief meta-beliefs, designed to evaluate 
participants’ assessments of their dispositions towards their own beliefs. Findings 
suggested that those who rated themselves as superstitious, religious or generally 
having a propensity to believe in things had significantly higher paranormal and
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religious belief scores. In addition, those who rated themselves as superstitious or as 
having a high propensity to believe in things had significantly higher delusion-like 
belief and anomalous experience scores. This suggests that participants can have 
insight into how their beliefs are likely to be objectively viewed, and are capable of 
judging their likeliness to report anomalous beliefs and experiences. Indeed, given 
that this was a general population sample and that they had been “primed” by 
answering questions on their beliefs and experiences prior to completing these items, 
this was reassuring. Further investigation of the usefulness of these measures may be 
beneficial, to establish if they would provide a quick yet reliable indication of 
participants’ dispositions to believe or experience these types of phenomena.
8.6 Comparing characteristics of ‘normal’ belief and delusion
A final major strand of research ties back in with the discussion regarding the 
definition of delusion at the start of this chapter. The findings from the characteristics 
of belief study (Chapter 3) fit with intuitions that have in part led to the questioning of 
delusions as beliefs, whereby researchers concur (albeit in the absence of empirical 
evidence) with the general public opinions that beliefs should lead to actions, have 
conviction, etc. (e.g., Berrios, 1991; Currie, 2000; Sass, 1994). However, 
notwithstanding arguments that such conditions do not hold for all delusions, it had 
not been empirically established as to how far delusions are representative of beliefs 
in general (given the range of conviction with which a belief could be held, etc.). 
Certain features of belief were subsequently addressed in this thesis, including the 
stability and the degree to which beliefs can be circumscribed (i.e., separated from the 
other beliefs held by an individual). Furthermore, in Chapter 5 the particular problem 
with the DSM definition’s reliance on distinguishing delusion from other beliefs (e.g.,
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religious beliefs) based almost entirely on the number of people holding the belief 
was subject to empirical testing.
8.6.1 Range o f  beliefs
In terms of the range of beliefs held by individuals, most previous work has 
focused on one particular type of belief rather than assessing and comparing reports 
by means of a single measure (and a similar approach has been taken with 
experiences). By including a range of beliefs and experiences in the CBQ, the 
importance of placing endorsements of psychotic-like beliefs and experiences in the 
context of other beliefs/experiences (including some that have also been considered 
unusual) was highlighted. Indeed, this is especially significant as the DSM offers no 
formal guidelines as to what proportion of people (from one culture) need to hold a 
belief such that it is no longer appropriate to consider this a delusion. The findings 
reported in Chapter 5 suggest that this important criterion in the DSM definition can 
be questioned, as paranormal and religious beliefs could not be distinguished from 
DLB when considering the proportion of people assumed to hold them. Furthermore, 
results from factor, correlational and coherence analyses all supported the case that 
delusion-like and paranormal and religious beliefs showed considerable overlap. In 
addition, similar results were found for psychotic-like and paranormal experience 
items, indicating that the boundaries between these types of experiences are relatively 
porous, despite one content type being more associated with clinical symptoms than 
the other.
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8.6.2 Stability o f  belief
A second feature of belief highlighted by the DSM definition was the idea of a 
‘fixed’ (i.e., stable) belief. Chapter 7 presented findings suggesting that stability in 
fact varied depending on the type o f  belief. In particular, delusion-like beliefs in the 
general public seem to be held with less tenacity than other types of belief, perhaps 
reflecting a distinguishing feature from a clinical delusion (i.e., one reason that these 
DLB are not clinically relevant m ay stem from their fluctuating and perhaps less 
intense nature). This study also highlighted the uncertainty of using test-retest 
measures, in that an overall measure may not accurately reflect the entire 
questionnaire, and furthermore, questioned the appropriateness of applying these 
criteria to such measures. If a proportion of DLBs represent unstable ideas held 
weakly by some members of the general population, then it may not be helpful to use 
a benchmark for these measures that emphasises consistency over time. Instead, 
concentrating on internal consistency measures may be more appropriate.
8.6.3 Coherence o f  belief
The second related set o f investigations presented in Chapter 7 described 
preliminary attempts to develop a better understanding of what belief coherence might 
constitute. Following suggestions that beliefs need to cohere with other beliefs held 
by the same individual (predominantly an idea developed from philosophy: e.g., 
Quine & Ullian, 1970), the presence o f seemingly circumscribed delusions appeared 
unusual. However, results from the coherence studies indicate that participants do 
indeed sometimes endorse lone beliefs, although the CBQ is clearly not a fully 
comprehensive list of beliefs. Furthermore, a significant proportion (35%) reported 
inconsistent belief pairs, in contrast to the theoretical accounts previously proposed.
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This highlights the importance of investigating (sometimes long-held) assumptions 
regarding the definition of common terms. That said, such discrepancies were in the 
minority. Indeed, the further studies of coherence showed support for the idea that in 
general, people’s beliefs often group together. Moreover, the results indicated that 
beliefs that fall into paranormal and religious or delusion-like categories tend to co­
occur (i.e., that there is more than a random occurrence of beliefs, as endorsing one 
paranormal or religious belief generally makes it more likely that the same person will 
endorse another from the group). Thus, while in general there does appear to be the 
predicted consistency between beliefs, it is also seems possible for non-clinical 
subjects to hold inconsistent beliefs. As such, this raises doubts regarding both the 
theoretical emphasis on consistency for all beliefs and the differentiation of 
circumscribed delusion from ‘normal’ belief.
In summary, this element of the thesis demonstrated that several assumptions 
regarding differences between delusions and ‘normal’ beliefs require further 
investigation, as there is considerable variation in the properties of the beliefs reported 
in the general population.
8.7 Patients
Finally, data were also presented from a small patient group, which allowed for a 
tentative comparison with a group of healthy age- and gender-matched controls, 
focusing on the number and strength of the different belief types and also the number 
and frequency of anomalous experiences. Interestingly, while there was a range of 
scores, which was to some degree accounted for by the range in illness severity, most 
patients were not distinguishable from healthy controls on the basis of either the
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number or strength o f their beliefs. Patients’ experiences, however, were somewhat 
more distinct from healthy controls’, with the majority of patients reporting more 
and/or more frequently occurring anomalous experiences, but again this was not a 
universal feature. This comparison provided tentative evidence in support of the idea 
that the content, and to some extent conviction, of a belief are not sufficient criteria on 
which to base a diagnosis of delusion.
One area for future research would be to build on this pilot study, using a 
larger sample to again evaluate the range o f beliefs and experiences, but to also look 
at the coherence and stability of beliefs for this group longitudinally. This would 
provide a direct comparison with the data already collected for healthy participants, 
and allow us to further evaluate the extent to which these attributes differ (if at all) 
between delusions and other beliefs, as well as whether other beliefs held by patients 
have similar qualities to delusions. In particular, it would be interesting to compare 
coherence between patients with circumscribed delusions and those with a number of 
delusional beliefs.
8.8 Summary
Overall, this thesis has explored a range of questions addressing the nature, processes 
and products of belief and delusion formation. The findings discussed here have 
implications in particular for: (1) belief and delusion definition, (2) comparisons 
between these two concepts, (3) the methodology appropriate fo r assessing beliefs, (4) 
the continuum approach and (5) the role o f  anomalous perceptual experiences. In 
addition, preliminary data have explored participants’ insight into their propensity to 
report certain types of beliefs and experiences. Pilot data have also allowed 
comparisons between responses of patients with delusions and healthy controls on the
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CBQ. Nevertheless, given the multidimensional and dynamic nature of belief 
processes, it is clear that there are many questions left unanswered.
In particular, future research questions highlighted by this thesis include:
Examining the prevalence of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ DLBs in the general 
population
Examining beliefs where a more objective measure of the validity of the belief 
is possible, to determine the degree to which ‘false’ beliefs are present in the 
general population
Establishing the coherence and stability of patients’ beliefs (both delusional 
and non-delusional), to empirically test assumptions surrounding delusions
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Appendix I: Believing, Thinking and Feeling Questionnaire
Believing, Thinking and Feeling
This questionnaire presents you with a series of statements or propositions. After 
carefully reading each, please indicate the extent to which each of three responses 
represents your position towards the given proposition/statement:
T believe this’
‘I feel this’
‘I think this’
Please note that the order in which these options are presented will vary between 
questions.
For the study to be useful, it is important that you answer the following questions 
honestly and quickly.
Please attempt all questions, unless you feel uncomfortable about a question, in which 
case please leave it blank.
Please complete the following items:
Key code: 2008 - ________
Gender: Male / Female
Age: __________
For the following statements, please circle the response which best represents your 
position for each of the three options, as in the example below.
Illustrative Example 
A. Some houses are haunted
T believe this’ Yes
T feel this’ ^ Y e s ^ \  No
T think this’ Yes
I f  y o u  h a v e  an y  q u e s tio n s  or co n ce rn s  at an y  stage, p lea se  fee l free to  con tact either o f  the 
research ers: R a ch e l P e c h e y  ( p e c h ev r k @ cf.a c .u k ) or Prof. P eter H alligan  
( h a llitza n p w @ c f.a c .u k ) at th e S c h o o l o f  P sy c h o lo g y , C a rd iff  U n iv ers ity , T ow er B u ild in g , Park  
P la c e , C ard iff, C F 1 0  3 A T
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STA TEM EN TS
The following statements were presented with response options as with the example above. 
Response options were rotated.
1 . 1 h a v e  free  c h o ic e  or  free  w ill
2 . A b o rtio n  is  r igh t
3. T h e p o s it io n  o f  th e  stars an d  p la n e ts  a ffe c ts  or d eterm in es m y  life
4 . M y  b o d y  or part o f  m y  b o d y  is  m issh a p e n  or u g ly
5. H um an a c t iv it ie s  c a u s e  s ig n if ic a n t  g lo b a l w arm in g
6. I am  an e x c e p t io n a lly  g if te d  p erso n  that o th ers d o  n ot re co g n ise
7. T h e so u l or sp irit su r v iv e s  d eath
8. C ertain  p e o p le  are o u t to  harm  or d iscr ed it  m e
9. S o m e  p e o p le  are p o s s e s s e d  b y  e v i l  sp ir its
10. It is  r igh t to  u s e  th e  d ea th  p en a lty  for  se r io u s  cr im es
11. C ertain  p e o p le  or  p la c e s  are d u p lic a te d , i.e . are in  tw o  d ifferen t lo ca tio n s  at the sam e tim e
12. W h en  I d ie  m y  so u l w ill  b e  reborn  in  an oth er b o d y
13. P e o p le  sa y  or d o  th in g s  that co n ta in  sp e c ia l m e ssa g e s  for m e
14. T h ere is  ex tra-terrestr ia l l if e
15. T h e re fle c tio n  in th e  m irror is  s o m e t im e s  n o t m e
16. B la c k  m a g ic  an d /or w itc h c r a ft  e x is ts
1 7 . 1 am  in fe sted  b y  p a ra sites
18. T h ere is  a g o d  or g o d s
19. S o m e  w e ll-k n o w n  c e le b r ity  is  se c r e t ly  in  lo v e  w ith  m e
2 0 . D em o c r a c y  is  th e  b e st  sy s te m  o f  g o v er n m e n t
2 1 . Part o f  m y  b o d y  d o e s n ’t b e lo n g  to  m e
2 2 . E u th an asia  (e n d in g  th e  l if e  o f  a p erson  w h o  is  in curab ly  ill in order to  lim it su ffer in g) is 
right
2 3 . S o m e  p e o p le  c h a n g e  in to  w e r e w o lv e s
2 4 . P e o p le  I k n o w  d is g u is e  th e m se lv e s  as o th ers to  m an ip u late or in flu en ce  m e
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2 5 . T h e  c o m p le x ity  o f  th e  w o r ld  su g g e sts  that it w a s  p u rp o sefu lly  d es ig n ed  b y an in telligen t  
creator
2 6 . M y  th o u g h ts  or a c t io n s  are n o t fu lly  under m y  control
2 7 . S a m e  s e x  r e la tio n sh ip s  are right
2 8 . T h ere  is  an oth er p erso n  w h o  lo o k s  and acts lik e  m e
2 9 . O r g a n ised  r e lig io n  is  o n e  o f  th e m ain  so u rces o f  hum an strife
3 0 . S o m e  p e o p le  c o m m u n ic a te  w ith  th e d ead
31 . T h e  w o r ld  is  ab o u t to  en d
32 . It is  right to  u se  a n im a ls  for  m e d ic a lly  re la ted  research
33 . M y  r e la tiv e s  or c lo s e  fr ie n d s are so m e t im e s  rep laced  b y  id en tica l- lo o k in g  im postors
34 . T h e  th eory  o f  e v o lu t io n  is  correct
3 5 . 1 am  d ead  an d /or  d o  n o t e x is t
36 . T h ere are d e m o n s  or e v i l  sp ir its
37 . P o s it iv e  th o u g h ts  an d  a ttitu d es im p r o v e  m y  p h y sic a l w e llb e in g
F in a lly , c o n s id e r  for a m o m e n t  h o w  y o u  c o m m o n ly  u se  each  o f  the q u a lify in g  term s (b e lie v e , 
th ink  and fe e l)  an d  rank  th e se  in  term s o f  th e  ty p ica l strength  o f  p erson a l en d orsem ent they  
im p ly  for y o u  w h e n  y o u  u se  th em
Very strong endorsement 
o f a statement
Very weak endorsement 
of a statement
T th in k  X ’ 5 4 3 2 1
T b e lie v e  X ’ 5 4 3 2 1
T fee l X ’ 5 4 3 2 1
Thank you for completing this questionnaire
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APPENDIX II: SCRIPT FOR TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS
(Sections 2-4 comprise items from the Cardiff Belief Questionnaire)
SCREENING
S I  G o o d  m o m in g /a f te m o o n /e v e n in g . M y  n am e is ______________________  from  m ru k
research . W e  h a v e  b e e n  c o m m iss io n e d  b y  P ro fesso r  H a lligan  at C ard iff U n iversity  to  
carry ou t a su rv e y  a m o n g st  th e p o p u la tio n  o f  the U K  ab out the nature and range o f  
b e lie fs  and e x p e r ie n c e s  in  ev e r y d a y  life . Y o u  h a v e  b een  se lec te d  at random  for th is  
su rv ey , and I w o n d e r  i f  I c o u ld  a sk  y o u  so m e  q u estio n s?
T h is in te rv iew  w ill  b e  c o n d u c te d  w ith in  th e C o d e  o f  C on d u ct o f  the M arket R esearch  
S o c ie ty . In a cc o rd a n c e  w ith  th e D a ta  P ro tec tio n  A ct (1 9 9 8 ) , any inform ation  y o u  
p ro v id e  w ill  b e  h e ld  a n o n y m o u s ly  an d  treated  in  the strictest co n fid en ce , and w ill 
o n ly  b e  u sed  b y  research ers at C a r d iff  U n iv ers ity . W e w o u ld  appreciate i f  y o u  
a n sw ered  all q u e s tio n s  b ut y o u  m a y  c h o o s e  n o t to  an sw er q u estio n s i f  y o u  fee l 
u n co m fo rta b le . Y o u  are free  to  r e v ie w  v o u r  re sp o n se s  or w ith d raw  at any point during  
th e in te r v ie w . T h e  stu d y  in c lu d e s  a w id e  ran ge o f  b e lie fs  and ex p er ien ces that som e  
p e o p le  m a y  f in d  u n u su a l but w h ic h  are m o re  c o m m o n  than m o st p eo p le  rea lise
T h e  in te rv iew  ta k es  ab ou t 15 m in u tes  and ev e ry th in g  y o u  say  w ill b e treated in the 
stric test c o n f id e n c e
5 3  G en d er [IN T E R V IE W E R  D O  N O T  A S K ]:-
M a le
F em a le
5 4  W h ich  o f  the fo llo w in g  a g e  c a te g o r ie s  d o  y o u  fa ll in to?
18 to  2 9  
3 0  to  4 4  
4 5  to  59  
6 0 +
S 5  W hat is  y o u r  current w o r k in g  s itu a tio n ?
E m p lo y e d  (e .g . fu ll t im e , part tim e , s e lf-e m p lo y e d )
N o t  e m p lo y e d  (e .g . retired , stu d en t, car in g  for h o m e /fa m ily )
Is the resp o n d en t ca p a b le  o f  u n d erstan d in g  th e q u estio n s?
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S E C T I O N  1: N A T U R E  O F  B E L I E F
R E A D  O U T : “ In th is  part w e  w a n t to  g e t  a better id ea  o f  w hat y o u  m ean  b y  the w ord  ‘b e l i e f .
“ W e  h a v e  b rok en  th e  id ea  o f  b e l ie f  in to  14 d ifferen t ch aracteristics. P lea se  con sid er each  o f  
th e  fo l lo w in g  ch a ra c ter istics  ca refu lly , and rate the ex ten t to  w h ich  each  is  an accurate 
d esc r ip tio n  o f  b e l i e f  u s in g  th e sc a le  n ot at a ll, partly and to ta lly .”
I N T E R V I E W E R  I N S T R U C T I O N :  R O T A T E  O R D E R  O F  Q U E S T I O N S  (Q 1 -Q 1 4 )
Answer scales were read out after each question. Response options were:
N o t  at all
P artly
T o ta lly
D o n ’t k n o w /r e fu se d
Q1 To what extent does ‘belief describe or refer to a strongly held conviction?
Q 2  T o  w h a t e x te n t  are ‘b e l ie f s ’ a personal interpretation about events, or the nature of
the world?
Q 3  T o  w h a t e x te n t  d o  beliefs influence your thoughts?
Q 4  T o  w h a t e x te n t  d o  b e lie f s  p ro v id e  a framework for explaining how things are or
should be?
Q 5  T o  w h a t e x te n t  d o  b e l ie f s  shape or colour your attitudes and decisions?
Q 6  T o  w h a t e x te n t are b e l ie f s  more than a passing thought or feeling?
Q 7  T o  w h a t e x te n t are b e l ie f s  relatively permanent across time and different situations?
Q 8  T o  w h at ex te n t d o  b e l ie f s  influence the way you feel?
Q 9  T o  w h at ex te n t are b e l ie f s  m o re  than  memories or facts?
Q 1 0  T o  w h at e x te n t are b e l ie f s  resistant to change?
Q l l  T o  w h at e x te n t are b e l ie f s  true and/or right?
Q 1 2  T o  w h at e x te n t  d o  b e lie f s  influence your behaviour?
Q 1 3  T o  w h a t e x te n t  are b e lie f s  so m e th in g  y o u  w o u ld  acknowledge or talk about publicly?
Q 1 4  T o  w h a t e x te n t are b e lie f s  a significant part of your personal core values?
S E C T I O N  2: B E L I E F S
R E A D  O U T :  “N o w  I w o u ld  lik e  to  ask  y o u  about so m e  b e lie fs  and ex p er ien ces that y ou  
M A Y  or M A Y  N O T  h a v e .”
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You may consider some of these slightly strange but it is important that you answer these 
carefully.”
“In addition, for the study to be useful for our research, it is IMPORTANT that you answer 
the questions honestly and quickly.”
“Please DON’T include any experiences or beliefs you may have had under the influence of 
drugs or alcohol.”
Answer scales were read out after each question. Response options were:
Do not believe 
Weakly believe 
Moderately believe 
Strongly believe 
No opinion 
Don’t know/refused
Q15 To what extent do you believe that people should help those less fortunate than
themselves?
Q16 To what extent do you believe that humans cause significant global warming?
Q17 To what extent do you believe in astrology (i.e. that the position of the stars and
planets affects or determines your life)?
Q18 To what extent do you believe that your body or part of your body is misshapen or
ugly?
Q19 To what extent do you believe that euthanasia is right?
[INTERVIEWER NOTE: If asked, define ‘euthanasia’ as ‘ending the life of a 
human or animal who is incurably ill in order to limit suffering’]
Q20 To what extent do you believe that you are an exceptionally gifted person that others 
do not recognise?
Q21 To what extent do you believe that democracy is the best system of government?
Q22 To what extent do you believe that certain people are out to harm or discredit you?
Q23 To what extent do you believe in a god or gods?
Q24 To what extent do you believe that certain places are duplicated, i.e. are in two
different locations at the same time?
Q25 To what extent do you believe in extra-terrestrial life?
Q26 To what extent do you believe that people say or do things that contain special
messages for you?
Q27 To what extent do you believe that the soul or spirit survives death?
Q28 To what extent do you believe you have fundamental human rights that cannot be
taken from you?
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Q29 To what extent do you believe in black magic or witchcraft?
Q30 To what extent do you believe that the reflection in the mirror is sometimes not you?
Q31 To what extent do you believe that abortion is right or wrong?
Q32 To what extent do you believe in demons or evil spirits?
Q33 To what extent do you believe that you are infested by parasites?
Q34 To what extent do you believe in “intelligent design” (i.e. that the complexity of the
world suggests that it was purposefully designed by an intelligent creator)?
Q35 To what extent do you believe that you are not in control of some of your actions?
Q36 To what extent do you believe that organised religion is one of the main sources of
human strife?
Q37 To what extent do you believe that some people communicate with the dead?
Q38 To what extent do you believe that humans share a common ancestor with apes?
Q39 To what extent do you believe that some well-known celebrity is secretly in love with
you?
Q40 To what extent do you believe in the death penalty for serious crimes?
Q41 To what extent do you believe that earth has been visited by aliens from other solar
systems?
Q42 To what extent do you believe that some people are duplicated, i.e. are in two places 
at the same time?
Q43 To what extent do you believe in the theory of evolution?
Q44 To what extent do you believe that the world is about to end?
Q45 To what extent do you believe that same sex relationships are right or wrong?
Q46 To what extent do you believe that people you know disguise themselves as others to 
manipulate or influence you?
Q47 To what extent do you believe in reincarnation (i.e. that when you die your soul is 
rebom in another body)?
Q48 To what extent do you believe that your thoughts are not fully under your control?
Q49 To what extent do you believe it is right or wrong to use animals for medically related
research?
Q50 To what extent do you believe that there is another person who looks and acts like 
you?
Q51 To what extent do you believe that the earth is the centre of the universe?
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Q52 To what extent do you believe that part of your body doesn’t belong to you?
Q53 To what extent do you believe some people transform into werewolves?
Q54 To what extent do you believe that young children (under 6) are capable of holding
beliefs?
Q55 To what extent do you believe that relatives or close friends are sometimes replaced 
by identical-looking impostors?
Q56 To what extent do you believe that you have free choice, or free will?
Q57 To what extent do you believe that you are dead and/or do not exist?
Q58 To what extent do you believe that animals have beliefs?
Q59 To what extent do you believe that some people are possessed by evil spirits?
Q60 To what extent do you believe that positive thoughts and attitudes improve your
physical wellbeing?
SECTION 3: EXPERIENCES
READ OUT: “Now I’m going to ask you about some behaviours and experiences”
“Please only tell me about experiences you have had as an adult, even though the questions 
include past experiences.”
Answer scales were read  out after each question. Response options were:
Often
Sometimes
Rarely
Never
Don’t know/refused
Q61 How often do you attend religious services (other than weddings, funerals, etc.)?
Q62 How often have you seen or sensed a ghost?
Q63 How often have you felt that familiar objects appeared different even though you
knew they hadn’t changed?
Q64 How often have you had an out-of-body experience (e.g. felt as though you were 
looking down on your own body from above)?
Q65 How often have you sensed when a friend or family member was in trouble?
Q66 How often have you seen things which other people cannot?
Q67 How often have you had premonitions of events that have yet to take place?
Q68 How often have you heard voices when no-one is around?
Q69 How often have you felt that familiar people all seem colder or more distant than
before?
341
SECTION 4: INSIGHT
READ OUT: “Finally, I’d like to ask you about some beliefs you may hold about yourself’
Q70 To what extent do you consider yourself a religious person?
Not at all religious 
Quite religious 
Very religious 
Don’t know/refused
Q71 To what extent do you consider yourself superstitious (i.e. likely to believe certain 
events occur through mysterious or magical means)?
Very superstitious 
Quite superstitious 
Not at all superstitious 
Don’t know/refused
Q72 To what extent do you consider yourself likely to believe in things that others do not?
Not at all likely 
Quite likely 
Very likely 
Don’t know/refused
Q73 To what extent do you consider yourself tolerant of people with different beliefs?
Very tolerant 
Quite tolerant 
Not at all tolerant 
Don’t know/refused
SECTION 5: DEMOGRAPHICS
READ OUT: “Finally, a couple of questions about yourself, so that we can make sure we 
have spoken to a good mix of people”
N.B. D1 and D3 were split into smaller questions in the interviews but are combined fo r  
succinctness here
D1 Which of these BEST describes the sort of work you do/did?
Modern professional occupations
Such as: teacher, nurse, physiotherapist, social worker, welfare officer, artist, 
musician, police officer (sergeant or above), software designer 
Clerical and intermediate occupations
Such as: secretary, personal assistant, clerical worker, office clerk, 
call centre agent, nursing auxiliary, nursery nurse
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Senior managers or administrators
(Usually responsible for planning, organising and co-ordinating work and for 
finance). Such as: finance manager or chief executive 
Technical and craft occupations
Such as: motor mechanic, fitter, inspector, plumber, printer, tool maker, 
electrician, gardener, train driver 
Semi-routine manual and service occupations
Such as: postal worker, machine operative, security guard, caretaker, farm 
worker, catering assistant, receptionist, sales assistant 
Routine manual and service occupations
Such as: HGV driver, van driver, cleaner, porter, packer, sewing machinist, 
messenger, labourer, waiter / waitress, bar staff 
Middle or junior managers
Such as: office manager, retail manager, bank manager, restaurant manager, 
warehouse manager, publican 
Traditional professional occupations
Such as: accountant, solicitor, medical practitioner, scientist, civil / 
mechanical engineer 
None of these/other 
Refused
D2 What is the highest educational qualification you’ve achieved to date? 
Secondary/high school/NVQ 1-3
University degree or equivalent professional qualification/NVQ4 
Higher university degree/Doctorate/MBA/NVQ 5 or equivalent 
None of these/other 
Refused
D3 What is your ethnic group?
Indian
Pakistani
Bangladeshi
Any other Asian Background 
Black and Black British -  Caribbean 
Black and Black British -  African 
Any other Black background 
Chinese
Mixed -  white and black Caribbean
Mixed -  white and black African
Mixed -  white and Asian
Any other mixed background
White -  British
White -  Irish
White -  Welsh
White -  English
White -  Scottish
Any other white background
Other ethnic group
Refused
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D4 Which of the following best describes your household? (MULTIPLE OPTIONS 
ALLOWED)
Live alone 
Live with partner 
Live with children 
Live with parent(s)
Live with other relative(s) 
Live with ffiend(s)
Live with housemate(s) 
Refused
D5A Do you have a longstanding physical or mental condition?
D5B Does this have a substantial adverse effect on your ability to carry out day-to-day 
activities?
D5C Are you currently taking medication for this condition?
D6 Which, if any, organised religion do you belong to?
Christianity
Hinduism
Islam
Judaism
Sikhism
Other
None
Refused
D7 Which hand do you write with?
Left
Ambidextrous/both
Right
Refused
Yes
No
Refused
ASK  DSB AND DSC 
GO TO D6 
G O TO D 6
Yes
No
Refused
Yes
No
Refused
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INTERVIEWER READ OUT: “Thank you very much for taking part in this survey. ALL 
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY YOU TODAY WILL BE HELD ANONYMOUSLY. 
These results will give us a better understanding of the range and influence of beliefs and 
experiences in everyday life.”
“The study includes a wide range of beliefs and experiences that some people may find 
unusual but which are more common than people realise. Hopefully, none of these questions 
give rise to concern. However, if you are concerned and would like help, support or further 
information, you may wish to speak with your GP.”
“If you would like further information about the study, please contact Prof. Halligan at the 
School of Psychology, Cardiff University, by emailing him at halliganpw@cardiff.ac.uk. or 
phoning on 02920 876 911.”
“If you have any concerns about the way this survey has been conducted, please direct your 
comments to the Cardiff School of Psychology Ethics Committee 
Secretary, psychethics@cf.ac.uk or 02920 874 007”
“I would like to thank you again for the time and help you've given me today.”
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Appendix III: Tables of revisions for Cardiff Belief Questionnaire items
(vi) Delusion-like beliefs
(vii) Paranormal and religious belief
(viii) Societal/cultural beliefs
(ix) Experiences
(x) Meta-beliefs
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Table (i): Delusion-like beliefs
Delusion item based on
Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4
Do you believe, or have you 
believed...
Do you believe... To what extent do you 
believe...
Persecution ... that people are out to harm or discredit you?* ... that certain people are out to harm or discredit you?
Grandeur ... that you are an 
exceptionally gifted person 
whom other people do not 
recognise?
... that you are an 
exceptionally gifted person 
that other people do not 
recognise?
... that you are an exceptionally gifted person that 
others do not recognise?
Delusions of reference ... that programmes on TV or the radio, or articles in 
magazines have been specifically created for you?
... that people say or do things that contain special 
messages for you?
Body dysmorphia ... that a part of your body is misshapen or ugly?* ... that your body, or part of 
your body, is misshapen or 
ugly?
Delusional parasitosis ... that you have been infested by parasites? ... that you are infested by parasites?
Erotomania ...that some well-known celebrity is secretly in love with you?
Thought insertion/
withdrawal/
broadcasting
... that someone else’s 
thoughts can be inserted into 
your mind?
... that your thoughts are 
under someone else’s 
control?*
... that your thoughts are 
not under your control?
... that your thoughts are 
not fully under your 
control?
Controlled actions ... that another person or 
entity can be in control of 
your actions?
... that someone else is in control of your actions? ... that you are not in 
control of some of your 
actions?
Mirrored-self
misidentification
... that when looking in the 
mirror the reflection is not 
really you?
... that the reflection in the mirror is not really you? ... that the reflection in the 
mirror is sometimes not 
you?
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Fregoli syndrome ... that people you know 
may disguise themselves as 
others to influence you?
... that people you know 
disguise themselves as 
others to manipulate you?
... that people you know disguise themselves as others 
to manipulate or influence you?
Reduplicative 
paramnesia (of place)
... that a place can be in two 
different locations at the 
same time?
... that some places are in 
two different locations at 
the same time?
... that certain places are 
in two different locations 
at the same time?
... that certain places are 
duplicated, i.e. are in two 
different locations at the 
same time?
Reduplicative 
paramnesia (of person)
... that someone can be in 
two places at the same time?
... that somebody is in two 
places at the same time?
... that certain people are 
in two places at the same 
time?
... that some people are 
duplicated, i.e. are in two 
places at the same time?
Capgras syndrome ... that your relatives have been replaced by similar 
looking people?
... that your relatives are 
sometimes replaced by 
identical-looking 
imposters?
... that relatives or close 
friends are sometimes 
replaced by identical- 
looking imposters?
Cotard syndrome ... that you are dead? ... that you are dead or 
do not exist?
... that you are dead and/or 
do not exist?
Nihilism - ... that the world is about to end?
Subjective doubles - ... that there is another person who looks and acts like 
you?
Somatoparaphrenia ... that part of your body 
doesn’t really belong to 
you?
... that part of your body 
doesn’t belong to you?
* Asked in a separate question as well on version 2, in the form ‘Have you ever believed...?’
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Table (ii): Paranormal and religious beliefs
Version 1 (n=5) Version 2 (n-8) Version 3 (n-9) Version 4(n=10)
Do you believe, or have you believed... Do you believe... To what extent do you believe...
... that it is possible to communicate 
with people who have died?
... that some people communicate with the dead?
... in fate or destiny? -
... in astrology (i.e. that the position of the stars and planets can affect 
or determine people's lives)?
... in astrology (i.e. that the 
position of the stars and planets 
can affect or determine your life)?
... in astrology (i.e. that the 
position of the stars and planets 
affects or determines your life)?
... in karma (i.e. good thoughts/actions 
lead to good fortune; bad thoughts and 
actions to bad luck)?
... that people can be possessed by evil 
spirits?
... that some people are possessed by evil spirits?
- ... in a god or gods?*
... in the soul (i.e. a spirit or 
force that exists within yet 
goes beyond the body)?
... in the soul (i.e. a spirit or force 
that exists beyond the body)?
.. .that the soul or spirit survives 
death?
- ... in intelligent design (i.e. the 
designed by an intelligent crea
it the complexity of the world suggests that it was purposefully 
tor)?
- ... in witchcraft? ... in black magic or witchcraft?
... in reincarnation (i.e. that 
when people die their souls 
are reborn in another body)?
... in reincarnation (i.e. that when 
you die your soul will be reborn 
in another body)?
... in reincarnation (i.e. that when 
you die your soul is reborn in 
another bodv)?
- s o m e  p e o p le  tra n sfo rm  in to  w e r e w o lv e s ?
- ... in demons or evil spirits?
* Asked in a separate question as well on version 2, in the form ‘Have you ever believed...?’
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Table (iii): Societal/cultural beliefs
Version I 
(n=6)
Version 2 
(n-10)
Version 3 
(n=12)
Version 4 
(n=19)
Do you believe, or have you believed... Do you believe... To what extent do you believe...
... in ‘an eye for an eye’? -
... that people should not eat meat? -
... in evolution? ... in the theory o:' evolution?
... that animals should be used for 
medical research?
... in using animals for medical 
research?
... it is right or wrong to use animals for medically related 
research?*
... in democracy? .. .that democracy is the best system 
for governing people?
... that democracy is the best system of government?
... in free will? ... that you have 
free choice, free 
agency or free 
will?
... that you have free choice, or free will?
” .. .that human activities are causing 
significant global warming?
... that humans cause significant global warming?
- ... that euthanasia 
is right?
... that euthanasia is right or wrong?*
“ ... that abortion is 
right?
... that abortion is right or wrong?*
... in having the 
death penalty for 
serious crimes?
... in the death penalty for serious crimes?
... that it is right 
that people help 
those less fortunate 
than themselves?
... that it is right or wrong that people help those less fortunate than themselves?**
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... that the Apollo 
moon landings 
actually took 
place?
... that positive 
thoughts and 
attitudes improve 
wellbeing?
... that when you 
have positive 
thoughts and 
attitudes your 
physical 
wellbeing 
improves?
... that positive thoughts and attitudes improve your physical 
wellbeing?
... that you have 
certain rights as 
a person that 
cannot be taken 
from you?
... you have fundamental human rights that cannot be taken 
from you?
... in extra-terrestrial life?
... that organised religion is one o f the main sources o f human 
strife?•
... that humans share a common ancestor with apes?“
... that the earth is the centre o f the universe?—
... that young children (under 6) are capable o f holding beliefs?
" ... that animals have beliefs?
' ... that same sex relationships are right or wrong?*------- - --- ------------------------ « p  __i___g _______________
... that earth has been visited by aliens from other solar 
systems?_______   L
* In telephone interviews, asked ‘are right’ rather than ‘right or wrong’
** In telephone interviews, asked using ‘should’ to avoid changing response items.
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Table (iv): Experiences
Category Version 1 (n=ll) Version 2 (n-9) Version 3 (n=8) Version 4 (n=8)
Have you ever... How often have you...
Hallucination­
like
experiences
... heard sounds when there’s 
nothing around to explain 
them?
... heard sounds when there is no 
adequate explanation for them?
... heard voices when you 
know no-one’s around?
... heard voices when no-one’s around? ... heard voices when no one is around?
... seen things which other 
people don’t appear to see?
... seen things which other people cannot?
Paranormal
experiences
... seen a ghost? ... seen or sensed a ghost?
... had premonitions of events that have vet to take olace?
... sensed when a distant 
loved one is in trouble?
... sensed when a friend or family member was in trouble?
... felt as though you are 
looking down on your own 
body?
... had an out-of-body experience (e.g. felt as though you were looking down at your own 
body from above)?
... felt you could read other 
people’s thoughts?
-
... tried to move objects using 
the power of your mind?
-
... felt you know who’s 
ringing before you answer the 
phone?
... seen another person’s 
aura?
... seen an aura (i.e. a unique cloud of 
colours and light that surrounds a person 
or thing)?
... seen or sensed an extra-terrestrial 
being?
-
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Experiences of 
unfamiliarity
- .. .felt that familiar people all seem colder or more 
distant than before?
- ... felt that familiar objects appeared different even 
though you knew they hadn’t changed?
Table (v): Meta-beliefs
Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4
(n=2) (n=4) (n=4) (n=4)
Do you consider yourself... To what extent do you consider yourself...
... a superstitious person? ... superstitious (i.e. likely to believe certain events occur through mysterious or magical means)?
... religious? ... a religious person?
- ... tolerant of people with different beliefs?
- ... likely to believe in things that others do not?
